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Disclaimer 
 
The views in this report are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Ministry of Social Development. 
 
This report was authored prior to substantive changes to the Working for Families 
Programme.     
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Glossary of abbreviations and useful terminology 
 
abatement or taper  The process of gradually reducing the amount of a government 
payment as income increases. For example, an abatement of 
20% means that for every extra dollar earned above a given 
income level (threshold), the payment will reduce by 20 cents. 
An abatement of 100% means that for each extra dollar earned, 
the payment is reduced by a dollar. 
 
AS  Accommodation Supplement, housing costs assistance 
available to homeowners, boarders and renters not in Housing 
New Zealand Corporation houses. 
 
ATE  Average Treatment Effect, the impact that programme 
participation would have on an individual drawn randomly from 
the population. 
 
budget constraint  An accounting identity that describes the consumption options 
available to an agent with a limited income (or wealth) to 
allocate among various goods. 
 
CCS  Childcare Subsidy, a payment for low- and middle-income 
parents to subsidise the costs of childcare and early childhood 
education for pre-school children. It is available for up to 50 
hours a week for parents in work, education or training and for 
up to nine hours a week for other parents. CCS is paid directly 
to the childcare provider. 
 
CIA  Conditional independence assumption, the identifying 
assumption for matching and for the simple regression 
estimator, that if one can control for observable differences in 
characteristics between treated and non-treated groups, the 
outcome that would result in the absence of treatment is the 
same in both cases. 
 
counterfactual   Term used in non-experimental analysis of programme impacts 
to represent the equivalent of the control in an experiment. The 
control and counterfactual terms are used to describe the 
outcome of not undergoing treatment. 
 
CTC  Child tax credit, a per-child payment to families that existed 
prior to in-work payment; an additional payment to low- to 
middle-income families not receiving other assistance; to be 
replaced by in-work payment in 2006. 
 
EMTR  Effective marginal tax rate. The percentage reduction in the last 
dollar earned due to the additive effects of paying tax and also 
losing a portion of a government benefit or other assistance 
through abatement. For example, someone who has an 
effective marginal tax rate of 80% only gets 20 cents in the 
hand for every dollar earned. 
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endogenous   A term arising from econometric analysis, in which the value of 
one independent variable is correlated with the error term (ie 
dependent on the value of the error term). 
 
FACS  Families And Children Study, Great Britain. 
 
FES  Family Expenditure Survey, United Kingdom. 
 
FIA  Family income assistance, a general term covering financial 
assistance paid by the Ministry of Social Development and the 
Inland Revenue Department to qualifying families with 
dependent children; currently consists of family support, child 
tax credit, family tax credit and parental tax credit. 
 
FRS  Family Resources Survey, United Kingdom. 
 
FS  Family support, a per-child payment available to families 
whether in or out of work, to help with the costs of dependent 
children.  
 
FTC  Family tax credit, a payment per annum to families not in 
receipt of benefits to guarantee a minimum in-work income. 
 





These are the impacts a programme may have on outcomes 
and behaviour of non-participants; they come about when 
programmes affect outcomes and behaviour of non-participants 
as well as participants. To examine general equilibrium effects 
requires a general equilibrium framework, the opposite of that 
defined for partial equilibrium analysis (see definition of partial 
equilibrium).  
 
heterogeneous  Differing across groups (opposite of homogeneous). 
 
HNZ  Housing New Zealand Corporation. 
 
homogeneous  Identical across groups (opposite of heterogeneous). 
 
impact  The estimated effect of a programme on an outcome, eg 
employment, relative to what would have occurred in the 
absence of the programme. 
 
income distribution  A description of the fractions of a population that are at various 
levels of income. The larger are the differences in income, the 
“worse” the income distribution is usually said to be; the smaller 
the differences, the “better”. 
 
income effect (of a 
price change) 
Refers to the change in the quantity demanded of a product 
exclusively associated with a change in real income. The 
income effect can be either negative or positive depending on 
whether the good (product) under consideration is inferior or 
normal. 
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income smoothing  The reduction of variation in income over a period. 
 
indifference curve  A set of points with the same utility. That is, utility is constant 
along an indifference curve and the curve shows all the 
consumption bundles that yield the same utility. 
 
Invalid’s Benefit  A benefit for those who are permanently and severely restricted 
in their capacity to work or are blind. 
 
IRD  Inland Revenue Department. 
 
IV   Instrumental variables, an econometric method for non-
experimental data, to help recover the programme impact 
estimate. 
 
IWP  In-work payment, a per-family payment made to the principal 
carer to help parents move into and stay in paid work. 
 
JTPA  Job Training Partnership Act, United States. 
 
LATE  Local average treatment effect, the mean effect on those 
people whose participation changes as a result of a policy. 
 
LEED  Linked Employer–Employee Database, New Zealand. 
 
MATE  Marginal average treatment effect, the mean effect on those 
people whose participation changes where it is defined by a 
change in a policy variable that is not an instrumental variable 
(see definition of LATE). 
 
MSD  Ministry of Social Development, New Zealand. 
 




Similar to quasi-experimental methods, a term that is used in 
earlier literature. The underlying ideal is the experiment where 
both an experimental group and a control group are randomly 
selected from prospective participants. Hence, quasi- or non-
experimental methods attempt to find a satisfactory surrogate 
for the randomly selected control group when the control group 
is not actually randomly selected. 
 
ONE  The ONE pilots (formerly the “Single Work-Focused Gateway”) 
were launched in 1999 in the UK, to test the feasibility of 
different ways of delivering joined-up benefit and employment 
services – see Osgood et al. 2003. 
 
opportunity cost  The cost of consuming (using) a resource arises from the value 
of what it could be used for instead. The “opportunity cost” of a 
resource is the value of the next-highest-valued alternative use 
of that resource. 
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OSCAR  Out-of-school care and recreation subsidy, a childcare subsidy. 
This is a payment to low- and middle-income families in work, 
education or training to subsidise care for 5- to 13-year-olds 
outside of school hours. It is available for up to 20 hours a week 
during term-time and up to 50 hours a week during school 
holidays. An OSCAR subsidy is paid directly to the childcare 
provider.  
 
outcomes  Social and economic factors liable to be affected by a social 
programme, such as WFF, which analysts will often treat as 
dependent variables. 
 
partial equilibrium  Partial equilibrium analysis means that the effects of policy 
actions are examined only in the markets that are directly 
affected; it either ignores effects on other groups in the 
economy or assumes that the sector in question is very small 
and therefore has little, if any, impact on other sectors of the 
economy. Opposite of general equilibrium (see definition of 
general equilibrium effects). 
 
poverty trap  See definition of unemployment trap. 
 
PRILIF  Programme of Research Into Low-Income Families, a United 
Kingdom series of surveys that preceded Families and Children 
Study. 
 
PTC  Parental tax credit, financial assistance for the first 56 days 
after a child is born where paid parental leave is not taken. 
 
replacement ratio  A measure of incentives to work. It is the net income from 
benefits as a percentage of net income from work. If it were 
possible to receive as much from benefits as from work (a 
replacement ratio of 100%), the motivation to work would be 
much reduced. 
 
reservation wage  The lowest wage rate for which a person will supply labour to 
the market. Below that wage, the person will not supply labour. 
 
selection bias  Bias resulting from the self-selection of individuals to participate 
in an activity or survey or as a subject in an experimental study; 
may also arise if participants are selected non-randomly by 
others, such as programme administrators. 
 
SOLO  The Ministry of Social Development’s client activity 
management system. 
 
special benefit  A supplementary benefit available on the grounds of financial 
hardship to both benefit recipients and non-benefit recipients, 
who are unable to meet their essential needs and commitments 
from their income and other sources. 
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substitution effect 
(of a price change) 
Refers to the change in the quantity demanded of a product 
resulting exclusively from a change in its price when the 
consumer’s real income is held constant. The substitution effect 
is always negative as it changes in the opposite direction to the 
change in price. 
 
SUTVA  Stable unit treatment value assumption, an assumption that the 
impact of the programme on one person does not depend on 
whom else, or on how many others, is/are in the programme. 
 
SWIFTT  The Ministry of Social Development’s client payroll system. 
 
SWN  Social welfare number, a unique number used as an identifier 
for an individual’s contact and payments with the Ministry of 
Social Development. 
 
taper  See definition of abatement. 
 
TAS  Temporary additional support, which replaces special benefit for 
new hardship applicants from 1 April 2006. 
 
TAXMOD  Treasury micro simulation model, a computer simulation model 
of the New Zealand population, mainly concerned with income, 
tax and benefit data. It is maintained by the New Zealand 
Treasury. 
 
TT  The average effect of treatment on the treated, the impact that 
programme participation has on individuals who actually 
participated. 
 
UB  Unemployment benefit, a benefit paid to adults who are able to 
work but unable to find employment. Other income, including 
from part-time, temporary or seasonal work, is allowed: an 
individual claimant and their partner can earn up to $80 a week 
(before tax) between them before benefit is affected. When 
earnings are more than this, the deduction is usually 70c for 
each dollar over the $80 limit. Any income will also affect any 
other payments (deductions vary). 
 





A name for the phenomenon by which taxation and welfare 
systems jointly contribute to keep people on social insurance. 
This is also known as the poverty trap in the United Kingdom. 
 
WFF  Working For Families, programme of changes to 
accommodation, out-of-work and in-work assistance introduced 
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1  Introduction to the purpose of this paper 
 
The methodological review is the second part of the evaluation research 
commissioned by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in 2005 to help in the 
preparation of the evaluation of the Working for Families (WFF) programme. This 
review enumerates the key evaluation questions identified by MSD as central to their 
policy concerns and considers how the features of WFF could affect evaluation. It 
details the methodological and data requirements that must be addressed in order to 
meet the four key evaluation objectives, namely:  
·  tracking and evaluating the implementation and delivery of WFF 
·  identifying changes in entitlement take-up and reasons for it 
·  establishing the impact of WFF on employment-related outcomes  
·  assessing WFF’s effect on net income and quality of life more generally.  
 
The methodological review complements the literature review by reviewing 
evaluations from around the world that are pertinent to WFF. An overview of 
evaluation methods is provided, concentrating on particular issues that arise within 
the WFF context. 
 
Section 2 focuses on implementation and delivery. Section 3 covers the issues 
related to take-up and entitlement and their evaluation. Section 4 discusses the 
evaluation methodologies that can be used in evaluating programmes such as WFF 
and introduces the data requirements they entail. Making work pay is the focus of 
section 5. Finally, section 6 examines hardship and poverty, living standards and 
wellbeing.  
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2  Implementation and delivery 
 
There are a number of issues to address in relation to implementation and delivery. 
The specific questions raised in the monitoring framework document relate to: 
1.  the effectiveness of changes to systems, processes and procedures in delivering 
WFF to clients  
2.  whether business processes and procedures deliver WFF to target groups 
effectively and, if not, what the barriers are 
3.  the impact of WFF delivery on the agencies themselves and their ability to deliver 
other agency outcomes 
4.  the impact of policies and processes on take-up 
5.  whether groups who “access” assistance differ from those who do not, and why 
6.  the effectiveness of inter-agency co-operation. 
 
The information sought for each of these four broad sub-programmes is fairly similar 
and relates to: 
·  application processes 
·  resourcing 
·  barriers and facilitators to implementation 
·  clients’ experiences. 
 
The intention is to get this information through a mixture of documentary evidence, 
interviews with implementation team members, surveys of MSD and IRD staff, and 
administrative data – some of which has been set up specifically to monitor the 
implementation of WFF. 
 
This section will consider issues 1, 2, 3 and 6 noted above; issues 4 and 5 will be 
addressed in section 3.  
 
2.1  The descriptive and evaluative tasks for the WFF evaluation 
 
Policymakers devise programmes such as WFF in the hope that the policy 
instruments will be implemented in the field as originally designed. To establish 
whether this in fact happens, they frequently commission evaluation research to 
establish what happened in the process of implementation. Central questions posed 
in such research are “Was everything implemented as planned?” and “Did the eligible 
population receive what they were entitled to receive?”. These are essentially 
descriptive questions.  
 
Policymakers also want to know what happened and, if it differed from what was 
anticipated, why it differed. These questions can be addressed through qualitative 
research identifying what happened, and what people thought about what was 
happening during the implementation process. Key informants are usually staff at 
different levels in administering organisations, contracted providers of services and 
“clients” with experience of applying for assistance. These questions can also be 
addressed through quantitative analysis of monitoring data, which establishes 
whether key indicators of the process are going in the anticipated direction.  
 
2.2  The meaning of delivery “effectiveness” 
 
“Effectiveness” is referred to in three of the six issues identified above, but the 
meaning of “effective” is open to interpretation. It is usually deployed as a “relative”    
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rather than an “absolute” concept, so that the question is normally posed with some 
implicit comparison in mind. The benchmark might be expectations of some sort, 
relative to past performance, or perhaps the degree to which delivery meets a 
specific target. It might be reasonable to assume that delivery has been effective if 
the poverty reduction targets are met or if the take-up of assistance among those 
eligible is 100%. However, it is less clear that these outcome-oriented measures can 
deliver definitive answers to the “effectiveness” question when targets are missed: 
how far below 100% does take-up have to be before evaluators suggest delivery has 
been “ineffective”? As take-up is unlikely to be close to 100%, it will be advantageous 
for the evaluation to adopt explicit targets or use international benchmarks for take-up 




The monitoring framework poses effectiveness questions at different levels: at the 
level of sub-programmes and systems, the level of the whole programme, for 
individual agencies and for “networks” arising from inter-agency co-operation. 
Establishing the effectiveness of the programme and its constituent parts might be 
readily quantifiable, but “agency” and “network” effectiveness imply more qualitative 
assessments of effectiveness, along the lines of “Are things working effectively 
enough?”. 
 
Turning specifically to the question of the effectiveness of changes to systems, 
processes and procedures in delivering WFF to clients, it is necessary to establish 
whether new and “re-engineered” systems deliver administrative outputs to a level 
prescribed or anticipated in business plans or to a level that exceeds performance in 
the pre-programme period. Fundamental to any appraisal of changes along these 
dimensions are: 
·  a clear understanding of what business processes were supposed to accompany 
WFF  
·  a knowledge of how they differed from the previous regime 
·  information on procedural outcomes before and after the introduction of WFF. 
 
2.2.1  “Hard” and “soft” measures 
 
There are two broad types of administrative “effectiveness” measures, loosely 
described as “hard” and “soft”.  
 
“Hard” measures are quantifiable indicators, such as the number of applications, the 
number of transactions, the number of errors per task, the size of errors made and 
time to process applications. These are standard measures in relation to accurate 
payments, but the information systems that generate them are not usually accessible 
for evaluation purposes. “Hard” measures from administrative systems can be 
configured in a variety of ways to obtain insights into different aspects of 
performance. For example, information on the number of tasks performed and time 
taken to perform them may be used as the basis for productivity estimates. If these 
outcomes are expressed in terms of labour input or costs, they can indicate labour 
productivity. Accounting for the number or size of errors in processing activities or 
applications can give measures of the quality of service provided.  
 
One of the difficulties with this data is that monitoring processes are not usually 
sophisticated enough to identify variation in time or cost per task across individual 
staff, regions or time. Instead, dedicated “time-and-motion” studies are performed to 
establish the relationship between inputs and outputs at a particular moment in time 
                                                  
1 Evans et al. (2006).    
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for a subset of tasks. These relationships are then used as benchmark indicators 
against which to test performance, or are simply taken as “given”. This is problematic 
because there is great variance in procedures and practices across individual staff, 
teams, offices, regions and time.  
 
The second set of outcomes is the “softer” measures based on survey respondents’ 
impressions of what, if anything, has changed and their attitudes towards the change. 
Measured staff perceptions can be meaningful evidence of change to processes 
where programme decisions are made by staff. Hence, there is a role for both hard 
and soft measures. Soft measures are discussed in relation to staff surveys in section 
2.5.2. 
 
2.3  “Barriers” to effective implementation  
 
A simple descriptive analysis of patterns of administrative inputs and outputs may 
indicate substantial variance across the administration of WFF. It might be assumed 
that this variance translates into variance in performance. Variance may indeed be 
associated with the quality and experience of front-line staff who deal with clients, 
office-level management and leadership, and the quality of guidance, all of which are 
amenable to optimisation through lesson learning. However, variance may also stem 
from the profile of clients and from the stage of the administrative intervention (from 
the impetus of a new policy drive through to the neglect characterising the period 
before policy replacement).  
 
It is difficult to isolate the factors that drive variance. Unless there is a systemic failure 
to deliver – as might occur with general information technology failures, which are 
immediately apparent – the best way to address “barriers” to implementation is to 
investigate variance in administrative outcomes across agencies, offices and staff. 
This implies there may be many lessons embedded in the analysis of within-office 
and across-office variance of administrative outcomes. This analysis might allow 
MSD to optimise its deployment of resources. However, acquiring this knowledge 
entails rigorous monitoring procedures over time and place, and depends on 
administrators’ preparedness to see their performance scrutinised by evaluators 
intent on raising standards of administration.  
 
There is a body of US evidence on local differences in delivery. Analysis of across-
office and within-office variance in inputs and outcomes is an important part of 
describing sub-group impacts. This is true even in the US, where offices can have 
substantial autonomy in their deployment of resources and may be heavily penalised 
financially if they perform poorly relative to targets or other offices. Nevertheless, 
there is clear evidence from the US that the quality of provision and the nature of 
delivery are critical in determining the success of welfare-to-work programmes 
(Evans 2001). For instance, useful information is found for California’s Greater 
Avenues for Independence (GAIN) programme. Both the Riverside version of the 
programme, with its emphasis on work-first, and the Alameda version, with its strong 
encouragement for clients to enter education, were consistent with the overall GAIN 
framework, but that framework was flexible. The extent of permitted discretion in such 
cases means that between-site variations cannot necessarily be reduced to a matter 
of service intensity, as they can operate along different dimensions. Riccio and 
Orenstein (1996) discriminate between GAIN sites in terms of personalised attention 
and in terms of enforcement including the use of sanctions. In a more extensive    
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JOBS
2 evaluation in Atlanta, Bloom et al. (2001 and 2003) use a “quick job entry” 
scale, personalised attention and monitoring among their discriminators. In the 
Michigan PRWORA
3 study by Sandfort et al. (1998), an emphasis on focused job 
search assistance was found to have a negative relationship with aggregated 
employment outcomes, while the use of workshops to enhance job search skills was 
found to have a positive relationship. 
 
For the WFF evaluation, the above experiences indicate that a wide range of 
variables need to be taken into account when modelling variations in public service 
outcomes (Lynn et al. 2000). The particular selection of variables and the way in 
which they are used to frame hypotheses remain matters for judgement in the 
context of WFF.  
 
Three lessons have been learned from evidence to date. First, there is substantial 
across-region and across-office variance in the way programmes are administered 
and in the quality of service delivered (White 2004, Evans et al. 2002). Second, little 
is known about why these differences exist and, oftentimes, persist. However, there 
are exceptions. For instance, it is well known that some urban centres run 
programmes poorly because job opportunities beyond the agency mean agency 
wage rates are insufficient to retain staff, resulting in implementation problems 
associated with staff turnover and staff inexperience (Bryson and Jacobs 1992). It is 
also well established that rural areas often suffer from a dearth of job, training or 
childcare opportunities and, as such, place major constraints on the ability of 
programmes to run to their full potential (Bryson and Jacobs 1992). Third, evaluators 
scrutinising staff motivations and actions find they often operate within a “social” 
model that seeks to maximise what they perceive to be the client’s welfare, 
regardless of the rules laid down in statute or regulations (Bryson and Jacobs 1992). 
This is often interpreted by economists as behaviour consistent with maximising their 
own utility as staff, which they derive from the feeling of “doing good” rather than from 
following procedures. As a consequence, some studies find staff discretion militates 
against positive employment impacts (Frölich et al. 2003, Smith 2000). 
 
A number of implementation and delivery factors other than those relating to office 
and administrative practices influence the success or failure of programmes such as 
WFF. The key factors are listed in Box 2.1. In the case of WFF, issues such as “who 
gets what”, “when to intervene” and appropriate programme design are largely 
formalised and may not be amenable to alteration, even if they are creating 
difficulties for implementation and delivery.  
 
                                                  
2 The centrepiece of the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
Training (JOBS) programme, which requires eligible recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) to participate in educational, job training and work experience, or job search activities, 
in order to reduce welfare dependency and to promote self-sufficiency. 
3 In the US, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 
ended the federal guarantee of cash assistance and replaced the AFDC programme with the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme.    
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Box 2.1  Implementation and delivery factors influencing programme success 
 
Who gets what? 
 
·  those in receipt of payments v. those eligible not in receipt 
·  sub-groups of the population receiving payments (unemployed people, sole 
parents, sick and disabled people) 
 
 
When to intervene? 
 
·  short-term v. long-term unemployed 
·  younger v. older workers 
·  conducive economic conditions 
·  pilot before national roll-out v. pilot to test whether viable at all 
 
 
Where to intervene?  
 
·  national v. local schemes 
·  rural versus urban 
 
 
Who will deliver the programme? 
 
·  agency collaboration 
·  who will lead? 
·  public v. private provision 
·  local discretion versus central control 





·  carrot v. stick (compulsion for eligible groups or selective use of sanctions) 
·  sequencing of elements in the programme 
·  components to be delivered (job search, training, job creation, subsidies) 
 
 
Financing the policy 
 
·  how to pay (windfall tax, spending review, matching funds from elsewhere) 
·  incentives to succeed (output-related funding) 
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2.3.1  Who delivers the programme and how 
 
There may be more scope to manoeuvre who delivers the programme and how. 
Recent literature has devoted considerable attention to two aspects of who delivers; 
the role of the private sector and the role of inter-agency collaboration. Private sector 
provision has been piloted in a number of schemes in Britain (eg Employment Zones 
– see Hasluck et al. 2003 and Hales et al. 2003 – and the ONE programme – see 
Osgood et al. 2003), the Netherlands and Australia.
4 This interest comes from the 
belief that efficiency gains may be made through the deployment of commercial 
managerial and systems knowledge.  
 
More broadly, there has been interest in overcoming communications difficulties, 
information technology problems and “cultural” barriers to implementation by 
formalising network structures among the agencies involved in different parts of the 
delivery process. In the case of WFF, delivery partners include government 
departments and their agencies (MSD, IRD, Treasury), local authorities, voluntary 
agencies and providers of formal childcare. This, in turn, has raised issues regarding 
optimal contracting arrangements.  
 
2.3.2  Local discretion 
 
Another theme emerging from recent literature is the degree to which delivery should 
be controlled from the centre (see Department for Work and Pensions 2004). There 
is a growing belief that programmes can be run more effectively within a 
decentralised service delivery model – where offices have some degree of autonomy 
in deploying resources as they see fit – since this can correspond with the dictates of 
local circumstances and staff suggestions. Interest has extended to consider the 
degree to which local offices are cost or profit centres whose budgets are dependent, 
at least in part, on performance (Barnow and Smith (2004) give a good discussion of 
the role of performance standards). However, local-level variance in delivery has 
prompted some concerns about the need for standardisation of delivery where the 
service relates to the prompt and accurate payment of credits or benefits set down in 
law. Issues also arise with respect to equity across applicants for assistance, since 
what is on offer, and whether similar individuals are offered it, may become a 
“postcode lottery” where entitlements are denied or overridden by local factors. 
 
2.3.3  Performance incentives 
 
There is also growing interest in maximising the “added value” of the staff working 
with clients through appropriately crafted financial incentives and by increasing the 
ambit for discretion. Once again, however, problems can arise. Financial incentives, 
either at individual, team or office level, may induce both negative and positive 
behavioural responses from staff. Movements away from a “rules-based” orientation 
towards discretion may empower staff and permit them to become more “client” 
focused instead of being “target” focused (“rule-bound”). However, this may lead to 
better outcomes only where staff are appropriately trained and capable of making 
reasonable judgements about an applicant’s best interests.  
 
Research for the US indicates that local offices respond to performance standards, 
but that short-term incentive structures often produce perverse long-term outcomes 
(Heckman et al. 2002).  
 
                                                  
4 For an OECD overview, see Struyven 2004 and Grubb 2004.     
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For WFF, it might be worth investigating the impact of existing performance 
incentives. In particular, attention could be given to the issue of “cream skimming”
5 
and the impact of staff treatment on the outcomes of those who are not targeted for 
treatment. 
 
2.4  Delivery and implementation issues specific to WFF  
 
The issues noted here exclude those relating to identifying the eligible populations 
and take-up, which are covered in section 3. 
 
2.4.1  Systems co-ordination across MSD and IRD 
 
WFF may face information technology-related issues. The fact that WFF is jointly 
administered by IRD and MSD introduces the issue of systems co-ordination across 
departments. These co-ordination issues may be particularly important for the 20,000 
or so “double-dippers”
6 in receipt of family income assistance from both MSD and 
IRD (IRD Data Warehouse Report of 2 December 2004), but will also be important for 
those eligibles moving onto and off income-tested payments, and thus into and out of 
MSD administrative responsibility. New procedures designed specifically to improve 
co-ordination between MSD and IRD with the aim of avoiding delays and 
overpayment/underpayment (eg the information exchange project between the 
agencies), means there is some compatibility between the computer systems. A 
further safeguard is that FIA details are stored in IRD’s tax administration data 
system. 
 
2.4.2  Debt problems 
 
Debts can accrue when beneficiaries are overpaid, an issue that is usually identified 
when the IRD “squares up” at the end of the fiscal year. FIA debt rose between 1999 
and 2002. The subsequent fall was due to IRD writing off debt and, from 2003, 
“proactive actions”, whereby actual income is matched to expected income. 
Nevertheless, FIA debt
7 totalled $141 million in 2004 (Crown Revenue Statistics 
2004, cited at 07.03 in MSD (2005c)). Debt also accrues through the Childcare 
Subsidy. WFF includes efforts to minimise the risk of debt, including ring-fencing 
Family Support, introducing a weekly payment option, automating information 
exchange between MSD and IRD, and using more proactive actions. The MSD debt 
department has also started to bill parents for overpayment. Given the difficulties low-
income families face in servicing debt, this may be a high monitoring priority. There is 
scope to include questions related to debt, perhaps by survey, when evaluating 
hardship, living standards and wellbeing (see section 6.4).  
 
2.4.3  Monitoring provision by contractors 
 
Social programmes such as WFF involve government agencies contracting with 
private agencies for the delivery of a range of services. Methods for monitoring 
delivery and implementation usually form part of the contract for the provision of 
services and reflect compromises based on perceptions of what is “do-able” and 
what is affordable. Government analysts and evaluators usually have to spend some 
                                                  
5 Cream skimming relates to selection; in this context, it is where service providers face a strong 
incentive to seek out those whose needs can be most easily met or can be met at the least cost 
compared with others eligible. 
6 Note that “double-dippers” are not those who are overpaid, but those who illegitimately get Family 
Support payments from both IRD and MSD.  
7 FIA debt accrues when overpayments are not repaid by the end-of-year tax-due date.    
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time to understand fully what these monitoring procedures cover, how they cover it 
and what they omit. This is often an onerous task. In WFF, perhaps the area most 
affected is childcare provision, which poses data challenges, as discussed in section 
2.5.3. 
 
2.4.4  Interactions with other programmes 
 
Competing and complementary programmes run alongside WFF. These programmes 
may interact with WFF in ways that affect its implementation and delivery – in 
particular localities or time frames or more generally.  
 
For instance, monitoring of WFF childcare subsidies will need to take account of 
other changes to the funding of early childhood education from April 2005. These 
changes include free early childhood education for three- and four-year-olds, which 
will be delivered from July 2007 through Ministry of Education bulk funding of 
providers.
8 Fees will not be charged for the first 20 hours of care for eligible children: 
no childcare subsidy is payable in this case, so places and carers providing such 
care may be invisible to those monitoring WFF. In cases such as this, it is important 
to establish what was happening before the change and what happened afterwards.  
 
However, at best, one could estimate the impact of increasing the overall funding for 
childcare. Distinguishing between the impact of (increased) subsidies and bulk 
funding would be difficult, if not impossible, particularly as:  
·  subsidies and bulk grants have been available for a number of years, although 
the level of funding for both is increasing  
·  most children who attend kindergartens (which provide part-time, sessional, early 
childhood education) already receive free provision, and kindergartens account 
for just over 40% of the 98% of three- and four-year-old children who attend some 
form of early childhood education.  
 
The other key issue that will make it hard to estimate the impact of WFF on childcare 
use is the intention to raise the quality of care. On one hand, this could make 
childcare more expensive and therefore less accessible. On the other hand, an 
increase in quality could lead to an increase in participation, as quality is known to 
have a considerable positive influence on parents’ decision to use formal childcare. 
 
2.5  Data challenges and opportunities  
 
The above discussion suggests the need for data to describe the implementation 
processes, to identify barriers and facilitators to implementation and delivery, and to 
measure inputs in order to establish resource implications in optimising delivery. This 
section considers how existing and new data might help shed light on these issues. 
 
2.5.1  Using existing administrative data 
 
In principle, administrative data can perform a range of functions crucial in tracking 
the implementation and delivery of WFF, including: 
·  monitoring the movement of existing beneficiaries (the “stock”) from the “old” 
regime onto WFF 
·  measuring the inflow of new recipients (the “flow”) onto WFF 
                                                  
8 It is estimated that this will save MSD $15 million per year (email correspondence, J Marney, MSD, 
December 2004).    
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·  identifying the churn in the WFF client population as individuals/households leave 
and re-enter WFF or move between MSD and IRD jurisdiction 
·  recording the delays between application and receipt of WFF payments 
·  recording the sums received by applicants 
·  identifying which types of person/household obtain which combination of 
payments 
·  identifying where beneficiaries go on leaving WFF. 
 
Analyses can be undertaken at an aggregated level to discern patterns relating to 
geographical, administrative, payment receipt or other indicators. Analyses may also 
be conducted at the level of individuals or households, in cross-section, through 
repeat cross-sectional snapshots or even longitudinally (where there is almost 
continuous observation of an individual’s status and circumstances). Administrative 
data may be used for other purposes too, such as identifying the percentage of 
invalid benefit recipients capable of working at least 15 hours per week. As discussed 
in section 3, administrative data will also be crucial in identifying eligibility for WFF 
and estimating take-up.  
 
However, there are many problems in configuring administrative data for evaluation 
purposes because this data was not originally intended for evaluation. Furthermore, 
even where practical constraints can be overcome, there may be legal and ethical 
issues in making full use of this data. We return to these issues in sections 3–6 in the 




The first issue is total data absence. A number of administrative innovations in WFF, 
such as the national network of childcare co-ordinators, are departures from the 
previous system, so new administrative systems may be needed to track their 
implementation and delivery. 
 
Also, some agencies may never have been required to retain data permitting 
evaluation. This is often a problem with childcare providers. Although licensed and 
certified childcare providers are required to submit attendance schedules on a weekly 
basis to trigger reimbursement, a quality control system for this data has yet to be 
implemented. The lack of data relating to unlicensed providers, who may move into 




A second issue relates to the format in which data is held. Administrative data is not 
usually amenable to analysis using standard statistical packages because it is held 
on dedicated systems designed to generate simple aggregate-level data. This seems 
to be the case, for instance, with SWIFTT, the client payroll system, which is currently 
used to produce 250 tables. SWIFTT has very rich data on payment recipients’ 
demographics, payment details and partners, but the data is not in a format that 
allows analysis of the microdata, and the database’s supporting documentation is 
complex. The IRD administrative data can be analysed through the IRD data 
warehouse, but fully utilising such data requires a considerable investment of time 
and effort.  
 
Partial data 
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In addition, data is often partial. A complete picture of payment receipt usually entails 
data-matching across administrative data-sets. For instance, MSD can track family 
income assistance payments but only for families with a core benefit whose income 
threshold is below a certain amount. IRD administers FIA payments for the eligible 
population whose gross household income is greater than $20,356, so a complete 
picture requires matching of the two data-sets. This requires legal and administrative 
permissions and unique identifiers on both data-sets. In most instances, data relates 
to successful applications only, so administrative data rarely contains sufficient 
information on the eligible population. Data is also often partial because it consists of 
records at individual rather than household level: households need to be constructed 
using identifiers linking adults and children. More on these last two points are found 
in section 3. 
 
Data error and imputations 
 
Data is often “dirty”. Administrative systems make up for historical inadequacies in 
data through imputation procedures that can introduce systematic measurement 
errors with respect to variables, such as the start and end dates of receiving a 
payment/benefit and the destination on leaving receipt. 
 
In the UK, independent analysts have been heavily involved in the construction and 
configuration of administratively based data-sets for the purpose of evaluating 
welfare programmes. This has given them an intimate knowledge of the limitations 
and pitfalls in using the data, improving their chances of analysing the data in an 
appropriate manner. It may be possible to develop this relationship with analysts in 
New Zealand. 
 
Using administrative data for identifying problems in implementation and delivery  
 
Analysts usually identify problems in implementation and delivery phases by 
checking patterns in data (delays, payment levels, uneven flows of recipients) at the 
office, district or region level. Thus, office or area identifiers are used as proxies for 
administrative variance. It is rare to obtain information offering a more precise fit – for 
example, in the form of individual staff caseloads and the number of staff and grading 
levels within offices. However, the availability of staff caseloads and other staff 
delivery variables might improve understanding of what is generating variance.  
 
2.5.2  Generating new data 
 
It is unlikely that new administrative data sources will be created purely to track WFF 
implementation and delivery. However, as suggested above, it may be necessary to 
do this with respect to childcare providers; in any event, much may be done to 
reconfigure existing data in this area. New data is necessary, however, to obtain 
clearer information on detailed processes of delivery and to obtain insights from 
those administering the system to help establish linkages between what WFF is 
delivering and the administrative systems underpinning it. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative surveys of staff 
 
As this is a very broad topic, a brief overview only of the key points is presented. 
Qualitative and quantitative surveys of staff are a good way of establishing whether a 
policy has been implemented in practice and, if not, why not and what is happening 
instead. Information from these surveys may complement information from “hard” 
measures, but should be able to go further in understanding the mechanisms 
underlying observed outcomes. That is, the surveys should elicit information that    
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explains why implementation is taking place as it is. They are one of the best ways of 
exploring the extent of inter-agency co-operation and the institutional limitations on it. 
Bloom et al. (2003) and Riccio and Orenstein (1996) use staff surveys to identify local 
effects (see earlier discussion in section 2.3).  
 
Staff are also in a good position to evaluate whether or not changes in delivery are 
valuable, either in policy terms or in respondents’ own terms. They may, for example, 
identify unintended positive or negative effects of administrative changes.  
 
One of the consequences of programme change is the impact it has on staff as 
workers, in terms of workloads, motivation and job satisfaction. Assuming staff are 
important agents of change, changes in staff work methods and practices can be a 
useful early indicator of whether a programme is “bedding down” well or not. Staff 
surveys might also be able to indicate why staff are, or are not, “buying into” the new 




There are some obvious limits to what can be learned from staff surveys and self-
report measures. A vast quantity of research exists on the limitations of the design of 
these questionnaires: see, for example, Anastasi (1976) or Oppenheim (1966).
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There may be systematic biases in responses if staff have ulterior motives for giving 
particular answers. For instance, they may stress the increased burden laid upon 
them, in the hope that extra resources will be forthcoming. The views of staff may be 
partial, either because they may be recently appointed to their role or because they 
see only a part of the programme. If there is a divergence of views on, for example, 
the advent or extensiveness of changes, the analyst may not know what weight to 
attach to opposing views.  
 
As with all subjective evaluative measures, there can be problems with interpersonal 
comparability (Manski 2004). If respondent A rates a change as “very effective” and 
respondent B rates it “quite effective”, how do we know that A is rating it higher than 
B and how do we know they are using comparable definitions of effectiveness? There 
are, however, means of overcoming some of these measurement difficulties using 
probabilistic measurements of expectation (Manski 2004). Also, panel surveys (which 
are repeated surveys of the same subjects) or longitudinal qualitative measures of 
individuals can help net out any fixed effect of being a “high” or “low” rater for 
individual-specific reasons, such as being an optimist or a pessimist.  
 
The systematic recording of staff actions on a database
11 may provide more 
coverage and accurate data than surveys. Finally, surveys can be expensive.  
 
2.5.3  Data for evaluating the implementation and delivery of Childcare Subsidies 
 
Monitoring the way Childcare Subsidies are implemented and delivered is a 
particularly important issue. There is real uncertainty about the impact of WFF on the 
demand for and supply of childcare and little data currently available with which to 
monitor the effect.  
 
                                                  
9 The human resource management literature is replete with studies identifying the human resource 
prerequisites to effective organisational change. Most invoke models making causal linkages to worker 
perceptions of their working environment, the impact these have on their levels of commitment and 
satisfaction, and outcomes in terms of labour turnover, productivity and so on. 
10 A useful brief review of concerns with self-report measures can be found in Razavi (2001). 
11 Typical staff actions that could be recorded might be “referred the client to a job”, “referred the client 
to a training programme” or “gave the client information about WFF”.    
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In order to gain an understanding of how increased Childcare Subsidies influence the 
behaviour of families and childcare services, surveys covering parents and providers 
would be required. 
 
The proposed Longitudinal Study of New Zealand Children and Families will 
undoubtedly be invaluable in tracking families’ experiences of childcare (for instance, 
cost, convenience, quality and take-up). There is also a plan to repeat the Childcare 
Survey carried out in 1998, which would also be very useful in exploring parents’ 
perspectives on this issue. For example, these surveys could assess the roles that 
information on childcare services and funding play in influencing parents’ childcare 
choices; explore parents’ views on childcare quality, affordability, accessibility and 
flexibility, and the extent to which services meet their needs (particularly in terms of 
opening hours, as these could considerably constrain parents’ employment options); 
and assess how subsidies influence parents’ childcare choices – for example, 
whether they enable or encourage families to use different types of non-parental 
care, substitute informal care with formal provision and/or switch to a more expensive 
service. 
 
On the supply side, the proposed survey of childcare service providers (as put 
forward by MSD in the draft WFF evaluation plan) will help with the following: 
 
·  Identify how childcare providers adapt their systems to WFF, including differential 
pricing between those eligible and ineligible for WFF. This issue will have to be 
explored in conjunction with changes aimed at increasing childcare quality, as 
these are also likely to affect fee levels.  
 
·  Establish the constraints on providers recruiting additional staff to increase 
capacity (including those generated by recent government requirements for more 
registered staff). 
 
·  Understand the change, if any, in the quality and quantity of childcare supply; in 
particular, whether there has been a net increase in the number of childcare 
places. A robust assessment of childcare quality would require researchers to 
visit childcare settings and collect data on different aspects of child–staff 
interaction, as this is one of the key determinants of quality; any other means 
would provide a rather “weak” measure of quality.  
 
·  Establish whether new childcare places have been filled by the eligible population 
and, if so, whether this has been at the expense of the ineligible population; or 
whether some providers might be reluctant, for whatever reason, to offer places 
to eligibles, and the reasons for eligible families not being attractive to some 
providers.  
 
·  Establish if providers have targeted WFF-subsidised families for additional places 
and why – for example, whether this decision was driven by the provider’s 
ethos/aims or profit focus. 
 
·  Establish if services have become more responsive to parents’ needs – for 
example, in relation to opening hours and the flexibility of the service.  
 
·  Explore issues around sustainability and financial viability, and the role of 
subsidies and bulk grants in relation to these. 
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·  Look at changes in the quantity, type and quality of provision among different 
types of service – for example, early childhood education and out-of-school 
childcare, group and home-based services, in the voluntary and private sectors. 
 
It would be useful to use this survey, or data on providers, to examine the availability 
and price of childcare services on an area basis in order to identify any local 
differences.  
 
There may be difficulties obtaining a sampling frame for such a survey. MSD can 
identify childcare providers from payment of the subsidy to providers. However, this 
information will necessarily exclude providers who have not received subsidies, yet 
data on these providers may be crucial to understand the configuration of care in 
localities, including demand for and supply of that care. It would be very useful for the 
survey to cover all licensed providers
12 to compare the experiences of services that 
receive the subsidies and those that do not. For example, the survey could assess 
how the availability (or lack) of subsidies might affect services’ ability to be more 
responsive to parents’ needs; might increase childcare quality or target those groups 
with poorer access to childcare; and might affect attitudes towards the service being 
open to subsidised children perhaps because of cultural issues such as köhanga reo 
or towards private providers in high-income areas.  
 
There might also be issues about the nature of such a survey and whether it is 
necessary to conduct visits and face-to-face interviews to establish the extent to 
which the care provided is commensurate with WFF subsidies paid. There is some 
monitoring of whether the children actually attend when subsidies have been 
received for them by providers. However, it is likely to be very difficult for a survey to 
collect this kind of data. 
 
To establish the extent of childcare supply, MSD is reliant on the Ministry of 
Education’s Annual Census of Childcare Service Providers. The census can provide 
information on the number of early childhood service providers by region, population 
density and hours of operation. It might be convenient to add questions to this 
census and link the survey of childcare providers to it. Using a census that was 
conducted before WFF was introduced and one conducted afterwards, it might be 
possible to establish whether the introduction of WFF corresponds to an increase in 
formal licensed provision. One would need to determine how to isolate any WFF 
effect from the effects of other ongoing policy changes (see section 2.4.4).  
 
MSD plans to use documentary analysis and interviews with implementation teams to 
track implementation and delivery of WFF childcare services. It might be worth 
including in this analysis other administrators who may not have direct responsibility 
for implementing WFF, to see whether they have a different view of the process. The 
interviews were scheduled for Spring 2005 and Spring 2006 to establish changes 
following increases in rates of subsidy in October 2005.  
 
The number of childcare co-ordinators is a potentially useful indicator of programme 
delivery progress, potential awareness and take-up, since the nationwide network of 
Work and Income childcare co-ordinators is the part of the programme planned to 
increase awareness and take-up of subsidies. If few co-ordinators have been 
established in this network, this may point to delivery problems, which may in turn 
limit awareness and take-up. Childcare co-ordinators can provide a crucial source of 
data on implementation, with the evaluation tapping into the data they collect 
                                                  
12 Although those who receive the subsidies could be oversampled (eg through screening) if it were not 
possible to identify them in advance.    
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routinely in their jobs. This can help identify the nature of providers and waiting lists. 
It usually saves a great deal of time if thought can be given to the data collection 
processes and data storage formats before co-ordinators “invent” their own systems. 
In this way, it is possible to standardise the items collected and to analyse them 
systematically. 
 
It is important to include in this element of the evaluation those who have 
responsibility for co-ordinating and supporting childcare services at the local level 
and for providing “market intelligence” to providers who want to set up a new service 
or expand an existing one. This would help in understanding the influences on 
providers’ behaviour and how these interact with the availability of subsidies and 
result in different outcomes (eg in relation to quantity, quality and type of provision, 
childcare fees and target groups).  
 
2.5.4  Data for evaluating the implementation and delivery of Accommodation 
Supplement and In-Work Payment 
 
MSD and Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZ) are reliant on SWIFTT to identify 
the number of Accommodation Supplement (AS) beneficiaries, the size of their 
payments and the non-benefit income they receive. This data might indicate the way 
AS changes are “bedding down”, particularly with respect to the amount of debt 
incurred through overpayment. More detailed information will, however, come from 
document analysis and interviews with implementation team members, together with 
a survey of WFF case managers. Baseline data was taken in March 2005 and, in the 
case of the survey of WFF case managers, will be updated regularly.  
 
An important aspect of the evaluation will be the experience of the call centres 
managing enquiries and applications. Monitoring of call-centre activity is 
sophisticated, so monitoring the number and nature of calls, waiting times and other 
indicators should be straightforward. It will be more difficult to assess the quality of 
advice and assistance given by call-centre staff and to identify barriers to improving 
their performance. This may require a dedicated staff survey or other anonymous 
checks, such as a mystery shopper exercise.  
 
Similar approaches are proposed for In-Work Payment (IWP), and similar issues 
arise with respect to the quality of service and access to advisers. However, some 
issues will require particular attention, since IRD administers this payment. These will 
include methods of delivering IWP to those who are working and not receiving other 
payments. 
 
2.5.5  The potential value of laboratory experiments 
 
There are other innovative ways of identifying why a programme is being 
implemented in the way that it is, and how to improve the performance of 
administrators and systems. One only recently applied in the field of social policy 
administration is laboratory experimentation. This is covered only briefly here; more 
information on laboratory experiments can be found in Falk and Fehr (2003).  
 
Laboratory experiments are artificial settings created by evaluators to establish how 
actors respond to different stimuli, which can, in principle, be manipulated by third 
parties such as policymakers. In the case of WFF, laboratory experiments may help 
to identify how staff and/or clients respond to environmental factors, such as financial 
incentives, peer pressure and alternative staff methods. This will help reveal why 
these people behave as they do and how they might behave when those factors 
change.     
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The advantage of laboratory experiments is the level of control evaluators have over 
the setting. This makes them good for testing simple hypotheses regarding cause-
and-effect, and the opportunity of honing procedures to improve efficiency. 
Laboratory experiments can also capture peer effects, which can be important in an 
office environment. Disadvantages, such as the artificiality of the environment 
created or the small stakes actors usually play for, can be rectified (Falk and Fehr 
2003).  
 
2.6  Thoughts on improving implementation and delivery of WFF in the future  
 
The current mode of delivering WFF appears to be largely decided. However, in the 
next phase of WFF, policymakers will want to explore ways to improve the 
programme’s administration where this might enable the programme to be delivered 
more effectively. This section outlines some of the issues worth considering. 
 
2.6.1  Physical engagement with agencies 
 
Recent developments give business managers and policymakers more options in 
configuring the organisational form that agencies can take in the future.  
 
One development has been the capacity of technology to link clients and staff in 
different ways, without necessarily requiring face-to-face encounters. This raises the 
question of what added value there is to face-to-face engagement. If it is valued, how 
often is it required?  
 
A second development has been the growing recognition of the value of locally based 
initiatives, often in the community, an issue explored in the UK’s Ethnic Minority 
Outreach project (Barnes et al. 2005). Outreach facilities are particularly valuable in 
reaching some groups of single parents and sick and disabled people. The challenge 
here is to identify what appears to work well at a local level and what should be left to 
more “distant” structures.  
 
Another development has been the movement towards mentoring in support of job 
retention, requiring agency contact with people who remain clients even once they 
have entered jobs (Kellard et al. 2002). Again, this is an area undergoing 
development with evaluation underway in the Employment Retention and 
Advancement Demonstration
13 in the UK. 
 
2.6.2  The right provider? The role of contracting-out and privatisation 
 
As noted in section 2.4.3, there has been some experimentation with the role 
privatisation and contracting can play in improving the efficiency of services (Fay 
1997). Evaluations to date have proved inconclusive (Grubb 2004, Hasluck  et al. 
2003; Hales et al. 2003). It is not clear that the private sector can provide efficiency 
savings or that it has managerial expertise that is lacking in the public sector. Indeed, 
in the UK, there are indications that private sector providers are not content to 
operate public job placement services at the prices currently on offer, and some 
contracts have not been renewed.  
 
                                                  
13 For information on the design, see Morris et al. (2003). For information on the evaluation, see 
http://www.mdrc.org/project_14_63.html.     
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On the other hand, contracting out to service providers – both not-for-profit and for-
profit – is now widespread in the UK. Contracting with providers raises issues, 
notably including the contractual basis on which it is undertaken (especially weighting 
towards output-related funding; see Rolfe et al. 1996) and the variability of the 
provider pool across localities.  
 
Research might be able to identify the optimal basis for contracting, with providers 
being trained and initiatives being geared to increasing the number of potential good-
quality contractors. Comparative research could play a valuable role. For instance, 
there are indications that the radical overhaul of the system in Australia has produced 
notable successes (Finn 2002). OECD research identifies a number of crucial 
dimensions of contract-setting that can enhance the performance of job placement 
services, including contract duration and size, monitoring processes, degree of 
specialisation, client choice, fee-setting and quality criteria for awarding contracts 
(Grubb 2004). This research suggests a number of ways by which performance might 
be improved in Britain, including the elimination of poor performers, methods for 
reducing transaction costs and steeper performance incentives (Grubb 2004). Key to 
these considerations is the extent to which systems and monitoring are centralised.
14 
 
2.6.3  Provision of technical assistance 
 
Technical field advisers have been used to oversee and assist the evaluation process 
in the Employment Retention and Advancement research in the UK. This has proved 
very useful. The technical adviser (TA) role was developed in the US by the 
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) to liaise between local 
delivery staff and the evaluation project team to ensure the research and the 
programme unfold as planned. TAs with knowledge of the local implementation 
culture may be assigned to a given programme patch or, to save money, may move 
between regions. Because they may perform various operational and research 
activities over the course of the research project, the ideal candidates for the 
positions will have experience as either line staff or managers in social programmes, 
some background in research (through education or work) and an interest in and 
commitment to the research goals of the policy initiatives.  
 
2.6.4  Large-scale project management 
 
Perhaps the greatest area for discretionary expenditure in service delivery relates to 
choice of computer hardware and software, and the subcontracting of work to 
implement and service large systems. Agencies often hit big problems when 
implementing new systems; this is due often to short timescales, badly negotiated 
contracts or the subsequent realisation that a system cannot deliver what was 
originally anticipated (eg Lissenburgh and Marsh 2003 p.24). Research into the role 
of this issue in service delivery would be valuable.  
 
                                                  
14 Systems at IRD seem to be quite centralised.    
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3  Take-up and entitlement 
 
 
The core issues for evaluation of take-up of the means-tested elements of WFF are: 
·  capture entitlement to, and receipt of, the WFF package of transfers accurately 
and thus measure take-up rates 
·  identify reasons for applying for, receiving, or not receiving WFF 
·  evaluate measures taken to improve take-up. 
 
3.1  Capturing entitlement to and receipt of WFF 
 
At the heart of the concept of take-up is the idea that there are two main population 
groups to identify and study: 
·  group 1, entitled non-recipients (ENRs) – those entitled to the WFF package of 
transfers but are not observed to make an application for them 
·  group 2, entitled recipients – those who are entitled to, apply for and receive WFF 
payments.  
 
Estimates of take-up are usually expressed in the form of group 2 as a proportion of 
all those entitled (sum of groups 1 and 2). There are also those who receive the 
transfer but who are not entitled – non-entitled recipients. Levels of such receipt in 
most systems are non-trivial and result from either wrong information or incorrect 
assessment. Non-entitled recipients also occur because circumstances change over 
time and during the period of payment. The different rules for periodic reassessment 
for tax credits and for other elements of the WFF package mean that such changes in 
circumstance will lead to different patterns of non-entitled recipients across WFF. The 
treatment of non-entitled recipients in the calculation of take-up rates is covered in 
more detail below.  
 
WFF is an intervention based on a number of income transfers that can combine to 
give multiple entitlements, with entitled individuals and families moving from one 
element to another (out-of-work to in-work entitlement, for instance) and potentially 
having entitlement to more than one element at any particular time (Accommodation 
Supplement (AS) alongside the In-Work Support Payment, for instance). It is thus 
important to see take-up as an issue that not only addresses each element of the 
programme but also ensures that each subset of WFF entitlement is taken up when 
individuals access any part of the programme. Research in both the UK and the US 
shows such multiple-programme take-up to be problematic (Keane and Moffitt 1983; 
Hancock et al. 2004
15). It is difficult to give detailed advice on multiple take-up issues 
without an insider’s knowledge of how separate agencies interlink and co-operate on 
individual payment details and how systems share details across the different 
computational and payment systems. 
 
Entitled non-recipients will not, by definition, be recorded in WFF administrative data 
(but may be recorded in other administrative data such as income tax records, 
separate applications for AS or other transfers), so estimating the total entitled 
population relies on good-quality household income survey data. The UK has the 
longest and most consistent record of measuring take-up.
16 It relied on the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES), the equivalent to New Zealand’s Household Economic 
Survey, for many years, until the introduction of a more specialised annual survey, 
                                                  
15 This paper concerns pensioners but many of its findings are applicable to multiple entitlements for 
working age groups. For further discussion see Evans et al. (2006).  
16 See Hernanz et al. 2004.     
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the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This was developed in the UK in 1992 for the 




Two measures of take-up are commonly used: 
·  caseload – a headcount of entitled recipients as a proportion of all those entitled 
·  expenditure – the total amount of payments received by entitled recipients as a 
proportion of the total amount potentially available for all those entitled.  
 
The difference between these measures is crucial since it is a common finding across 
studies of take-up that those with larger monetary entitlements are more likely to 
apply for and receive transfers. This means that, for example, a 90% headcount take-
up may reflect a 99% expenditure take-up, with the 10% of entitled non-recipients 
only accounting for 1% of the estimated budget.  
 
An early and important task in developing any methodology for estimating WFF take-
up is the evaluation of the Household Economic Survey and other existing survey 
data, to establish their coverage and accuracy of data for estimating entitlement 
across the whole WFF package. For measuring entitlement and estimating take-up 
and associated outcomes, the most problematic area is often seen as accurate 
quantification of savings and other investments, and of capital resources. Such data 
on capital and income from capital is known to be subject to reporting and 
measurement error. However, at times of policy change, the likelihood of 
measurement error is increased. Careful consideration must also be given to 
ensuring that recipients and potential recipients can accurately identify entitlements 
they receive or do not receive in any survey instruments and interview protocols (for 
instance, whether to ask for documentary evidence alongside recall). Underpayment 
and overpayment of entitlement (to the point that survey data will find non-entitled 
recipients), and the associated variation of rates of entitlement to recover 
overpayments, are issues important to measure in take-up (see section 3.2 regarding 
transaction costs).  
 
3.1.1  Difficulties identifying eligibility from survey data sources  
 
Surveys entail taking a subset from a known population and extrapolating from the 
analysis of the data to the population. The extrapolation is done by re-weighting the 
analysis back to population proportions using survey weights based on the inverse of 
an individual’s known probability of selection for the survey. Several problems arise 
with this procedure. 
 
Identifying suitable sampling frames 
 
The first hurdle to overcome is identifying a suitable sampling frame. For WFF this 
would be a population identifying all those with children. Since some may move into 
and out of eligibility with fluctuations in income and personal circumstances, it is 
                                                  
17 The FRS was launched in October 1992 to meet the information requirements of Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) analysts. Traditionally, the department had relied on other government social 
surveys, notably the FES and the General Household Survey (GHS). However, these surveys have 
relatively small sample sizes and therefore did not provide sufficiently reliable information on many 
groups in society that were of particular interest to the DWP. Households interviewed in the survey are 
asked a wide range of questions about their circumstances. Although some of the information collected 
is available elsewhere, the FRS provides new or much more detailed information in a number of areas 
and brings some topics together in one survey for the first time. The sample size allows more 
confidence in the analysis of smaller sub-groups, including, for example, regional breakdowns and 
analysis of recipients of certain benefits.    
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unwise to draw eligibility criteria too narrowly. It is important to retain those on the 
margins of eligibility, not only because they may shortly become eligible but also 
because they may provide useful comparators to those in receipt of WFF payments 
when assessing WFF impact on wellbeing and employment in other parts of the 
evaluation. Much could be learned from the sampling processes used for the studies 
evaluating the UK’s Working Families’ Tax Credit (see Brewer et al. 2005). Like WFF, 
this scheme offered substantial tax credit transfers to families up to the median 
equivalised household income. Sampling was based on records from Child Benefit, a 
non-income-tested benefit with an almost 100% take-up in Britain. The data also 
contained addresses, permitting the construction of a sampling frame for all families 
with children. In a second phase, it was possible to home in on families likely to be in 
or on the margins of eligibility using doorstep and other sift procedures. It is not clear 
that such a file exists in New Zealand. If it does not, there may be no alternative but 
to undertake a doorstep or telephone sift of the population in order to identify those in 
or on the margins of eligibility for WFF components, perhaps having excluded much-
higher-income households using individual tax record data from IRD. This approach 
might be necessary anyway, for AS, which is available to low- and middle-income 
households without children. 
 
Identifying eligibility and entitlement with survey data 
 
Surveys measuring take-up of WFF require questions that collect all relevant 
information that may affect entitlement, including income sources and amounts, 
household structure, economic status including hours of work, age, residency and 
location. Existing micro-simulation based on Household Economic Survey (HES) data 
will provide a basis for examining how far existing data “captures” the full 
implementation of WFF. Efforts should be made to ensure that the periodicity of 
income measures and fluctuations in income are optimally captured. However, 
fluctuations and periodicity of income lead to difficulties in accurately capturing 
entitlement to tax credits that are reconciled on an annual basis.  
 
One of the greatest difficulties in survey research is identifying eligible non-recipients 
(ENRs) or non-participants. Research conducted at the Policy Studies Institute 
(Marsh and McKay 1993) indicates that the more accurately one obtains information 
about ENRs, the less eligible they look. This is because they often fail to qualify for 
support for reasons that are difficult to capture in basic sets of data on income and 
circumstances (eg because they have sources of income that are not immediately 
apparent). They may also fail to gain support because they are only on the margins 
of eligibility (eg because they have small entitlements, or are about to pass out of 
eligibility due to a foreseeable change of circumstance that the data analyst cannot 
see, making the application for payment not worthwhile). 
 
The need for large-scale surveys 
 
The precision of take-up and entitlement estimates depends on sample size. 
Furthermore, there is policy interest in sub-populations that are not very numerous in 
the New Zealand population as a whole. These include sub-groups of non-European 
ethnic groups, for instance. In order to make comparisons between low-incidence 
groups and across such groups, it is necessary to stratify the sample and over 
sample these groups so that sample sizes are sufficiently large to permit accurate 
assessments of their experiences. “Grossing up” is the term usually given in the UK 
to the process of applying factors to sample data so they yield estimates for the 
overall population. The simplest grossing system would be a single factor, the 
uniform grossing factor could be calculated as the number of households in the 
population divided by the number in the achieved sample. However, surveys are    
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normally grossed up by a more complex set of grossing factors, which attempt to 
correct for differential non-response at the same time as they scale up sample 
estimates. Grossing-up procedures have received considerable attention in the UK, 
and MSD would be well advised to use this experience as an illustration.
18  
 
Large samples also allow analysts some scope to deal with sample attrition and out-
of-scope cases without having to resort to drawing further samples. They also permit 
more careful hypothesis testing, since smaller confidence intervals around estimates 
reduce the likelihood of rejecting a hypothesis that is actually true or accepting a 
hypothesis that is actually false.  
 
The major disadvantage of large-scale surveys is the cost incurred in interviewing 
and in processing data. These costs can be limited by clustering the sampling points 
used to obtain the sample, though this can come at some cost in sampling error. 
However, the loss of sample precision through clustering is usually small in social 
surveys of typical design.  
 
Survey non-response  
 
High response rates to surveys increase confidence in their quality and in the results 
obtained.
19 Differential non-response between sub-groups can induce biases in 
survey estimates. Grossing-up and re-weighting surveys back to population 
proportions using observable characteristics is only a partial solution to the bias that 
non-response can induce, since the patterns of non-response may be correlated with 
unobservable attributes that may, nevertheless, be relevant in interpreting results. 
The characteristics of non-respondents can be partially captured in a variety of ways. 
Refusals and non-contact cases (where an address produces no contact) can be 
profiled with a minimal amount of data. Interviewers can code reasons for non-
contact and a simple observation form can be filled out with data on the 
accommodation and any known characteristics of its occupants. Additionally, data on 
refusals can be captured by interviewers through a shortened list of questions given 
at the point of refusal. Current best practice in the UK on the Family Resources 
Survey can be seen in McCee et al. (2004). However, the influence of unobserved 
differences between non-respondents and respondents is, by definition, difficult to 
establish. Motivation levels may be correlated with the probability of response, as 
well as the likelihoods of receiving WFF payments and job entry. Hence, some survey 
costs should be focused on boosting response rates, which could be investigated 
with piloting. The detailed levels of necessary response rates and non-response 
thresholds will depend on future specification of research design and the needs of 
MSD to capture take-up and other phenomena in sub-groups of the population. 
 
A role for longitudinal survey data 
 
One approach to conceptualising take-up is to look at “frictional” elements of 
behaviour – delayed applications rather than a simple failure to apply.
20 Longitudinal 
survey data, especially panel data, can also be an important additional source of 
                                                  
18 See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/2002_03/methodology/estimation.asp for the current approach to 
grossing up Family Resources Survey data for benefit policy estimation in the UK. 
19 Target response rates are adopted by some organisations and governments. The US Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which governs federal surveys in the US, requires its agencies to 
employ procedures designed to maximise the likelihood of achieving an 80% response rate. However, 
this requirement is accompanied by a fairly conservative definition of response rate employed by OMB, 
which includes all the non-contacted sample in the calculation (no answers, busy signals, answering 
machines and call backs for telephone studies; non-answered mail for mail and Internet studies). 
20 Discussed most clearly in Fry and Stark (1993) and Costigan et al. (1999).    
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take-up measurement alongside cross-sectional evidence to capture such delays and 
to capture income fluctuation over time. Additional data on income fluctuations can 
be used to calibrate and adjust cross-sectional measures of take-up of WFF tax 
credits, which are adjusted on an annual tax-year basis. Longitudinal data can follow 
individual and family circumstances as they change and allow us to observe 
differences in take-up behaviour. These arguments for longitudinal data are additional 
to those used elsewhere in this paper in the overall evaluation of WFF. However, 
attrition can be a problem, especially when correlated with outcomes of interest, as 
might be the case when residential mobility, induced by a switch in labour market or 
benefit status, results in the survey agency losing a respondent. 
 
Measurement error, including recall and awareness problems 
 
Survey responses to factual questions (whether you have received WFF payments 
and, if so, the type and size) are subject to error when respondents’ recall is 
inaccurate. The biases are not necessarily a problem if randomly distributed across 
respondents, but they will be problematic where they are large or associated with 
particular features of the recipient or his/her payment application. For example, it may 
be that those receiving smaller sums are less likely to recall their receipt, potentially 
lowering headcount estimates of take-up. It is usually informative to link survey data 
to administrative data to investigate the nature of these biases. Linking administrative 
data more generally for evaluation and take-up reasons can be problematic, and 
survey protocols and agreements with respondents may preclude linking data to tax 
and other records. The UK’s official estimates of take-up use administrative data to 
calculate the denominator (the actual number of recipients); using administrative data 
to calculate the true number of entitled recipients can add an element of precision to 
estimates that is not available to grossed-up estimates from survey data. Even 
administrative totals will require adjustment for non-entitled recipients and for non-
household-based payments (for comparison with household survey data) and other 
adjustments. Some studies of take-up in the UK have used administrative records of 
one transfer (housing allowances in particular) to investigate take-up of another.  
 
In assessing survey information on the incidence and size of WFF payments, one 
must be aware that it will be difficult for recipients to know precisely which WFF 
payments they are receiving and how much they receive. The In-Work Payment 
(IWP), Family Support and Family Tax Credit are all tax credits paid directly into the 
principal caregiver’s bank account. The credits will be paid as a single sum when the 
recipient is in receipt of more than one credit, making it difficult for the recipient to 
distinguish one from another. Furthermore, the periodicity of payment could affect 
awareness of payments received. Payments are made weekly, fortnightly or annually, 
depending on the recipient’s choice. Those receiving more frequent payments are 
likely to factor them into household budgeting, making it likely that they will be aware 
of what they get and when. Those receiving annual payments may be aware of large 
sums but reconciling predicted and actual annual income may make it more difficult 




Let us suppose a survey has a large achieved sample and a good response rate, 
with individuals drawn with known probability drawn from an accurate and up-to-date 
sampling frame. One is still left with the difficulty of interpreting the responses to 
specific questions. There are the issues of interpersonal comparability and of the 
extent to which any item is reliably measuring what the analyst thinks it is measuring. 
Questionnaire designers can avail themselves of question batteries that have been    
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tested for reliability across many surveys over time, such as those from the General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which are interpreted as measures of wellbeing.  
 
However, asking about perceptions of services and experiences of payment in take-
up and entitlement surveys often entails designing purpose-built questions. These 
can be tested with statistical procedures for validity and reliability in the context of the 
particular survey, but it is unclear how they might perform for another cohort, at 
another time, or if the order of questions is altered. External validation is possible 
through the repetition of tried-and-tested questions or the deployment of other 
methodologies bearing on the same issues. Once again, the UK is the main source 
of potential questionnaire design, since its package of transfers looks most similar to 
WFF. The documentation and questionnaires on the FRS and the Families and 




3.1.2  The role of administrative data 
 
Linking survey data to administrative data can help with problems of non-response 
and sample attrition. It can help verify individual-level entitlement as well as provide 




An administrative data source used as a sampling frame may contain detailed 
information on the universe of interest. It may thus be used to model sample non-
response and attrition, and therefore help to adjust for them in survey estimates of 
take-up, perceptions and experiences. It is unlikely that longitudinal data will contain 
the detail of income and assets necessary for full imputation of entitlement to the 
WFF package, but linking to administrative data could provide important insights into 
dynamic profiles of take-up, especially where differences in take-up between those 
entering work and those already in work may be important. 
 
3.1.3  Comparing data sources for estimating take-up 
 
With respect to childcare assistance, MSD relies on a combination of SWIFTT 
administrative data and dedicated survey data to establish the proportion of eligible 
families taking up assistance, how they differ from existing beneficiaries of subsidised 
childcare, perceptions of the availability of places and the relative merits of formal 
and informal care. It is not obvious how a sample frame will be constructed for this 
survey; it may be that childcare providers will be sampled, with primary carers drawn 
from within those primary sampling units. There are certainly analytical advantages to 
linking carers with data on the care provider(s) they use. The Department of Labour 
may take the lead on some of these surveys. This data will be supplemented by the 
proposed survey of childcare service providers discussed in section 2.5.3. 
 
In addition to the MSD SWIFTT administrative data on AS payments, evaluation of 
AS entitlement will involve what appear to be three separate surveys: a national 
survey to identify families brought into eligibility by changes to rent and income 
thresholds; a communications evaluation survey focusing on awareness of eligibility 
                                                  
21 http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/doc/4803%5Cmrdoc%5Cpdf%5C4803userguide5.pdf and 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/2003_04/methodology/questionnaire.asp for FRS; 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/facs/questionnaires/questionnaire4.pdf for FACS. 
22 The UK’s Department for Work and Pensions baseline estimates of take-up are based on 
administrative totals of recipients and expenditure compared with FRS estimates of ENRs and ENR 
expenditure. See also the discussion of matching administrative data with survey data to validate take-
up estimates in chapter 5 of Department for Work and Pensions (2005).    
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and entitlement; and a survey of clients exiting payment receipt who do not take up 
AS, to assess eligibility, awareness and reasons for failure to take up AS. The 
combination of these methods is likely to fulfil most evaluation requirements. 
 
The evaluation of IWP envisages a similar mix of data sources to that envisaged for 
AS (the communications evaluation survey, national survey data and a survey of 
clients exiting benefit, together with MSD administrative data).  
 
The advantages of administrative data are substantial. It not only contains the 
variables needed to establish eligibility and payment receipt, but it is also likely to be 
fairly error-free and individuals will be tracked by the system, provided they remain 
recipients of benefits or tax credits,. One further advantage is that the IRD data has 
been collected in a fairly standard fashion since 1996/1997 and, in the case of data 
on AS and childcare payments held by MSD, since 1992. This will allow analysis of 
patterns before and after the introduction of WFF. From an analytical perspective, if 
one wished to identify the effect of policy changes on take-up, the work and payment 
receipt histories of those with experience of the system would permit comparisons 
between seemingly similar individuals whose patterns of take-up differ. Of course, 
this identification strategy would be confined to individuals with some history of 
payment receipt recorded on the system. 
 
The recent OECD overview summarises the advantages and disadvantages of 
general-purpose survey data, of administrative data and of specifically designed 
surveys in the table, reproduced here as table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1  Data sources: advantages and disadvantages 
Type of data  Advantages  Disadvantages 
General-purpose surveys  · Information about both the eligible 
and the recipients 
· Richness of information about other 
individual and household 
characteristics 
· Readily available 
· Measurement errors of various 
types (timing of the survey, 
misreporting of income, etc) 
· Small sample sizes for specific 
sub-groups of the population 
Administrative records  · Accuracy of information about 
recipients 
· No information about the eligible 
non-recipients 
· Scarcity of information about 




· Information about both the eligible 
and the recipients 
· Richness of information about other 
individual and household 
characteristics 
· Hard to generalise results when 
the survey is targeted to specific 
sub-groups 
· Costly and time consuming to 
produce 
Source: Hernanz et al. 2004:16. 
 
3.1.4  Common methodological problems  
 
A range of commonly encountered methodological problems have been recently 
summarised in the Department for Work and Pensions (2005) in the UK. 
 
Private household assumption: There will be entitlement for individuals and families 
who do not live in private households and who, most probably, fall outside survey 
sampling frames. Adjustments to take-up estimates based on household surveys will 
be required for the denominator (the numerator will also need adjustment if based on 
administrative data). It is recommended that the number of non-household-based 
recipients is identified, together with an estimate of expenditure on them, in order to 
adjust household-survey-based take-up estimates.    
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Self-employment: Accurate modelling of entitlement for self-employed people is 
severely constrained. Methods will have to be developed to reflect both WFF 
payment entitlement rules and data quality for this group. 
 
Grossing-up: Investment in good quality grossing-up weights that reflect a number of 
population characteristics has been a feature of UK official measurement of take-up. 
See previous discussion. 
 
Awaiting the outcome of an application: A proportion of entitled non-recipients will be 
wrongly identified because they have made an application, but it is awaiting (a 
positive) determination. ENR estimates can be refined to eliminate such cases using 
administrative data or, if an application is recorded as being made in the survey data, 
by estimating the outcome. 
 
Accounting for errors: The Department for Work and Pensions in the UK identifies 
five types of error: 
·  overstatement of entitlement to payments 
·  under-reporting of benefit receipt 
·  understatement of entitlement to payments 
·  inaccurate grossing-up 
·  payment to non-entitled cases.  
 
These problems and types of error mean that a variety of ranges of errors and error 
combinations will be found in most take-up estimates. Reporting take-up is thus 
advisably done in ranges rather than fixed estimates. One outcome of reporting in 
ranges is that, over time, it is more difficult to establish if take-up is increasing or 
decreasing unless changes in estimates occur outside of the range intervals.  
 
The last two methodological considerations (concerning waiting for the outcome of an 
application and accounting for errors) can also help conceptualise the dimensions of 
take-up. According to van Oorschot (1991), these dimensions can be thought of as 
the following:  
 
Primary versus secondary non-take-up: Primary non-take-up refers to not making an 
application or not receiving payment. Secondary non-take-up refers to wrongly 
determined ineligibles. 
 
Total versus partial non-take-up: Both primary and secondary non-take-up lead to 
total non-take-up of payments (payments are zero). There are also cases where take-
up is partial and entitlement is actually higher than the (non-zero) payment received. 
 
Temporary versus permanent non-take-up: Temporary non-take-up is where a delay 
occurs between entitlement beginning and an application being made. 
 
3.2  Identifying reasons for non-take-up 
 
There is a substantial literature on the theory of take-up,
23 which is best summarised 
here as a split between individual and institutional factors with a variety of 
approaches that either concentrate on one of these factors or look across both of 
them. A full list of references and a fuller overview is given in the accompanying 
                                                  
23 See Hernanz et al. 2004, Currie 2004 and Dornan 2003, chapter 2.     
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literature review.
24 The main arguments are summarised here only in order to 
contextualise methodological approaches. 
 
At the individual level, there are three main methods, each based on different 
assumptions and disciplinary approaches.  
·  Economic studies tend to use cost–benefit assumptions to explain non-take-up by 
looking at the relative individual costs and benefits of making an application.  
·  Psychological models tend to look at motivation and different thresholds for 
action.  
·  Sociological models tend to look at group and individual identity (stigma), 
networks, knowledge and various interpretations of agency. The literature on 
institutional factors relies more on explaining macro-level social and 
governmental attitudes and approaches to transfer policy along with more narrow 
concerns about the design and implementation of the programmes themselves.  
 
Methodologically, evaluative studies that seek to explain take-up can go down two 
non-mutually exclusive potential paths: to sign up to one or more of the theoretical 
approaches (and design specific survey or other instruments to capture them); or to 
be more pragmatic and identify a common set of factors that cut across the different 
theoretical approaches to create an evidence base. The research concentrates on 
the second approach, as it involves a smaller commitment to new specific survey 
work and can occur as a review of both the current evidence from New Zealand 
general-purpose surveys and of the potential of current survey instruments to identify 
factors that can explain non-take-up. 
 
 
At the individual level, the following factors are important (many of these factors 
overlap and interrelate). 
 
·  Complexity and ignorance: Thirty years of UK research consistently finds that 
individuals often do not know or understand issues pertaining to entitlement to 
many benefits (Dornan 2003). There are also misunderstandings and 
misinterpretation – either that schemes are “not for them” when indeed they are, 
or that different elements of government assistance activity (tax, benefits of 
different types) are integrated and that an application for one is automatically an 
application for all forms of entitlement or that contact with one agency will be 
shared with all other government agencies concerned.
25  
 
·  Personal characteristics: These are also important, with consistent evidence of 
non-take-up associated with older people (in the UK) and race and ethnicity (in 
the US) and with some evidence of age of children affecting take-up for lone 
mothers (in the US). Education level and literacy are also linked to non-take-up.
26 
 
·  Stigma: A large range of studies use different measures of stigma and find 
relationships with non-take-up. However, there is no consistent or certain 
definition of stigma across these. Stigma seems to arise from cultural attitudes 
and from wider factors, and from more direct effects of the welfare system and its 
                                                  
24 Evans et al. (2006).  
25 See Ritchie and Mathews 1982, Finch and Elam 1995 and National Audit Office 2002. 
26 However, the approach and implementation of US welfare programmes probably mean that this 
finding cannot be generalised to other countries. On the other hand, the presence of young children will 
also be more closely linked to the “trigger” event of birth, which can lead to a claim.    
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perceived or experienced administration of benefits and attitudes to recipients. 
See the accompanying literature review for more details and references.
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·  Transaction costs: These are sometimes seen as “information costs” and thus 
linked to complexity and ignorance (mentioned above). Alternatively, such costs 
relate to the pecuniary gain from payment receipt – with short-term or low levels 
of entitlement seen as marginal reward for the costs of making an application. 
Other costs are seen as the procedures, delays, hassle and uncertainty (for 
instance, concerns about wrong payment and incurring debt) associated with 
making an application. The incidences of underpayment and overpayment can be 
important, and they link into debt issues. Recent work on tax credits in the UK 
and internationally has shown how annualised assessment and reviews can be 
problematic in this respect (Griggs et al. 2005, Howard 2004).  
 
·  The experience of “trigger” events: “Trigger” events are those that give 
entitlement to transfers. Payments for children are triggered by birth, for instance, 
and income-related benefits can be triggered by loss of income – for example, at 
retirement, unemployment or sickness. Additionally, in the UK, there has been 
great investment in ensuring that in-work benefit entitlement is assessed and pre-
applied in active labour market programmes, particularly for lone parents (Evans 
et al. 2003). Advice and advocacy can also be seen as a trigger event to start an 
application. Non-take-up can be linked to those with underlying low incomes who 
experience no defined trigger event – such as the stock of low-paid families 
already in work and their potential entitlement to in-work benefits. 
 
It is obvious from the description of these factors that many of the so-called 
individual-level factors actually relate to institutional factors – the design and 
implementation of the benefits themselves. 
 
The aim of WFF policy is to increase take-up of a set of more generous transfers. 
Take-up is a systemic outcome based on a combination of institutional rules and 
behaviour (delivery factors) and individual-level behaviour (payment receipt factors). 
There is much that is built into the design of both transfers and their implementation 
that will affect take-up, including the following factors:  
·  entitlement periods before review for changes of circumstances 
·  cross-entitlement within the package of transfers and with the tax system – so 
that information on entitlement to one element can be used to help establish 
entitlement to others (and thus reduce additional information required) 
·  potential “passporting” – where entitlement to one element is known to be 
coincidental to, or gives rise to, automated entitlement to another 
·  length and complexity of application form  
·  tests of income and assets 
·  evidential requirements 
·  speed of assessment and payment 
·  form and manner of payment 
·  the use of caseworkers and other brokers of entitlement 
·  the requirement to apply promptly and the ability to backdate.  
 
Where specific measures and practices are introduced to encourage take-up, these 
should be covered by specific questions to analyse their effectiveness.  
  
                                                  
27 Evans et al. (2006).     
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At present, we have some information on some of these items, from the following 
administrative data sources: 
·  application forms requested and given 
·  details of applications submitted and characteristics of recipients 
·  outcomes of successful and unsuccessful applications  
·  linking of applications/receipt over time and between overall elements of the WFF 
package 
·  accompanying institutional information (on caseload of employment services or 
from outreach activity, for instance).  
 
As well as mapping take-up of entitlements, government departments wish to know 
more about perceptions of the service they provide and attitudes to the application 
process. Information on these is often considered to be an end in itself. It can also 
help explain variations in take-up that go beyond correlations with age, ethnicity and 
size of entitlement, since it can account for perceived costs and benefits of applying 
for payments. The factors involved include any stigma attached to making 
applications and any barriers to payment application inherent in the application 
process, such as the effort involved in making an application and the quality of 
information and advice on offer from staff. For instance, customer satisfaction 
surveys, which are occasionally disparaged by social scientists, can actually shed 
important light on the perceived costs of making an application and can be useful in 
understanding take-up and barriers to take-up.  
 
It is well established that awareness and knowledge of entitlements and application 
processes are correlated with applying for transfer payments, but it is unclear 
whether poor knowledge and awareness are causal factors explaining low take-up. 
This can only be clearly established with panel data that track individuals before they 
apply for payments.  
 
There is more robust evidence of links between advisers’ perceptions and people’s 
propensity to use a service. Front-line staff, as “gatekeepers” to the system, can 
deter people from applying, or encourage them to apply, in the first place. Staff, 
through their knowledge and dealings with the applicant, can influence the nature of 
a longer-term relationship. Case managers in employment advice can emphasise the 
benefits from applying for IWPs and tax credits that can influence job search and job 
entry. The crucial factor here is the degree to which advisers are “trusted” by 
applicants to help manage the perceived risk of changing their circumstances – for 
example, by entering work. This risk arises from the potential for disruption of income 
streams with a shift in personal circumstances (McLaughlin 1991).  
 
It is arguable that analyses in this area have not been as sophisticated as is merited 
by the issue. Consumer theories of market segmentation could be usefully deployed 
to distinguish between client types and between the multiple products and services 
on offer through WFF. This could be the basis for a better understanding of the way in 
which agencies can meet the needs of their various customers. Dorsett and 
Kasparova (2004) have recently used this approach when using cluster and factor 
analysis to classify payment recipients using FACS data, and it has also been used in 
analysis of the market for union membership (Bryson and Gomez 2003). A recent 
study to assess the feasibility of statistical profiling also uses what might be regarded 
as a market segmentation approach, since it seeks to allocate resources across 
clients according to their expected need (Bryson and Kasparova 2003). 
 
A matter of particular interest in WFF is the ability of recipients to choose the 
frequency of tax-credit payments – weekly, fortnightly or annually. A study of the    
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determinants of this choice could be very useful for the Government. Such a study 
could also contribute to the wider literature on public economics, which views such 
behaviour in terms of individual discount rates.  
 
3.3  Evaluating measures taken to improve take-up 
 
There is a far larger literature suggesting remedies following analysis of reasons for 
non-take-up than there is of studies that have evaluated the success of pro-take-up 
programmes. In an OECD working paper, Hernanz et al. (2004:22) state that the 
evidence 
 
... suggests the existence of significant interactions both among different welfare 
programmes, and between the welfare and the tax system. Receiving one 
benefit typically makes it more likely that the same person will also apply for 
other programmes. Careful design of the rules and regulations regarding 
eligibility for multiple programmes could both increase information and take-up 
among eligible individuals, and reduce fraudulent behaviour by the non-eligible. 
For example, one-stop shops introduced in several OECD countries – where 
individuals who apply for one benefit are automatically informed about other 
programmes they could be eligible for – could significantly increase take-up 
rates. Especially in times of reforms, the effect of the tax system on the 
incentives to take up welfare should also be carefully considered. 
 
The possibility of using administrative data to improve take-up should be considered. 
IRD administrative data relating to Family Income Assistance (FIA) contains fairly rich 
information regarding demographic, family, income, work history, and 
payment/benefit history data. This information is initially generated when people 
approach IRD to make an application: they are required to register and complete a 
registration form before doing so. This means there is sufficient information held on 
IRD files to identify eligibility and the amount payable for applicants. The data is 
updated throughout the year and is longitudinal, so data is accurate. Profiles of FIA 
recipients are problematic because there are both “year-end” and “front-end” 
recipients, with end-of-year square-ups, and because inactive accounts are closed 
after two years.  
 
When IRD refers to the FIA population, it distinguishes between three populations:  
·  the FIA-paid population – the total number of people who have elected to receive 
their payments from IRD  
·  the FIA-assessed population – the FIA-paid population plus those assessed for 
their end-of-year square up; this includes those who receive their payments from 
MSD 
·  the “total” population – all those contacting IRD in the past two years, including 
the assessed, the FIA paid and those to be assessed by or transferred from MSD. 
 
There may be value in distinguishing between these populations for evaluation 
purposes. 
 
It is not possible to identify an eligible population for WFF payments from 
administrative sources alone because IRD data is confined to families registering for 
assistance. IRD has no information on non-applicants who may be eligible for 
assistance. Furthermore, families who receive FIA via the benefit system only (ie 
from MSD) are not required to file returns and therefore IRD will not have any 
information about their family composition unless extra information is also transferred 
from MSD to IRD. This means that no single agency has administrative files covering    
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the whole FIA recipient population; the creation of such a file depends upon legal and 
technical hurdles being overcome.  
 
What, then, of MSD administrative data? This data is based on the client payroll 
system, SWIFTT, which holds demographic details of primary benefit recipients and 
partners if recorded, the recipient’s incomes, number of children, length of time 
receiving payments and changes in benefit/payment status. Hours of work are 
recorded if relevant to the benefit being received. Payments themselves – including 
those for AS and childcare payments – are traceable back to 1992. FIA payments are 
only observed for those below a certain income threshold who are in receipt of social 
assistance; otherwise, payments are made through IRD. The other major source of 
administrative data is SOLO, the MSD’s client activity management system. It 
records information on matching clients to employment and programme 
opportunities, and on employment-related activities and status. SOLO is confined to 
beneficiaries. 
 
Individuals receiving an assessment for payment or actual payment for a main social 
assistance benefit or superannuation from MSD are given a social welfare number 
(SWN). This number can be used to track changes in payments received and 
payments made to individuals. Eligibles who do not contact MSD do not enter the 
system for IRD, as administrative files cannot identify the whole eligible population. A 
further difficulty arises in creating household-level data from the individual files. This 
might be feasible using residential addresses to link individual files, but MSD can 
only accurately create family or couple groupings if the payment they apply for 
requires family-related information. Codes identifying the rate of payment may reveal 
whether a payment is received by an individual, family or couple, but this may prove 
inaccurate in some cases. 
 
To summarise, administrative data from MSD and IRD can identify the characteristics 
of individuals approaching agencies to apply for payments, estimate their 
entitlements and record the payments received. The whole applicant population 
would only be observable if IRD and MSD data were linked, which is practical but 
legally difficult. The data does not systematically identify household-level information. 
Nor does it identify eligibles and ineligibles in the non-applicant population.  
 
Turning to the eligible population for childcare subsidy, MSD collects data on the 
number of applications (granted and declined), payments to providers and 
information relating to parents. However, MSD does not hold data on eligibles who 
have not applied, so it is not possible to construct an eligible population from 
administrative sources alone. A further problem is that there is no data to establish 
which childcare places are taken up by WFF-eligible families and, if eligibles are 
taking a greater proportion of available places, the impact this has on the childcare 
options available to ineligibles. MSD refers to this as “an ongoing problem that was 
first identified in the Cabinet paper” (MSD written communication). 
 
Additionally, specific measures to improve take-up could be designed on an 
experimental basis – with a treatment and a control group to assess how far 
changing elements of administration, form design or other aspects of design and 
implementation can improve take-up. See the discussion in sections 2.5.5 and 4.3 on 
the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.  
 
In relation to childcare subsidies, the issue of take-up will be inextricably linked to 
parents’ views and attitudes about formal childcare. It will therefore be very important 
to explore how the availability of subsidies might affect parents’ willingness to use 
formal provision and their perceptions of the accessibility of childcare services (for    
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example, of whether more places are created, whether they are more locally based 
and whether they are cheaper). The survey could also establish whether subsidies 
might affect parents’ choices in terms of provider types – for example, they might 
enable them to (partly) replace an informal carer with a formal provider or to switch to 
a higher-quality (but more expensive) service. The survey could also try to 
disentangle the effects of different influences (eg increased funding and higher 
quality standards), although since this analysis would be based on parents’ 
perceptions, it would provide only some softer measures of the impact of different 
types of intervention. Any changes in childcare prices that affect eligibility for subsidy 
will also affect take-up and will need to be examined in any survey and evaluation.  
    
32 
4  Identifying the causal impact of social programmes  
 
The purpose of policy evaluation is to assess whether, and by how much, changes in 
policy and the introduction of new programmes influence outcomes, such as 
employment and earnings for those subject to the policy change and those not. As 
one analyst noted: 
 
The task of evaluation research lies in devising methods to reliably estimate [the 
impact of policy change], so that informed decisions about programme 
expansion and termination can be made. (Smith 2000:1) 
 
The fact that WFF is not randomly assigned means that identifying its causal impact 
on outcomes such as employment, wages and wellbeing relies on the deployment of 
non-experimental methods. Some practical approaches to this problem are 
discussed in sections 5 and 6. This section introduces these methods in a more 




4.1  Nature of the impact evaluation problem 
 
To know the effect of WFF on a participating individual, we must compare the 
observed outcome (eg employment) with the outcome that would have resulted had 
that person not participated in WFF. However, only one outcome is actually observed. 
This can be called the factual outcome. The so-called counterfactual
29 outcome is 
that which would have resulted had the participating individual not participated (or 
had the non-participating individual participated). This counterfactual outcome cannot 
be observed, which is why the evaluation problem arises. Seen in this way, the 
essential difficulty in programme evaluation is one of missing data. Many approaches 
to evaluation attempt to provide an estimate of the counterfactual and to use this to 
identify the programme effect. 
 
4.1.1  Types of impact 
 
It is unlikely that all individuals will respond to a policy intervention in precisely the 
same way. Rather, there will be heterogeneity (variation) in the impact across 
individuals. This insight raises two questions which evaluations might wish to 
address: 
·  what impact programme participation would have on an individual drawn 
randomly from the population – the average treatment effect (ATE)
30  
·  what impact participation has on individuals who actually participated – the 
average effect of treatment on the treated (TT).  
 
Both estimates are of interest, assuming the goal of the programme is efficiency 
rather than equity. While TT can indicate the average benefit of participation, ATE 
would be relevant were the policy interest focused on making a voluntary programme 
compulsory, for example. The “population” for the ATE might be wider or narrower – 
for example, it could be all working-age people, or all on low wages, or all potentially 
eligible for a (voluntary) programme. 
 
                                                  
28 This section draws heavily on Bryson et al. 2002. 
29 In an experiment, this group would be the controls.  
30 Note that the term conventionally used in the evaluation literature to indicate the programme is 
“treatment” and that for people participating in a programme is “treated”.    
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The two effects are identical if we assume homogeneous (equal) responses. 
However, where we allow for the more realistic scenario of responses varying across 
individuals, the measures can likewise differ. To illustrate, where a programme is 
voluntary, as in the case of WFF, we might anticipate that those who volunteer differ 
from the wider eligible population in terms of their expected gains from the 
programme: it is because they perceive benefits from participation that they 
participate in the first place. If this is so, it is unlikely that impact estimates for 
participants will be relevant for eligible non-participants.  
 
It is important for policymakers to be aware of the different treatment effects, for two 
reasons. 
 
·  When comparing results across studies, the reader needs to be aware of which 
treatment effect the study is addressing. In general, if those with the largest 
expected gains participate, ATE will be smaller than TT.  
 
·  Different policy questions are addressed by the different treatment effects. For 
example, TT is the estimate that can answer the policy question of whether or not 
a programme should be abandoned since, if the mean pecuniary impact of 
treatment on the treated lies below the per-participant cost of the programme, 
there is a strong case for its elimination. When deciding whether to make a 
voluntary programme compulsory – extend it to the whole eligible population – 
the question becomes whether or not the mandatory programme would pass a 
cost–benefit test. (Note that there are difficulties in predicting the impact of a 
mandatory programme from evaluation of a voluntary one.) In this case, the 
parameter of interest is the ATE.  
 
There is a third parameter of interest to policymakers. This is the impact of a policy 
introduced to affect people at the margin of participation – for instance, by widening 
eligibility or increasing outreach. The mean effect on those people whose 
participation changes as a result of the policy is known as the local average 
treatment effect (LATE). Since the most realistic policy option is often a modest 
expansion or contraction in the number of people participating in a programme, LATE 
may often be of most interest for policy.
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Box 4.1  Summary of types of impact 
·  Average treatment effect (ATE): the impact programme participation would have 
on an individual drawn randomly from the population. 
·  Average effect of treatment on the treated (TT): the impact participation has on 
individuals who actually participated. 
·  Local average treatment effect (LATE): the mean effect on those people whose 
participation changes as a result of the policy. 
4.2  Solutions to the evaluation problem 
 
A simplistic approach to estimating the impact of WFF on an outcome would be to 
compare the outcomes of programme participants with those of non-participants. If 
those participating in the programme were a random sample of all those eligible, this 
would be a valid approach. However, as already noted, this is unlikely to be the case.  
 
                                                  
31 Formally and technically, a LATE depends on the existence of an instrumental variable. A change in a 
policy variable that is not an instrumental variable (although it might be what is called a policy 
instrument, which is something different) defines a marginal average treatment effect (MATE).     
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4.2.1  Selection bias  
 
In reality, such a simple comparison would result in a probable overestimation of the 
effectiveness of the programme. For instance, if those with more favourable labour 
market characteristics were more likely to have chosen to participate in WFF, it is 
probable that participating individuals would have done better on average than non-
participating individuals, irrespective of whether they actually undertook the WFF 
assistance. This is the essence of the selection problem. To arrive at a valid estimate 
of a WFF impact, the effect of selection must be accounted for.  
 
The question of selection bias
32 arises when some component of the participation 
decision is relevant to the process determining success in job search. More simply, 
selection bias can result when some of the determinants of participation also 
influence the outcome.  
 
4.2.2  Observable and unobservable characteristics 
 
The relationship between the two processes may be able to be fully accounted for by 
observable characteristics. In this case, selection bias can be avoided simply by 
including the relevant variables in the equation explaining outcomes, and hence 
controlling for confounding observable characteristics. In the more general case, 
unobservable characteristics affecting participation can also influence outcomes.  
 
As an example of this, the impact of individual characteristics such as motivation and 
desire to do paid work is an important issue in the literature. It may be that more 
highly motivated individuals are more likely to participate in WFF and are also more 
likely to find work. In this case, the effects of motivation are correlated across the two 
equations. Controlling for differences in observable characteristics does nothing to 
alleviate this. Without addressing the issue of sample selection, the estimated impact 
of WFF on employment will will be biased (incorrectly estimated).
33  However, it is 
worth mentioning that judicious use of observable characteristics can go some way 
towards minimising the bias associated with unobservables. In the example above, 
observables that are thought to be highly correlated with motivation, such as pre-
programme unemployment duration, may capture some of the motivation effect. But 
some would argue that including such observables can introduce endogeneity (as a 
kind of lagged outcome). 
 
As another example of potentially unobservable differences between the treatment 
and comparison groups, consider the role of the administrator in selecting 
participants. Programme entry may be a function of administrator selection as well as 
of choice on the part of the individual applicant. Where administrators are 
discriminating between the less able and the better able, either consciously or 
otherwise, as a basis for programme selection, this process will bias estimates of 
programme effects if it is unobserved by the evaluator. This may occur where 
administrators are “cream skimming” (that is, taking the best for the programme), in 
which case programme effects will be overestimated. Equally, programme effects 
may be underestimated if the programme administrators are targeting programme 
resources on the least able.  
 
                                                  
32 Selection bias is bias resulting from the self-selection of individuals to participate in an activity or 
survey or as a subject in an experimental study. It may also arise if participants are selected non-
randomly by others, such as programme administrators. 
33 Despite the seemingly limited potential for administrator selection in the WFF programme, 
discretionary decisions are still made regarding eligibility and hence the issue of sample selection is not 
avoided.    
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A number of alternative approaches exists that take explicit account of the selection 
issue. These can be grouped under the broad headings of experimental and non-
experimental approaches and are described briefly in sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
 
4.2.3  General equilibrium effects 
 
Before turning to these techniques, it is worth noting that they have a common 
feature; they ignore the impact a programme may have on outcomes and behaviour 
of non-participants. These effects, known as general equilibrium effects, may arise 
where participants benefit to the detriment of non-participants. This may occur, for 
instance, where WFF participants are helped in such a way that they take jobs that 
would otherwise have gone to non-participants, such that participants simply 
substitute for non-participants.  
 
General equilibrium effects can negate the gains that a partial equilibrium framework 
suggests accrue to participants. Whether this occurs in practice depends on the 
nature and size of the programme. A small programme operating in a sizeable labour 
market is unlikely to generate noticeable general equilibrium effects. Programmes 
that increase the effective supply of labour by equipping the previously inactive with 
marketable skills will also have some negative effects on non-participants. Note that 
general equilibrium effects need not be negative, but can involve positive spillovers; 
however, for programmes that encourage search effort, they are likely to be negative. 
General equilibrium effects need to be taken into account in evaluating WFF given its 
size relative to the New Zealand population and labour market. A good discussion of 
general equilibrium effects is found in Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). See also 
sections 4.5 and 5.14 for further discussion.  
  
4.3  Random assignment experiments 
 
Although there are unlikely to be any randomly assigned programmes in WFF, it is 
worthwhile mentioning the value of random assignment as an insight into the 
limitations of other methodologies. 
 
Random assignment experiments operate by creating a control group of individuals 
who are randomly denied access to a programme. Properly carried out, random 
assignment creates a control group comprising individuals with identical distributions 
of observable and unobservable characteristics to those in the treatment group 
(within sampling variation). The selection problem is overcome because participation 
is randomly determined. The mean outcome for those participating in the programme 
relative to that for those in the control group provides an estimate of the TT. While 
this is the parameter most commonly examined using random assignment, it is 
possible to design experiments in such a way as to derive estimates of ATE. 
 
4.3.1  Practical problems 
 
Random assignment tends to be costly and requires close monitoring to ensure it is 
effectively administered, however. Random assignment experiments may also 
require informing potential participants of the possibility of being denied treatment. 
The potential for denying treatment can pose politically sensitive, ethical questions.
34 
                                                  
34 Some opponents argue that there could be no role for experiments in social programmes. Yet some 
proponents argue there is a stronger ethical case for random assignment in social programmes when 
there is no strong evidence base regarding effectiveness of the programme, making it unclear whether 
there are potential benefits.     
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These may reduce the chances of an experiment being considered as a means of 
evaluating a programme. Ethical considerations may also increase the chances of 
those responsible for delivery of the programme being reluctant to co-operate.  
 
Other practical problems can bias the estimates. The implementation of the 
experiment itself may alter the framework within which the programme operates. This 
“randomisation bias” can arise for a number of reasons (Heckman and Smith 1995). 
For instance, if random exclusion from a programme de-motivates those who have 
been randomised out, they may perform more poorly than they might otherwise have 
done, and artificially boost the apparent advantages of participation. Furthermore, 
those receiving treatment may drop out of the programme. In this case, random 
assignment does not identify treatment on the treated but instead identifies the mean 
effect of “intent to treat”. This may or may not be of direct policy interest. Conversely, 
those denied treatment may choose to participate in programmes that are effective 
substitutes for the programme under evaluation.  
 
4.4  Non-experimental approaches 
 
There are a number of non-experimental evaluation techniques, and the choice of 
best approach is determined in large part by practicalities. Specifically, the 
characteristics of the programme and the nature and quality of available data are key 
factors.  
 
Non-experimental techniques have one thing in common: in the absence of an 
observable counterfactual, assumptions have to be made to identify the causal effect 
of a policy or programme on the outcome of interest. These are termed identifying 
assumptions. In general, the fewer the assumptions made, and the more plausible 




The main approaches are discussed, and their identifying assumptions highlighted, 
below. They are presented in two broad categories: before–after estimators and 
cross-section estimators. 
 
4.4.1  Before–after estimators 
 
The essential idea of the before–after estimator is to compare the outcomes of a 
group of individuals after participating in a programme with the outcomes of the same 
or a broadly equivalent group before participating, and to view the difference as the 
estimate of TT. This approach has been widely used in evaluations, usually adjusting 
the results to control for the effect of observable characteristics. Given the nature of 
WFF and available data, this might be the only available technique in some cases.  
 
The identifying assumption for this estimator is that the difference between the true 
post-programme counterfactual and the pre-programme outcome averages out to 
zero across all individuals participating in the programme. In fact, so long as this 
averaging-out takes place, the approach does not require longitudinal data. Instead, it 
can be implemented with repeat cross-section data, so long as at least one cross-
section is from a pre-programme period.  
 
                                                  
35 The plausibility of the assumptions is the most important aspect, rather than the number of 
assumptions.    
37 
Before–after estimators involve selection on unobservables. In essence, it assumes 
that the unobservables are specific to an individual and either fixed over time 
(individual effects) or not fixed over time (transitory effects).  
 
Participation in the programme is assumed to depend on the fixed effect and not the 
transitory effect. Clearly, macroeconomic changes between the two observation 
points will violate the assumption, as might changes in the lifecycle position of a 
cohort of participants. In addition, anticipation effects by participants and non-




In view of the likely transgression of the identifying assumption, a more widely used 
approach is the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator, also known as the “natural 
experiment” approach (eg Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). DiD operates by comparing 
a before–after estimate for participants with a before–after estimate for non-
participants and regarding the difference as TT.  
 
The identifying assumption is more plausible than that for the before–after estimator. 
Specifically, the average change in the no-programme outcome measure is assumed 
to be the same for participants and non-participants. What this means in effect is that 
the DiD estimator can cope with macroeconomic changes or changes in the lifecycle 
position, so long as those changes affect both participants and non-participants 
similarly.  
 
This highlights the need to select a suitable comparison group of non-participants. 
Often, the choice of comparison group is justified on the basis of it trending in a 
similar way to the treatment group with regard to the outcome variable in question 
over a prolonged period before the programme was introduced. While this is 
reassuring, it is usual to adjust DiD estimates for observable characteristics and 
consequently it is the regression-adjusted outcomes that should trend together rather 
than the outcome measures themselves. 
 
The effectiveness of the DiD estimator can be seen by considering the nature of the 
characteristics of the unobserved variables that may affect outcomes. In addition to 
the individual effects and transitory effects characterising the before–after estimator, 
an effect common to individuals but varying over time (trend effect) is also allowed 
for. As already noted, the before–after estimator eliminates the individual effects. The 
advantage of the DiD estimator is that it also removes the trend effects. Thus, the 
only remaining effect is that specific to the individual but varying over time. This 
cannot be controlled for, and should it influence the decision to participate in the 
programme, the identifying assumption will be violated and the resulting estimates 
biased. 
 
The fragility of the DiD estimator to violation of the identifying assumption can be 
seen by considering an empirical phenomenon which has become known as 
Ashenfelter’s dip. It has often been noted that participation in a training programme is 
more likely where there is a temporary reduction in earnings just before the 
programme takes place. Should earnings be mean-reverting,
36 earnings growth 
among participants would exceed that among non-participants, irrespective of 
whether they received any training. Consequently, the DiD estimator (and the before–
after estimator) will provide overestimates of programme effects on earnings in this 
                                                  
36 Mean reversion is a characteristic of certain statistical processes, and is the tendency to gravitate 
towards a “normal” equilibrium level.    
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scenario (Heckman and Smith 1999). This could be relevant also to wage 
supplementation programmes such as WFF, ie some people who receive payments 
could be in this position of a temporary dip in earnings, so change in earnings over 
time could be misleading as a measure of programme effect. 
 
Furthermore, the before–after estimator and the DiD estimator both rely on the 
composition of the treatment group remaining unchanged in the post-programme 
period. If this condition is not satisfied, the difference between the true counterfactual 
and the pre-programme outcome will not necessarily average out to zero across all 
individuals. Both panel and repeat cross-section data can be problematic with regard 
to changing composition of the treated and untreated populations. Changing 
composition can occur most obviously with repeat cross-section data but it is also 
possible with longitudinal data – for example, should the sample deplete over time on 
a systematic basis. 
 
4.4.2  Cross-section estimators 
 
If longitudinal or repeat cross-section data is not available, other approaches must be 
considered.  
 
Cross-section estimators use non-participants to derive the counterfactual for 
participants. Until recently, a standard way to isolate the independent effect of 
programme participation on labour market and wellbeing outcomes involved using 
regression methods to control for observable differences between participants and 
non-participants. For example, to compare differences in the rates of a binary 
outcome (such as entry to work) between participants and non-participants after 
controlling for observable differences in the two groups, a logistic regression 
approach was used. The binary outcome was the dependent variable, and the 
observables plus a binary “participation” indicator were the independent variables. 
The coefficient for the “participation” indicator was interpreted as the programme 
effect on the treated, TT, after controlling for the observables.  
 
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that, having controlled for observables, 
participation is independent of the process determining outcomes. In other words, 
observables that enter the regression capture selection into the programme. As we 
note below, regression shares this assumption with the method of matching.  
 
Two other cross-sectional estimators that deal with selection on unobservables are 
common in the literature – instrumental variables and the Heckman selection 
estimator.  
 
Regression and instrumental variables 
 
The instrumental variables (IV) method is a regression approach possible when a 
variable can be identified that is related to participation but not outcomes. This 
variable is known as the instrument and it introduces an element of randomness into 
the assignment that approximates the effect of an experiment. Where an instrument 
exists, estimation of the treatment effect can proceed using a standard IV approach. 
One way to think about random assignment is that it provides the ideal instrumental 
variable.  
 
Where variation in the impact of treatment across people is not correlated with the 
instrument, the IV approach recovers an estimate of impact of treatment on the 
treated, TT. However, if the variation in gains is related to the instrument, the 
parameter estimated is LATE (Imbens and Angrist 1994). Consider the example of    
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using distance from a childcare centre as the instrument. If individuals know their 
gains from using the centre, then among participants, those from farther away need a 
larger gain than average to cover their higher cost of participating. Where there is 
such a correlation, LATE is estimated. As noted earlier, if the policy under 
consideration is a marginal increase or decrease in the costs of participation 
(childcare costs in the example), then LATE is the parameter of interest. 
 
The main drawback of the IV approach is that it will often be difficult to find a suitable 
instrument because, to identify the treatment effect, one needs at least one regressor 
that determines programme participation but is not itself determined by the factors 
that affect outcomes (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, Heckman 1995). The instrument 
is most effective if it is virtually randomly assigned. There are few obvious 
instruments in the case of WFF, although distance from a childcare provider might be 
one, and non-linearities in income entitlements for assistance might also be plausible. 
Detailed knowledge of how a programme is administered can throw up ideas for 
instruments – hence the implementation and delivery evaluation data can link to the 
impact evaluation.  
 
Heckman selection estimator (control function) 
 
The Heckman selection estimator allows for selection into the treatment group on the 
basis of variables that are unobservable to the analyst. It operates by assuming a 
particular form for the distribution of the unobservable characteristics that jointly 
influence participation and outcome. By explicitly modelling the participation decision, 
it is possible to derive a variable that can be used to control for that part of the 
unobserved variation in the outcome equation that is correlated with the unobserved 
variation in the participation decision. Including this new variable alongside the 
observable variables in the outcome equation can result in unbiased estimates of the 
treatment effect. While not strictly necessary from a mathematical viewpoint, credible 
implementations include an instrument – that is, a variable included in the estimation 
of the participation equation that is excluded from the outcome equation. 
 
This approach appears to offer an elegant means of obtaining an estimate of TT in 
the presence of selection. However, there are two main drawbacks. First, as with the 
IV approach, the identification of a suitable instrument is often a significant practical 
obstacle to successful implementation. Second, the resulting estimates are entirely 
contingent on the underlying distributional assumption relating to the unobserved 
variables. In fact, research has shown that estimates can be surprisingly sensitive to 
these assumptions not being met.
37 
 
Method of matching 
 
The method of matching assumes selection on observables. For every individual in 
the treatment group, a matching individual is found from among the non-treatment 
group.
38 The choice of match is dictated by observable characteristics. What is 
required is to match each individual in the treatment group with an untreated 
individual with similar characteristics. The mean effect of treatment can then be 
calculated as the average difference in outcomes between the treated and the 
matched non-treated.  
 
                                                  
37 See, for example, Goldberger (1983) and Puhani (2000). 
38 In practice, participants may be matched to multiple non-participants. See, for example, Smith and 
Todd (2005) and Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) for more about matching methods.     
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The approach has an intuitive appeal but rests on several assumptions. The first is 
that if one can control for observable differences in characteristics between the 
treated and non-treated groups, the outcome that would result in the absence of 
treatment is the same in both cases. This identifying assumption for matching, which 
is also the identifying assumption for the simple regression estimator, is known as the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA). It allows the counterfactual outcome for 
the treatment group to be inferred, and therefore for any differences between the 
treated and non-treated to be attributed to the effect of the programme.  
 
To be credible, a very rich dataset is required since the evaluator needs to be 
confident that all the variables affecting both participation and outcome are observed. 
That is, it is assumed that any selection on unobservables is trivial in that these 
unobservables do not affect outcomes in the absence of the treatment. Where data 
does not contain all the variables influencing both participation and the outcome, the 
CIA is violated since the programme effect will be accounted for in part by information 
that is not available to the evaluator. One example might be instances in which the 
evaluator is unaware of those approaching eligibility for the programme adjusting 
their behaviour in anticipation of programme entry by reducing their job search (the 
Ashenfelter’s dip noted earlier). This might affect both their probability of entering the 
programme and their likelihood of obtaining a job. Another example is where some of 
those eligible for a programme do not participate because they are expecting a job 
offer shortly.  
 
However, if the CIA holds, the matching process is analogous to creating an 
experimental dataset in that, conditional on observed characteristics, the selection 
process is random. Consequently, the distribution of the counterfactual outcomes for 
the treated is the same as the distribution of the observed outcomes for the non-
treated. 
 
Matching makes an assumption made by all partial equilibrium estimators, that an 
individual’s programme participation decision does not depend on the decisions of 
others. This assumption would be violated if peer effects influenced participation. This 
might occur, for instance, where a programme targeted at single parents is highly 
regarded by participants locally, thus encouraging others to join. If this peer 
correlation is unrelated to outcomes, it becomes part of the error term in the 
participation equation and need not be a problem. However, where peer correlation is 
related to outcomes, estimates that cannot account for those peer effects will be 
biased. An example might be instances in which a programme offers a limited 
number of places such that decisions to participate now reduce the probability of 
other applicants entering the programme later. If decisions to participate early are 
correlated with factors that independently improve labour market prospects – such as 
motivation to get a job – estimates failing to account for this will be upwardly biased. 
It is possible to overcome this problem where proxies for supply constraints are 
available for inclusion in the estimation (Sianesi 2001). However, it should be noted 
that peer correlation unrelated to outcomes still has implications for the standard 
errors.  
 
Another assumption that is required for matching and all of the other partial 
equilibrium estimation strategies is the so-called SUTVA (stable unit treatment value 
assumption). This assumption says that the impact of the programme on one person 
does not depend on who else, or how many others, is/are in the programme. SUTVA 
is the assumption that the model’s representation of outcomes is adequate, ie that 
the observed outcome for an individual exposed to treatment depends only on the 
individual and not on treatments other individuals receive nor on the mechanism    
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assigning treatment to individuals, and that whether the individual participates 
depends only on the individual. 
 
A practical constraint exists in that as the number of characteristics used in the match 
increases the chances of finding a match reduce. It is easy to see that including even 
a relatively small number of characteristics can quickly result in some participants 
remaining unmatched. This obstacle was overcome thanks to an important result of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This showed that matching on a single index 
reflecting the probability of participation could achieve consistent estimates of the 
treatment effect, in the same way as matching on all covariates. This index is the 
propensity score
39 and this variant of matching is called “propensity score matching”. 
Its clear advantage is that it replaces high-dimensional matches with single-index 
matches.  
 
The problem of reduced chances of finding a match does not disappear entirely with 
propensity score matching, however. It is still possible there will be nobody in the 
non-treatment group with a propensity score that is “similar” to that of a particular 
treatment-group individual.
40 This is known as the support problem, and means of 
addressing it vary in their level of complexity. However, they all operate by identifying 
participants who are poorly matched and omitting them from the estimation of 
treatment effects. What they seek to guarantee is that any combination of 
characteristics seen among those in the treatment group may also be observed 
among those in the non-treatment group.  
 
Where there is no support for the treated individual in the non-treated population, the 
treated individual is dropped from the analysis. The estimated treatment effect has 
then to be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated falling within the 
common support. In one way this is a strength of matching, since it makes explicit the 
need for common support across the treated and non-treated. However, enforcement 
of the common support can result in the loss of a sizeable proportion of the treated 
population, especially when considering multiple-treatment programmes.  
 
One must bear this in mind when considering the policy relevance of results. This is 
because the policy analyst wishes to know the effect of a policy on those who 
participate (or even on the whole eligible population), not just a sub-sample for whom 
common support is enforceable (see also section 4.1.1). If treatment effects vary 
non-randomly with those unsupported characteristics, the treatment effect relevant to 
the supported sub-population will not provide a consistent estimate for the 
unsupported sub-population. Whether this is a problem in practice will depend upon 
the proportion of the treatment group lost. In any event, it is informative to consider 
the characteristics of those treated who are lost to the analysis, since this will 
uncover the sorts of treated individuals who have no counterparts in the non-treated 
population. This can often tell a great deal about the nature of selection into a 
programme and provide important clues for the interpretation of estimated effects. 
 
The explicit acknowledgement of the common support problem is one of the main 
features distinguishing matching methods from standard parametric regressions. The 
problem is less severe with parametric approaches since the model results can be 
used to extrapolate to unsupported regions. However, such out-of-sample predictions 
                                                  
39 Note that the index used for matching need not necessarily be the probability of participation, although 
in practice it commonly is. 
40 Participants are similar to non-participants in that their propensity to participate is similar. For this to 
happen, it is not necessary for the participant and matched non-participant to share characteristics. 
Rather, the values each has for the combination of variables entering the participation equation 
generate similar propensity scores.    
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will need to be carefully assessed. The other main distinguishing feature, already 
hinted at, is that matching is non-parametric. Consequently, it avoids the restrictions 
involved in models that require the relationship between characteristics and 
outcomes to be specified. If one is willing to impose a linear functional form, the 
matching estimator and the regression-based approach have the same identifying 
assumptions. 
 
While the use of matching has largely focused on participation or non-participation in 
a programme, there is often a need to consider programmes that may comprise 
several different types of treatment, as might be the case in WFF. Imbens (1999) and 
Lechner (2001a) show that the major results relating to the two-state framework 
extend straightforwardly to the case of multiple mutually exclusive treatments – that 
is, where an individual’s participation in one part of the programme precludes them 
from simultaneously participating in another part of the programme. Hence, matching 




Heckman, Ichimura et al. (1998) proposed combining matching with difference-in-
differences. This “conditional” DiD estimator allows for individual fixed effects and 
trend effects to influence participation. In other words, it weakens the identifying 
assumption for matching by allowing unobserved variables to influence participation. 
This weaker assumption was not rejected in their study.
41 This methodology is 
perhaps among the most commonly used at present in the evaluation of welfare-to-
work programmes. 
 
4.5  General equilibrium effects
42 
 
General equilibrium effects come about when programmes affect outcomes and 
behaviour of non-participants as well as of participants. Heckman, Lochner and Taber 
(1998) show that taking account of general equilibrium effects can strongly affect the 
impact estimates made using partial equilibrium analysis.  
 
However, there are considerable methodological difficulties in analysing general 
equilibrium effects such that “they will remain controversial in both the academic 
literature and the policy world” (Smith 2000:2). Smith goes on to argue: 
 
Despite this controversy, evaluators should pay attention to general equilibrium 
effects, if only indirectly through examining the sensitivity of cost–benefit 
analyses to alternative assumptions about them. Such sensitivity analyses would 
represent an improvement on much current partial equilibrium research that 
simply ignores general equilibrium effects. 
 
One way in which WFF may affect non-participants is through displacement 
(Calmfors 1994). In the context of WFF, displacement may occur because assistance 
such as that provided by additional subsidised childcare hours increases the speed 
with which participants leave out-of-work benefits for employment but slows down the 
return to work of others, since participants are competing for the same job places as 
WFF ineligibles. Related to this are substitution effects, whereby subsidies to one 
group of workers cause employers to substitute them for other unsubsidised workers. 
                                                  
41 For an application of conditional DiD to the evaluation of the New Deal in the UK, see Blundell et al. 
(2003) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). See Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2001) and 
Eichler and Lechner (2000) for applications of conditional DiD using matching. 
42 This subsection draws heavily on Smith (2000).    
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A third consideration is deadweight effects, whereby a programme devotes time or 
resources to an activity that would have occurred anyway. Note that the usual partial 
equilibrium estimates are net of deadweight. Calmfors (1994) also notes the 
importance of tax effects, whereby the taxes collected to finance a programme may 
distort the choices and opportunities of both participants and non-participants. Tax 
effects do not appear to be relevant in the case of WFF since it is funded out of 
budget surpluses. However, estimation of displacement, substitution and deadweight 
effects is important in appraising the benefits of a programme net of its true costs and 
its distributional effects.
43 This is particularly so for programmes such as WFF, which 
offers generous financial work incentives to a sizeable proportion of the population. 
 
4.5.1  Estimating general equilibrium effects 
 
General equilibrium effects are usually recovered using structural models that involve 
making explicit assumptions about the mechanisms generating the general 
equilibrium effects. As well as being computationally and conceptually complex, these 
models rely upon strong assumptions about the functional forms of economic 
relationships and the values of economic parameters. 
 
All the partial equilibrium analyses described in sections 4.3 and 4.4 ignore 
displacement, substitution and deadweight, and thus estimate potentially biased 
programme effects. To illustrate for WFF, consider the impact of the In-Work Payment 
(IWP) on the annual earnings of participants versus a comparator group. If eligibles 
are induced to work, or to work for longer, by the offer of a tax credit, but IWP has 
displacement effects, these effects will show up as lower earnings among 
comparison-group members, some of whom will have been displaced, leading to an 
upward bias in the estimated impact of IWP on its participants. 
 
Empirical investigation of the general equilibrium effects of job-entry bonuses for the 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) population in the US reveals substantial deadweight 
(Meyer 1995) and displacement effects (Davidson and Woodbury 1993
44), the latter 
offsetting between one- and two-thirds of the gross impact obtained through partial 
equilibrium estimates.  
 
4.6  Which techniques “work”? 
 
There is no single answer to this question. The choice of evaluation technique 
depends on the nature of the programme being evaluated plus the nature of the 
available dataset. The identifying assumptions that underlie each of the approaches 
may be more or less credible in particular applications. The key point is that all 
approaches involve assumptions being made, and these assumptions are generally 
untestable in practice.  
 
However, researchers have sought to appraise the plausibility of key assumptions by 
analysing experimental data using non-experimental techniques, judging the 
“success” of the non-experimental approaches by their ability to replicate 
experimental results. Findings are mixed. For instance, propensity score-matching 
techniques successfully replicate experimental results in one study (Dehijia and 
Wahba 1999) but not in others (Heckman et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2000, 2003, 
2005; Agodini and Dynarski 2001). Heckman et al. is the most comprehensive 
                                                  
43 A budget surplus does not mean that there are no deadweight costs, since opportunity costs matter.  
44 Note that their results may be dependent on the assumption they make that total employment is fixed. 
This is reasonable in the short-term but not in the medium- or long-term.    
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attempt to use experimental data to examine the assumptions underlying various 
evaluation techniques. While the results are data dependent and not necessarily able 
to be generalised, they provide an insight into the strength of the assumptions 
underlying the main techniques. However, in general, studies comparing 
experimental and non-experimental results place non-experimental estimators at a 
disadvantage. This is because they rely on drawing comparison groups from 
localities other than those where the treatment occurs, and often use different data to 
construct predictor and outcome measures (see, for instance, LaLonde 1986; Dehijia 




Even if, in a particular study, one or other of the assumptions underpinning a 
particular approach is likely to be violated, this does not mean that we should dismiss 
using that approach out of hand. It is also important to consider the likely seriousness 
of the violation and the direction of any bias introduced. Often, the assumptions are 
not justifiable and there is no prior knowledge of the relative magnitudes of the bias 
due to unobservables and that due to observables. It is then useful to apply matching 
methods to eliminate the bias due to observables first and then use different 
procedures to address the bias due to unobservables; this is the use of the 
conditional DiD estimator described at the end of section 4.4.2. 
 
However, the size of the WFF – that is, the percentage of the population eligible for 
the programme coupled with the size of the financial incentives it offers – suggests 
that the programme is liable to have a substantial impact on non-participants as well 
as participants. This indicates that the potential general equilibrium effects must be 
accounted for in any thorough investigation. 
 
                                                  
45 The comparisons using Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) data in Heckman et al. (1998) are 
different in this respect because JTPA eligible non-participants are from the same local labour markets 
and have data collected in the same manner as a subset of people in the experiment.     
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5  Making work pay 
 
In this section, the issues related to evaluating the impact of WFF on making work 
pay are discussed. The methods of identifying causal impact introduced in section 4 
are drawn upon. 
 
5.1  The rationale behind WFF 
 
There is a unifying logic to the WFF interventions, namely that, although increases in 
paid employment can improve net household income, this is not always the case and 
that, furthermore, there is a strong perception among many who are out of work that 
the returns for paid work are insufficient to merit moving into the labour market, 
particularly for those with children. Thus, WFF seeks to “make work pay” through 
income transfers to workers that increase the net returns to working relative to being 
out of work. This is primarily achieved through income-tested transfers that, in 
reflecting assessed needs, are gradually withdrawn as net income rises.  
 
In social policy terms, WFF seeks to breach the “unemployment trap” associated with 
relatively high replacement ratios (albeit driven by low wages rather than high 
benefits) by offering state assistance to those moving into employment and, in some 
cases, lowering effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs). However, it does so at the 
expense of extending the “poverty trap” of EMTRs fairly high up the income scale to 
those who now become eligible for assistance. This scenario is fairly similar to the 
one faced in the UK, where, since the early 1990s, successive governments, 
Conservative and Labour, have increased the generosity of in-work wage 
supplements. In the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, this was undertaken in 
conjunction with a decline in the real value of out-of-work transfer payments (driven 
by a decision to “up rate” them by prices rather than earnings in the early 1980s) and 
an increase in the conditionality of any out-of-work payments to encourage job 
search and a closer attachment to the labour market.  
 
There are strong theoretical grounds for expecting offsetting effects from these 
financial incentives on parents’ labour market participation decisions. In theory, there 
are two decisions individuals (and households) must make. The first is whether or not 
to participate in the labour market at all. The second is, conditional on choosing to 
participate, deciding how many hours of paid labour to supply. Assume for the 
moment that these are relatively unconstrained choices of individuals and that the 
choice is determined largely by the net income generated by decisions and 
preferences for work versus leisure at different levels of net income. These decisions 
are affected by what economists call income and substitution effects. The income 
effect refers to changes in desired hours of work as individuals’ incomes change, 
holding the wage rate constant. If leisure is a normal good, the effect of higher 
income (with a constant wage rate) is to reduce labour supply. The substitution effect 
describes the effect on a person’s choice between hours of paid work and leisure as 
the wage rate changes, holding income constant. An increase in the net wage rate 
(with constant income) may be expected to increase labour supply. 
 
Policy reforms such as more generous tax credits involve both income and 
substitution effects, so the impact on labour supply cannot be predicted in advance. 
The income effect of a higher tax credit will reduce labour supply, whereas the 
substitution effect will increase it. At what point an individual will change their 
preference set depends, in part, on the costs they face and the utility they derive from 
each state. In extremis, those with high out-of-work utility may trade additional    
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income for leisure because the effective income guarantee offered by tax credits for 
relatively low hours of work makes leisure attractive above the qualifying hours’ 
threshold. Under these circumstances, the income effect outweighs the substitution 
effect, resulting in existing workers reducing their hours to close to the qualifying 
threshold. This phenomenon was observed among single parents in the UK eligible 
for wage supplements and is labelled the backward-bending labour supply curve by 
economists (Blundell 1994).  
 
The key point here is that, a priori, it is not obvious whether a certain set of financial 
incentives will induce people to supply their labour and, if they do, what hours they 
will choose. Nor do we know, a priori, what the new incentive set might do to the 
hours decisions of those already in employment, many of whom will be eligible for 
existing (less generous) assistance. 
 
However, there is a second component to WFF – increases in Family Support (FS) 
that are not conditional on employment status and thus offer more income to lower-
income families regardless of employment status. This increase comes about partly 
through the transfer of the child component of the out-of-work benefit to FS, but also 
through above-inflation upratings. This approach, perhaps motivated by concerns 
about poverty, can also have ambiguous effects on labour supply. By increasing the 
income available to those out of work, it can make being out of work a more viable 
option, potentially extending periods of labour market inactivity. On the other hand, 
there is substantial evidence that interruptions to income flows during the transition 
into work, and the precariousness of many entry-level jobs, act as a disincentive to 
job entry among those reliant on out-of-work state support (Jenkins and Millar 1989).  
 
FS may assuage those concerns, assisting movement into work by offering a basic 
income that is not put at risk when a parent chooses to enter employment. There is 
evidence in Britain that policies designed to assist families with the perceived risk of 
transition into paid employment can increase labour market participation (McLaughlin 
1991, 1994). 
 
5.2  Household labour supply 
 
Many of those eligible for WFF are in couples, or are in the process of leaving or 
forming partnerships, whereupon labour supply decisions occur at the level of the 
household. This is because the unit for eligibility is the household (its income, its 
working hours, etc), such that the decisions of two parents are inextricably linked. 
That is to say, in a household context, there is interdependence between parents’ 
preferences, making the decision a household-level one rather than a purely 
individual one. This raises a number of important issues about the way in which 
incentives work and resultant choices.
46 
 
Consider three scenarios. The first is one in which both parents are out of work. 
Faced with greater financial incentives to enter employment, they must decide 
whether to do so, who moves into a job and what hours to work. In most countries, 
the hours condition for tax credit eligibility must be reached by one or other parent. 
Combined hours are not relevant. This usually results in one parent entering paid 
employment at or above the threshold. However, in the case of In-Work Payment 
(IWP), the hours condition is at the household level, so whether the eligibility 
threshold for IWP is reached depends on the sum of the couple’s working hours. In 
principle, this offers greater flexibility to the couple, both of whom may supply shorter 
                                                  
46 Note that preferences are constant in the standard model, but choices change.     
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working hours. That said, the threshold for a couple is 30 hours for IWP, almost twice 
the threshold for working tax credit in the UK (16 hours). It is possible that the IWP 
household-level hours threshold will help avoid the “dual earner” versus “no earner” 




In the second scenario, one parent is already in paid work but the second parent is 
considering whether to work or not. The IWP hours threshold rule could allow the 
couple to combine their hours in any number of ways to reach the 30-hour eligibility 
threshold. However, the low net returns to state-assisted households induced by 
relatively high EMTRs mean that second earners may only supply their labour when 
the combined earned income of both parents takes them well beyond the “poverty 
trap”. This is certainly the experience in the UK, where a decision to participate by a 
second earner is one of the primary routes off in-work assistance (Bryson and Marsh 
1996). 
 
In the third scenario, both parents are in work but become eligible for the first time for 
tax credits or are eligible for more assistance than before. How do these low-earning 
two-earner households respond to the policy change? One possibility is that the 
parent with a lower attachment to the labour market will reduce their hours or 
withdraw completely from the labour market. In the literature, it is often assumed that 
the woman conditions her labour supply on her spouse’s labour supply, making her 
the secondary earner (this is known as the chauvinist model). 
 
5.3  Other considerations in making work pay 
 
The stylised discussion above ignores some crucial points about the nature of labour 
market decisions made by households, which need to be considered in any 
evaluation of WFF. 
 
First, individual and household choices are often constrained. These constraints may 
be set by employers who are not amenable to offering “family-friendly” hours, either 
because they have cost implications for the firm or because they are simply viewed 
as inconvenient by the employer. One needs to survey employers to understand how 
they engage with this issue, or at least observe the changing distribution of hours 
offered by employers to eligible and non-eligible workers to establish how serious this 
constraint is.  
 
Another constraint is the availability of affordable and suitable childcare during 
working hours and while travelling to work. The total number of hours for which 
childcare is subsidised through WFF is substantial (up to 50 hours per week for those 
in employment or training, and nine hours for those seeking paid work). The subsidy 
meets all, or some, of the cost per hour of care, depending on the charge made by 
the provider and the income-testing of the parent(s). However, it is as yet unclear 
whether available care will be suitable in the eyes of parents.
48  
                                                  
47 Since 2003, the amount payable for 30 hours’ working to couples in receipt of Working Tax Credit has 
been based on the couple’s joint hours. The effect of this change has yet to be evaluated. We thank 
Mike Brewer for pointing this out. 
48 Suitability will turn on criteria such as quality, convenience and reliability. See section 2.5.3 for 
suggestions of how the Childcare Survey might cover these issues. The survey would also need to 
cover accessibility to family-friendly working arrangements, as these will shape parents’ work and 
childcare decisions. It will also be important for this survey to measure work and parental care 
preferences, as these might help in understanding for whom and under what circumstances childcare 
subsidies affect behaviour.    
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Second, labour supply choices are not purely calculations based on the net financial 
returns to paid employment relative to unemployment. These considerations are 
clearly very important, but they are not the only ones. Parents’ choices will be 
determined by the implications of labour market choices for their wellbeing and that 
of other family members. There are well-established psychological benefits to paid 
work for the workers themselves, associated with self-actualisation (Warr’s concept 
of job-related wellbeing; see Mullarkey et al. 1999), social status and social contact. 
However, these must be weighed against the opportunity costs of going to work, 
which might be particularly high for those who view their caring role as central to their 
own self-conception. Difficulties in obtaining entry-level jobs and holding onto them 
can also result in negative outcomes for parents and their children, including stress, 
reduced quality time for parent/child relationships, and the loss of the positives from 
working when those jobs disappear. 
 
Third, children make an input into the labour supply decisions of single and couple 
parents. They have their own perceptions of whether paid work is good for the parent, 
children and household, and they negotiate with parents over working patterns, care 
arrangements and so on, all of which can feature in the choices made by parents. 
Parents’ perceptions of children’s needs at different lifecycle stages will also influence 
parents’ choices, particularly among families with young children. 
 
Fourth, there are fixed costs to working, which are often overlooked. These relate not 
only to the childcare costs referred to above, but also to travel time and costs, the 
purchasing of work-related tools, clothes and other equipment and, in some cases, 
child-related expenditures following the cessation of “passported benefits” such as 
the community services card. Once such factors are taken into consideration, any net 
returns to working may diminish significantly.
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Fifth, there are time dimensions to the supply of labour, which cannot be captured 
simply in a “snapshot” before/after time frame. Most parents will be considering the 
consequences of entering, or not entering, the labour market or training for the 
medium and longer terms. For instance, the desire to fulfil a prime-carer role may 
delay a parent’s entry to the labour market for some years, even though the parent is 
eager to return to employment. 
 
5.4  What is WFF offering? 
 
When faced with labour supply decisions, parents and households have a range of 
benefits and credits for which they may be eligible. Depending on their 
circumstances, many will be eligible for more than one benefit or credit. These 
transfers to individuals interact in a complex way, so it can often be difficult for 
individuals to establish precisely how well-off they might be by entering paid work and 
how the net returns might differ with the number of hours worked. What can look like 
a perfectly sensible set of arrangements on paper can prove to be very difficult to 
comprehend for a beneficiary or worker. Making the “right” choice can be difficult 
                                                  
49 According to Cabinet Policy Committee (2004 in Cabinet Paper minutes 04 13/4 point 109), the WFF 
reforms reforms “have the potential to cause an estimated 29,000 existing Community Services Card 
holders to lose their eligibility. The loss would, on average, cost current holders approximately $600 
annually. Holders with chronic health problems have the potential to lose more from the loss of 
Community Services Card subsidies than they will gain from the Family Income Assistance reforms. In 
light of the above impacts, we propose increasing the Community Services Card eligibility thresholds at 
each of the three stages of the Family Income Assistance reforms to ensure all current recipients remain 
eligible for Community Services.”    
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without adequate information about the way the system works, which is why MSD 
advisers play such an important role in explaining what financial assistance is on 
offer and matching that to labour market opportunities. 
 
It is useful, nevertheless, to consider what WFF looks like “on paper” – that is to say, 
how the financial support package alters as individuals enter work and supply more 
hours. To do this, we present what economists term the budget constraint facing 
workers as they move up the hours’ distribution. The budget constraint comprises a 
level of non-labour income (income when hours of work are zero) and a schedule 
indicating net income for any number of hours worked. For a given wage rate and a 
specified level of non-labour income, utility-maximising individuals will simultaneously 
select whether to work or not and how many hours of work are desired. We present 
graphical illustrations of the way in which net income changes with hours worked due 
to the interaction of gross earnings and tax/benefit entitlements. We show the budget 
constraint for seven points in time, from pre-WFF in April 2004 through to April 2007, 
after the major WFF changes. In addition, we show how the state assistance 
package changes with additional hours of work in April 2004 and April 2007.
50 What is 
on offer depends on entitlements determined by family type, gross hourly wages, 
housing costs and locality. We are grateful to analysts at MSD for providing the 
information used below.  
 
To simplify, we focus on the following four families: 
·  Rod and Barb live with their three children aged 1, 5 and 7 in Auckland. They pay 
$385 per week in rent and Rod works with a $25 per hour gross wage. 
·  Rob and Aroha live with their two children aged 4 and 16 in Wairoa. They pay 
$120 per week in rent and both work with a $12 per hour gross wage. 
·  Pete and Sue live with their two children aged 6 and 12 in Timaru. They pay $150 
per week in mortgage and both work with a $27.88 per hour gross wage. 
·  Mary is a single parent with one child aged 4, living in Onehunga. She pays $255 
per week in rent and works with an $11 per hour gross wage. 
 
Rod and Barb (figures 1a–1c) 
 
The budget constraints for Rod and Barb in April 2004, April 2007 and the intervening 
period are shown in Figures 1a–1c in appendix 1. At zero hours’ work, net household 
income rises from below $600 per week to almost $700 between April 2004 and April 
2007, due to more generous entitlements to AS and FS. The removal of the AS 
abatement for beneficiaries in October 2004 produces a net income increase at low 
hours, but this Auckland family benefits particularly from the AS changes in maxima 
in April 2005. The FS up-ratings in April 2005 and April 2007 are particularly valuable 
for this three-child household, as is the introduction of IWP in April 2006, when the 
family work earnings are in excess of the eligibility threshold. There is an interaction 
between hourly pay rates, earnings and the eligibility threshold. Whereas in 2004 
state assistance ceases at around 40 hours of work due to the low hourly rates of pay 
(see figure 1b), by April 2007 assistance is available through to around 55 hours due 
to the increased generosity of payments (see figure 1c).
51 This additional assistance 
is apparent in the budget constraint (figure 1a), which shows much higher net 
incomes in 2007 than in 2004 until entitlements to state assistance diminish for hours 
in the mid-40s. This comes at the expense of high EMTRs. These were already high 
                                                  
50 The examples use hourly pay rates, which is useful for lower income groups, where this type of 
payment form is more common, and which also helps illustrate the work impacts; however, the eligibility 
for payments is related to earnings, which will reflect both the pay rate and number of hours worked.  
51 Obviously, the example does not reflect all cases, as someone working for a very low hourly pay rate 
will be able to work a much greater number of hours before eligibility is affected than someone on a 
higher hourly rate.     
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in 2004 for low hours working, averaging close to 100% through to 20 hours, but 
similar EMTRs also exist by 2007 in the over-40-hour range, whereas the absence of 
assistance meant EMTRs of around 40% previous to 2004. 
 
Rob and Aroha (figures 2a–2c) 
 
Rob and Aroha differ in a number of ways from Rod and Barb. The budget 
constraints for Rob and Aroha are shown in figures 2a–2c in appendix 1. They have 
only two children, they are in receipt of Unemployment Benefit and their rental costs 
are considerably lower. Both parents are working but have much lower hourly 
earnings than Rod. Indeed, at $12 per hour, their earnings are only 1.25 times the 
adult minimum wage. The assistance package available to them in 2004 differs 
accordingly. They have only a small entitlement to AS and they are eligible for 
substantial childcare subsidy (which is paid to the childcare provider). In April 2004, 
the budget constraint remains very flat up to around 30 hours’ work, when it actually 
dips because of an EMTR above 100% due to a drop in benefit income. The budget 
constraint then climbs steadily, with the household still eligible for substantial 
assistance at 60 hours’ work. By April 2007, as in the case of Rod and Barb, net 
income is appreciably higher at zero hours. Net returns to working are roughly 
constant in the 8- to 30-hour range in 2007, as in 2004, due to high EMTRs of close 
to 100%. Around the 30-hour mark, net returns to working improve from April 2006 
due to FTC changes, which eliminate the very high EMTR at that point. The 
substantial hike in net incomes from April 2006 compared with October 2005 from the 
30-hour point is due to the advent of IWP. This household continues to be eligible for 
substantial FS/IWP and childcare subsidy even at 60 hours’ employment. 
 
Pete and Sue (figures 3a–3c) 
 
Like Rob and Aroha, Pete and Sue are married with two children, but their hourly 
earnings are considerably higher and they have a mortgage rather than renting. 
Figures 3a–3c in appendix 1 illustrate their budget constraint changes. This is a 
household facing a fairly smooth budget constraint with high EMTRs of close to 
100% between four and 18 hours, a situation that remains unchanged after the 
introduction of WFF. There is some increase in net income through gradual upratings 
of FS and AS, with the latter payable further up the hours distribution, but the only 
substantial change affecting this household is the advent of IWP, which increases net 
earnings in the 30- to 40-hour range from April 2006. Due to their high hourly 
earnings (close to double the median hourly wage in 2004 of $15.34
52), assistance 
ceases at a little over 40 hours. 
 
Mary (figures 4a–4c) 
 
Mary is one of many single parents expected to benefit financially from WFF. Mary’s 
budget constraint is shown in figures 4a–4c in appendix 1. She is a low earner, with a 
gross hourly wage only 1.2 times the adult minimum wage, and her rent is fairly high. 
The budget constraint shows she will benefit substantially from WFF, regardless of 
the hours she works, although compared with the pre-WFF regime of April 2004 the 
net returns to working are particularly high for long hours of work. High EMTRs of 
nearly 100% in the hours range 16–44 mean she can do little to improve her net 
income by working more hours over that range. Even beyond these hours, the net 
returns to working remain modest until, from April 2006, there is a substantial 
increase in income arising from IWP. Compared with 2004, Mary receives 
                                                  
52 Statistics New Zealand 2004.    
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considerably more in childcare assistance, IWP and FS in the 50- to 60-hour range in 
2007. 
 
Within economics, the decision between hours of work and hours of leisure is treated 
as part of neoclassical consumer theory. The budget constraint is the “objective” 
component, but where people place themselves on the budget constraint is 
determined by the “subjective” component, namely their indifference curves. The 
illustrations above nevertheless illustrate how the objective component differs across 
household types, pointing to the potential for heterogeneous impacts across 
households and thus the value of sub-group analyses. 
 
5.5  Effects of WFF  
 
5.5.1  Routes by which WFF may affect aggregate employment 
 
There are five direct ways that WFF may affect aggregate employment. The first is 
the rate at which individuals take up paid work. It is possible that some non-workers 
will contemplate paid work for the first time due to the new incentives regime set by 
WFF,
53 while others will simply enter employment more rapidly than they might have 
anticipated. If a person expects entitlements to rise substantially with a forthcoming 
event – for instance, the ageing of a child – this may slow the rate of job entry. 
 
Second, some may remain in jobs for longer than they otherwise would have done. 
This happens because wage supplements have the effect of smoothing individuals’ 
and households’ incomes over difficult periods. In the absence of a tax credit, those 
facing cuts in overtime payments, reductions in hours or the birth of a new child might 
have left their jobs due to difficulties making ends meet. With wage supplementation, 
these decisions can be delayed or do not arise because the extra income coming into 
the household makes job exit unnecessary. There is substantial evidence that this 
was the prime reason that family credit raised employment rates for low-income 
families in Britain (Bryson and Marsh 1996; Kempson, Bryson and Rowlingson 1994). 
 
Third, total hours will depend upon the hours worked by new workers, plus the hours’ 
adjustments made by existing workers. Existing workers below the hours qualifying 
threshold may find that a small increase in their hours results in a substantial rise in 
net income, inducing a supply of more hours. However, this may be offset by those 
well above the hours threshold who, faced with a poverty trap and relatively high out-
of-work utility, choose to cut their hours, so maximising their per-hour income from 
working. 
 
Fourth, the credit may induce workers to accept wages that are below those they 
might otherwise be prepared to take – something described in the economics 
literature as lowering their reservation wage, namely the price at which they are 
prepared to enter the market. This can have other consequences: for instance, if it 
means they are induced to enter a “poor” job that they might not have otherwise gone 
for, the poor job match may result in them exiting that job more quickly than the job 
they might have entered if they had prolonged their job search to find a better 
“match”. 
 
                                                  
53 There are other incentive effects of WFF than on employment – for example, wage changes may 
affect incentives to invest in human capital (training on the job or externally) and there are also the 
effects of WFF on the incentive to take compensation in kind rather than in wages.     
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The fifth direct WFF effect on employment levels arises from the general equilibrium 
effects (discussed in section 4.5) through its impact on non-participants’ behaviour 
and opportunities through displacement and substitution effects.  
 
In addition to these effects, there are the second-order effects associated with WFF’s 
impact on wage-setting, labour demand and consumer behaviour. It is conceivable 
that WFF will increase the overall demand for labour. If IWP wage supplements 
reduce the price of labour relative to capital, employers may substitute labour for 
capital where opportunities arise. In addition, WFF may increase the effective labour 
supply by, for instance, increasing job search activity or increasing the pool of 
Invalid’s Benefit clients willing to do more than 15 hours’ work per week. If this 
happens, it may drive down equilibrium wages, or at least reduce wage inflation 
pressures and, other things being equal, increase the number of job places offered 
by employers (Layard et al. 1991).
54 
 
A similar effect might occur if wage-setting behaviour alters. This may happen in a 
number of ways. Employers aware of widespread wage subsidies may drop wages to 
the statutory minimum, or to some point lower than ambient wages, knowing that the 
shortfall will be made up by the state.
55 The lower cost per job slot may induce 
employers to offer more jobs. Even if employers are unaware of the extent of state 
wage supplements, employees may be less demanding with respect to wages, 
knowing that high EMTRs within the WFF eligibility range lower net returns from 
wage rises compared with what they might otherwise be. Under these circumstances, 
employers may find that they face less demand from employees for wage hikes or 
less wage competition more generally. This may induce a downward drift in wages 
due to a diminution in pressures to maintain the real value of wages. On the other 
hand, if aggregate employment rises, so too will the aggregate wage bill, barring a 
substantial drop in earnings. In these circumstances, jobs growth could come through 
a multiplier effect whereby employees have more money to spend on domestic 
goods, resulting in greater labour demand.
56  
 
5.5.2  WFF effects on wages and promotion 
 
We have already noted that WFF may influence wage setting in the economy. 
However, WFF tax credits may also have ambiguous effects on workers’ wage 
growth and incentives to invest in jobs (Lydon and Walker 2003, Bryson 1998). High 
EMTRs for those eligible for income-tested benefits can blunt the incentive to 
enhance their earnings potential through human capital investments, such as on- or 
off-the-job training, and reduce their inclination to seek promotion because such 
activity is effectively taxed by the high EMTR. An employer may be less inclined to 
reward an employee financially if they know the worker will lose much of an increase 
in forgone state assistance. On the other hand, an employer may have more financial 
resources available to train workers if credit subsidies to workers exert downward 
pressure on wage inflation, potentially increasing the supply of wage-enhancing 
employer-provided training. On the worker side, if we assume that workers have to 
co-fund general training with the employer because the employer will not recoup all 
of the returns from that training, this will usually mean the worker taking a lower wage 
to help fund that general training. If this training effect occurs, then it may increase 
                                                  
54 Of course, in a competitive labour market, increased demand for labour would, other things being 
equal, begin to push up the price of labour again. 
55 Callender et al. (1995) found the UK family credit system had no such effect on wage-setting. This is 
not that surprising since, in practice, employers are constrained in their wage-setting by equity 
considerations, recruitment and retention pressures and because they use wages to enhance worker 
efficiency. 
56 The distributional effects of welfare reform are discussed in Bitler et al. (2004).    
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the propensity of workers to engage in general human-capital-enhancing training. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that any such effects will be countered by the returns 
to work experience, which are enhanced by the programme if WFF induces more 
rapid job entry than would otherwise be the case. If wage subsidies induce job entry 
at pay rates below those that individuals might otherwise expect, one might expect 
those workers’ wages to revert, before long, to those obtained by “like” workers – a 
process that would show up as accelerated wage growth associated with the credit. 
 
5.5.3  Other potential WFF impacts pertinent to “making work pay” 
 
The discussion so far has identified possible WFF effects on a number of outcomes 
pertinent to the “making work pay” agenda of MSD. At the level of the individual, 
there are the issues of job entry (whether to enter and the rate of entry); job retention 
(usually measured in terms of the elapsed time to job exit); hours choices; promotion 
and training decisions; and earnings levels and earnings growth. These all have their 
counterparts at household level and economy wide. For instance, job entry and exit 
rates determine the rate of labour turnover in the economy and are related to job 
creation and job destruction rates.  
 
There are three other types of outcome pertinent to WFF’s objective of making work 
pay – wellbeing, labour market orientation and labour market activity short of job 
entry. 
 
Individuals’ perceptions of their wellbeing and that of their family, and how both might 
be influenced by job entry, were mentioned above as among the subjective costs and 
benefits of entering the labour market. Even though the psychological benefits of paid 
work are well established (Jackson 1994), it is unclear whether WFF-induced entry 
will have net psychological benefits for individuals and their families. WFF jobs may 
differ in a number of dimensions from those that individuals might otherwise have 
entered. For instance, they may be lower paid, of shorter hours or be entered more 
quickly than jobs that individuals may otherwise have obtained (as discussed 
previously). These criteria may positively or negatively affect how individuals feel 
about themselves and their family circumstances. The only way to measure WFF 
effects is to conduct surveys of individuals’ wellbeing before and after WFF reforms 
such as IWP. The Families and Children Study (FACS), a series of surveys known as 
the Programme of Research into Low-Income Families (PRILIF) and other studies 
conducted in Britain, discussed in section 6.4.1, identify methodological 
considerations in conducting such surveys. 
 
Policies may be regarded as successful where they encourage those in receipt of 
payments to take a more positive attitude to working and making a contribution to 
society. Such changes may be visible in terms of changing behaviour or may be 
measured by attitude surveys. This criterion of success is valid if policymakers are 
content to get people “closer to work” by increasing their employability, even if they 
do not actually take work. Thus, even if WFF does not affect job entry, it may bring 
about changes in individuals’ orientation towards employment or their labour market 
activity. For instance, individuals may become more work-focused if they see greater 
financial rewards from entering paid work. This may manifest itself in positive 
orientations towards employment in the form of work commitment, for instance, or in 
job search behaviour (eg shifting from being wholly inactive to beginning some 
search, or increasing the intensity of job search, or lowering expectations about the 
sorts of jobs one is prepared to take). There have been efforts to measure such 
effects (eg Bryson, Knight and White (2000) in relation to the New Deal for Young 
People in Britain). This measurement usually entails the design of dedicated surveys, 
preferably with a longitudinal component to avoid reliance on retrospective data.    
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However, some measures such as job search behaviour are to be found in Labour 
Force Surveys.
57 Thus, provided it is possible to identify those who are likely to be 
eligible for WFF or its components, one can estimate WFF effects on job search 
behaviour by comparing it across eligibles and ineligibles, ideally within a difference-
in-differences framework to overcome confounding unobservable factors that might 
influence both entitlement and behaviour. 
 
There is great advantage in collecting information over time for eligible and ineligible 
individuals on attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of labour market attachment – it 
helps the evaluator get inside the “black box” of the mechanisms by which policies 
may bring about changes in individuals’ orientations that result in the “hard” 
outcomes such as job entry and earnings. Without this information, evaluators may 
invoke mechanisms that are theoretically plausible without knowing whether they had 
an impact in practice. This is particularly important when it is difficult to separate out 
theoretically important yet counteracting influences, such as those relating to income 
and substitution effects, or when, even though theory suggests mechanisms are 
pointing in the same direction, it is hard to discern how much weight to attribute to 
each mechanism. Such surveys often reveal that the barriers to labour market 
participation policymakers had in mind when designing a policy are not the ones that 
feature in the mind of the target population or, if they are, are conceived in a 
somewhat different way. 
 
There is a long tradition in Britain of survey respondents being asked to explore the 
mechanisms by which a policy may or may not be having its intended effect. These 
questions, asked in dedicated surveys constructed specifically for the programme 
evaluation, establish individuals’ knowledge of a programme or policy, their attitudes 
towards it, and the role – if any – that the policy has in influencing individuals’ or 
households’ labour market decision making. Standard sets of questions have been 
developed over years of programme evaluation, though questionnaire design is 
always tailored to the programme and client group at hand (see FACS, which is more 
recent and builds on the earlier PRILIF). Code frames have been developed for 
answers to such questions, though space is often left for open-ended answers in the 
spirit of qualitative, depth interviewing. The advantage of such surveys is that, 
provided they are based on random or stratified random samples from representative 
populations, they allow for extrapolation to the pertinent population (eg all eligibles or 
all participants) so that one can infer the incidence of certain attitudes, practices and 
perceptions. This approach is frequently supplemented by qualitative research using 
in-depth interviews based on topic-guided interviewing to explore in greater detail 
individuals’ and families’ perceptions of activities and processes key to the 
programme, such as application processes, job searching, work orientations and 
wider concerns for family wellbeing. For example, the issue of behavioural effects 
might be well approached by a study of how well clients understand the WFF both 
before and after interacting with staff.
58 Although highly informative, such 
programmes of research are costly and do not always provide results in a time frame 
that policy clients desire. 
 
5.6  Participation versus eligibility 
 
                                                  
57 For example, high marginal tax rates on wages might induce non-wage compensation, and survey 
questions about such compensation could be used to explore this.  
58 The programme is quite complex, and the size of any behavioural effects will depend in part on the 
extent to which individuals understand the incentives it presents.    
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Tax credits, like other income-tested state transfers, are dogged by take-up 
difficulties, as discussed in section 3. These may be attributable to poor information, 
a high distaste for work or a low distaste for being on out-of-work benefits. Low take-
up may also be driven by a high distaste for in-work transfers (Brewer 2003, Brewer 
et al. 2005, Lydon and Walker 2004). In the UK, this has led to the payment of 
Working Families’ Tax Credit through the pay packet in the hope that this will reduce 
stigma. In estimating labour supply, these potential alternative explanations are 
important because they help determine who takes up the tax credit from the eligible 
population. There is substantial evidence that those who take up programmes such 
as tax credits are not a random subset of the eligible population. In particular, they 
tend to have larger entitlements and longer likely periods of entitlement. So, if one is 
estimating the impact of something such as the IWP by comparing those eligible who 
receive the payment with those eligible who do not receive the payment, this may 
produce upper-bound estimates of a programme’s impact. This can be overcome, to 
some degree, if one tries to match the two groups on observable characteristics, 
though this technique will only assist in dealing with selection if selection can be 
captured by observable characteristics. 
 
Where take-up problems are severe, the very concept of eligibility is problematic 
because there may be a substantial number of people who do not qualify for 
assistance because they do too few or zero hours of work, but would be eligible by 
virtue of their relatively low underlying earnings potential if they did meet the hours 
qualifying condition. That is to say, the eligible population is truncated in some way 
because the programme is not sufficiently attractive to induce some to enter the 
eligibility zone. When eligibles differ systematically from those who might become 
eligible if they were to enter work, how the evaluator sets up the “treatment” and 
comparator groups may have a big effect on estimated impacts. Thus, the way 
eligibility is treated and the assumptions made about the nature of non-take-up may 
alter inferences about the success or otherwise of WFF. From the evaluator’s 
perspective, and indeed from the policymaker’s perspective, the parameter of interest 
may well be the “intention to treat” rather than actual treatment. However, if it is likely 
that this parameter is liable to differ from the impact of actual treatment (either 
eligibility or actual credit receipt), it seems wise to estimate these parameters 
alongside one another if practically feasible, since differences or similarities are likely 
to be informative with respect to the programme’s effects. 
 
As noted elsewhere, it is common to compare outcomes for eligibles versus 
ineligibles, where eligibility is roughly proxied by family structure and estimated 
earnings. This can help sidestep the potential selection bias that might arise if one 
simply focused on those who had entered paid employment, since this might itself be 
a function of the net benefits of programme participation. However, it does introduce 
problems of measurement error, since the analyst may not have sufficiently detailed 
information to make precise judgements on entitlement. Usually, this information is 
only available through dedicated surveys which obtain all relevant information 
pertinent to individual and partner.  
 
5.7  Identifying comparators to the eligible population in a “natural experiment” 
 
Most social programmes and welfare programmes are piloted to ensure the 
implementation process is optimal. This partial roll-out is often used to test the impact 
of a programme among a subset of the wider eligible population. However, there 
appears to be no formal piloting of WFF. Once a programme is nationally available, it 
can be difficult to identify a comparator group that can proxy a counterfactual 
scenario against which to measure programme impacts. A standard means of doing    
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this is a before–after study, often combined with a matching of eligible and “like” 
ineligible individuals (as in the case of matched difference-in-differences estimation). 
However, there may still be opportunities to pursue a before–after comparison with 
those who are not eligible for the programme.
59 Difference-in-differences estimation 
may be plausible for the following: 
·  all parents v. all non-parents 
·  single parents v. single women 
·  single parents v. high-wage single parents 
·  men in couples v. men in childless couples 
·  men in couples v. single men 
·  men in couples v. high-wage men in couples 
·  women in couples v. women in childless couples 
·  women in couples v. single women 
·  women in couples v. high-wage women in couples. 
 
The viability of using any of these groups as comparators to the eligible population for 
DiD estimation depends on four factors. First, it depends on whether the comparators 
have really been untouched by the programme. They will have been touched by the 
programme if substitution or displacement is occurring, for instance – a point 
returned to in the discussion of general equilibrium effects in section 5.14. 
Comparison between those with and those without children may itself be a problem if 
the very composition of these groups is partly a function of WFF, as may be the case 
if childbearing choices are affected by the new WFF regime. (In economists’ 
language, the childbearing decision becomes endogenous.) This may occur if, for 
instance, new financial incentives encourage people to delay or hasten their choice 
to have children. This problem can only be overcome if analysts model labour supply 
and childbearing jointly, such as Angrist and Evans (1998). This requires the analyst 
to identify one or more factors that influence childbearing choices but do not affect 
labour supply. 
 
Second, DiD estimation relies on the assumption that macro trends affecting 
outcomes of interest that may have coincided with the timing of the programme 
commonly affect the eligible and ineligible populations. If the macro effects have 
differential impacts across the two groups because they have characteristics that 
make them react differently to common macro shocks, this will confound estimates of 
WFF effects. There are, however, methods for adjusting for differential trends. For 
instance, one can search for a pre-programme period characterised by the same 
responses to macro effects (Bell et al. 1999, Blundell and Costa Dias 2000, 2002). 
 
Third, the DiD estimator cannot control for unobserved temporary individual-specific 
factors that influence the participation decision. The classic example is Ashenfelter’s 
dip, wherein a temporary dip in earnings will temporarily increase an individual’s 
probability of being eligible for a programme. Because the dip is temporary, we would 
expect earnings growth in that group to exceed that for those who did not suffer a 
temporary dip, whereupon earnings growth for the participants would exceed that for 
non-participants even in the absence of the programme. In this case, the programme 
effect on earnings growth would be overestimated. 
                                                  
59 An important aspect is what the treatment consists of. For the WFF package, the treatment may be 
defined as the change to the budget set, rather than the take-up of a particular benefit. In this case, 
because treatment is the change in the budget set, everyone is in some way treated because: one may 
respond to the change by becoming eligible for and then taking up one of the WFF payments; someone 
else eligible but not taking up the payment is not someone untreated, but someone without a treatment 
effect. To use a design that compares eligibles and ineligibles then requires plausible and convincing 
arguments that the ineligibles are individuals who never change behaviour in response to the particular 
change in the budget set represented by WFF.     
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Fourth, when using cross-sectional data for DiD estimation, there is a danger that the 
compositions of the comparator and control groups will change between the pre-
programme and post-programme periods. These variations in the composition of the 
two groups may themselves affect outcomes independently of the programme, thus 
confounding estimates of the programme’s impact. This can be overcome, as 
discussed in section 6.4.3, if one uses panel longitudinal data to control for 
compositional effects. Changes in composition are easy to check and can be 
corrected by regression, since DiD is based on conditional means. 
 
An alternative way of identifying programme effects in a differencing framework is to 
use those who become newly eligible for a programme through its increased 
generosity, an approach also discussed in relation to earnings growth (see section 
5.12.1). 
 
Comparators can also be found from within the eligible population. In essence, this 
entails comparing two eligible groups, using differences in entitlement amounts, the 
timing of entitlements, or multiple versus single programme participation to identify 
the effect of one programme or treatment versus another. Thus, for instance, there 
are differences in the amount of FS that families get, depending upon the number 
and age of children. If one maintains that these factors are exogenous – that is, that 
they are not themselves a function of the availability of WFF-related payments – one 
might compare outcomes for those entitled to different amounts to establish the 
impact of differences in FS eligibility on outcomes such as employment. A before–
after comparison of the differences would help identify the impact of the difference in 
treatment. Similarly, one might obtain estimates of the impact of one sub-programme 
(call it sub-programme A) by comparing differences in outcomes before and after 
treatment for one client group using sub-programme B alone, versus a client group 
using sub-programme B in combination with sub-programme A. In principle, it might 
be possible in this circumstance to estimate the additive effect of programme A, 
although this would rely on controlling for selection into A and B versus B alone and 
making some assumptions about interaction effects between A and B. 
 
One threat to this evaluative approach, often overlooked, would be the impact on 
ineligibles of financing WFF. There are three ways by which programmes are usually 
funded: 
·  a windfall – for example, the tax on utilities that paid for the New Deals in Britain 
·  tax increases 
·  government debt increases. 
 
If WFF were funded, at least in part, through raising taxes in other areas (eg indirect 
sales taxes) or through income taxes levied on eligibles or ineligibles, this would 
become part of the “treatment”: these funding methods will have their own 
behavioural effects on, for example, labour supply. There is also the efficiency loss 
from the excess burden (also known as the marginal social cost of taxes) associated 
with them. Thus, the financing of WFF must be taken into account when designing 
and interpreting the evaluation. However, the New Zealand Government has been 
running a current account surplus for some time. Much of this is being invested in 
superannuation funds and capital projects but it is also funding WFF and other 
initiatives, and some might interpret this as implying that there are no attendant fiscal    
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indirect impacts of the programme.
60 However, the opportunity cost of the money 
spent on WFF indicates a potential deadweight cost due to taxation.
61  
 
5.8  Identifying those entitled to WFF 
 
Any evaluation of WFF impacts on making work pay, wellbeing and other outcomes 
relies upon accurate identification of those who are eligible for WFF components and 
accurate estimates of those entitlements. These are a prerequisite for the 
construction of counterfactuals and in establishing where people may be located 
along a budget constraint. As discussed in section 3, the data requirements for 
establishing entitlement can be onerous, even when the criteria for entitlement are 
clear and transparent. In particular, it is often difficult to obtain accurate estimates of 
household income, capital and assets. Analysts using publicly available datasets 
such as Labour Force Surveys usually “make do”, proxying entitlement with 
household characteristics (age and number of children, partnership status) and 
estimated earnings potential (using human capital earnings equations, such as Leigh 
(2004)). This is further discussed in section 5.12.4. One can place more reliance on 
such studies when findings prove robust to sensitivity tests involving alterations to the 
entitlement definition.  
 
The ideal solution to this data problem is to construct surveys containing both the 
outcomes of interest (eg employment and wellbeing) and those items permitting 
accurate identification of entitlements and take-up. This is the rationale for surveys 
conducted in Britain, for instance, to track the impact of policies such as Family 
Credit (using PRILIF) and Working Families’ Tax Credit / Working Tax Credit (using 
FACS). 
 
Another possibility is using administrative data. Data held by MSD and IRD contain 
accurate information on recipients of Family Income Assistance (FIA). IRD 
information includes: 
·  demographics – gender, age, location (though not ethnicity) 
·  family – partner, number and age of children, dependency of children, shared 
custody, changes in family circumstances (for FIA recipients only)  
·  income, taxation and FIA – annual income for individuals and families (market, 
business, benefit, investment), tax for individuals, family tax credits for the family, 
overpayment and underpayment of FIA, child support receipts and payments, 
student loan allowances and repayments 
·  work and payment history – dates in employment, employer, dates on payments 
(though no direct measure of hours worked). 
 
Although there are some important data items absent (hours worked, ethnicity), this 
data is very rich. However, there are a number of drawbacks. First, families receiving 
FIA via the MSD system are not required to file returns to IRD so there is no 
information about their family composition. MSD administrative data from payroll 
(SWIFTT) and case management (SOLO) systems could, in principle, track 
individuals’ payments longitudinally and, provided an assessment for payment or 
payment for a main benefit or superannuation has been made, detailed information 
on individuals and their households could be obtained. However, it seems that this 
MSD data is not readily useable at an individual level. Also, although MSD and IRD 
                                                  
60 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=21824. 
61 If the money were not spent on WFF, a social benefit could be produced by returning the money to 
the taxpayer, hence reducing the deadweight cost of taxation. However, this might not meet 
redistribution goals.     
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data can be matched technically (using MSD’s Social Welfare Number (SWN), a 
unique IRD identifier, location and first/last name), there are legal and ethical barriers 
to doing this. MSD and IRD data has been matched in exceptional circumstances in 
the past, but the decision to do so is made on a case-by-case basis. The use of 
linked IRD/MSD data for WFF evaluation requires a persuasive case to be made. 
These legal and ethical difficulties in matching data owned by different departments 
also affect matching with other useful data sources on issues such as schooling and 
health. 
 
Perhaps even more fundamentally, however, there are two key drawbacks to the 
IRD/MSD data. First, IRD and MSD have no information on the potential entitlements 
of individuals who never approach them to make an application. This means that one 
cannot construct eligible populations from administrative data alone. Second, IRD 
and MSD data cannot create household-level files from individual files unless people 
apply for a payment relating to families. According to information supplied by IRD, it is 
not possible to link individuals in a household unless they are in receipt of Family 
Support (FAM), and for this reason it is not possible to identify who may be eligible 
for WFF. Similarly, MSD points out that there is no clear way of linking individuals to 
households using MSD administrative data (unless they are linked using addresses). 
However, MSD can create family/couple groupings if the payment received requires 
information related to the family composition/partnering status. There is a code that 
describes the rate at which people are paid, and this could be used in conjunction 
with a number of tables to determine whether the payment received is for individuals, 
families or couples. Like IRD, MSD cannot create families from individual files unless 
people apply for a payment relating to families. It is also possible for IRD/MSD to 
infer household or family relationships; however, the results from doing this are 
imprecise.  
 
Nevertheless, the UK experience indicates there is great value in utilising 
administrative data and tailoring it, where possible, to evaluation purposes. Among 
other things, it has the advantages of being fairly accurate, free of recall error, 
longitudinal, free of non-response bias and free of attrition problems (provided 
individuals can be tracked as they move into and out of the benefit system and into 
and out of employment) and of offering populations or large sample sizes. Once initial 
investments in data quality and data format have been made, using administrative 
data can also be a much cheaper option than surveys for some analyses.  
 
There is also real value in linking administrative data to survey-based data, thus 
giving a “second take” on all the variables identified above. This cannot be done 
retrospectively for surveys that have already been conducted but administrative data 
can be linked to survey data, provided those in a sampling frame can be identified 
with their unique MSD/IRD identifiers, and provided legal permissions are granted 
and respondents are content. Statistics New Zealand may permit linkage between 
MSD/IRD data sources and its own major surveys. Similar linking happens very 
rarely elsewhere (eg in Britain concerns about undercounting benefit claimants led to 
a matching exercise linking Labour Force Survey data to administrative benefit 
records for cross-checking). But there seems to be much more mileage in linking 
administrative data to surveys conducted by MSD/IRD. This can help give the true 
picture in relation to household or income circumstances, establish which state 
transfers have been made and when, create the basis for sampling frames – for 
example, for transfer recipients of various sorts – and offer accurate outcome 
information in relation to earnings and the like. Administrative sample frames also 
permit analysis of non-response bias and attrition in surveys because the 
administrative data on who responds and who does not relates to the whole sample 
frame. This data therefore allows for adjustments to otherwise potentially biased    
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estimates (as an example, Green et al. (2001) evaluated the ONE programme in 
Britain). We would therefore strongly encourage efforts to bring administrative data 
into play in the WFF evaluation. 
 
5.9  Methodologies for identifying the impact of WFF on “making work pay” 
 
5.9.1  The viability of the matching methodology 
 
In section 4, we stressed the need for rich data to support identification strategies, 
based on the presumption that selection into treatment can be captured by 
observables. The conditional independence assumption discussed in section 4.4.2 
requires that the analyst include all variables influencing both treatment and outcome 
and that, in the absence of these variables, matching estimates will be biased. Until 
recently, it had been assumed that administrative data might not be sufficiently rich to 
fulfil this requirement, thus making a case for data collected through dedicated 
surveys. However, recent research
62 on the evaluation of the New Deal for Lone 
Parents in Britain suggests that the sequence of labour market events in the years 
before policy change helps capture what would otherwise be unobservable factors 
influencing treatment and outcome. Since MSD/IRD data contains work and 
payment/benefit histories going back some years, matching estimators may be able 
to play a role in WFF evaluation, especially if combined with the differencing 
approach described in section 5.7. Of course, the richness of the administrative data 
does not overcome the other limitations (omission of non-applicants and difficulties 
identifying eligible households) described in section 5.8. 
 
In the absence of administrative data, survey data would probably need to collect 
retrospective information on payment/benefit and work history. This is available, to a 
limited degree, in ongoing surveys. 
 
5.9.2  Regression discontinuity designs 
 
Another methodology that could be deployed to identify WFF impacts on making 
work pay is the regression discontinuity method.
63 This is a special case of 
instrumental variables estimation and identifies the effect of treatment on the treated 
for individuals at the discontinuity, unless additional very strong functional form 
assumptions are made. In essence, the method involves individuals being scored 
according to their probability of treatment. Some will have a high score, meaning they 
have a very high probability, and some will have a very low score, meaning they are 
very unlikely to be eligible for treatment. However, there will be a margin at the cut-off 
point between those who are eligible and those who are not (the cut-off for eligibility – 
for example, income level) which generates some randomness as to whether a 
person is treated as entitled or not. At this margin, it is possible to find 
counterfactuals for eligibles, allowing WFF effects on outcomes to be identified. 
 
Profiling can be used as the basis for a discontinuity analysis but only if the profiling 
is actually used as the basis for selection into the programme, which may not be 
applicable for WFF. In one of the caseload administrative datasets, there is a variable 
akin to a profiling variable where the member of staff working with the client ascribes 
a probability that an individual will go on to long-term payment receipt. This may be 
used to assign WFF treatments. If one assumes homogeneous treatment effects, 
                                                  
62 Dolton et al. 2005. 
63 See useful references such as van der Klaauw 2002, Hahn et al. 2001, Buddelmeyer and Skoufias 
2004 and Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999, section 7.4.6.    
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then this is the most efficient method of WFF resource allocation (Bryson and 
Kasparova 2003). It may be that this profiling variable can be used as the basis for a 
regression discontinuity design since there will be some individuals close to the 
decision cut-off who are “almost” treated or “almost” entitled. To the extent that this 
variable is useful, an analysis could be based on this, but it would likely have some 
limitations as to which WFF target groups are covered.  
 
5.10  Data sources 
 
5.10.1  The demand side: The value of employer surveys 
 
Employers may respond in a number of ways to WFF. We have alluded to some of 
them above in relation to the demand for different types and quantities of labour, 
training provision, wage setting and making job offers. But, just as it is valuable to 
conduct surveys of individuals to see how they perceive WFF and establish how they 
have responded to the changes behaviourally and in their attitudes, so it is for 
employers. Because it is unfashionable for governments to manage the demand side 
of the economy, policymakers often overlook the fact that supply-side changes such 
as those made by WFF can be undermined or succeed depending on employers’ 
responses to them. Employer surveys would be helpful in identifying levels of 
employer knowledge about WFF components, such as subsidised childcare and tax 
credits. A longitudinal survey before and after changes such as IWP would help 
establish whether levels of knowledge change as WFF beds down and, irrespective 
of the knowledge that employers have, whether their behaviour alters with respect to 
recruitment, retention, wage-setting, training and so on. Employer surveys also 
provide valuable information on mechanisms generating general equilibrium effects, 
such as the probabilities of displacement effects. 
 
5.10.2  Linked employer–employee data 
 
Linked employer–employee data, such as that being developed with the New 
Zealand Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED), could have substantial 
benefits in evaluating WFF. Although the number of variables in the dataset is limited, 
as a population of employees and employers it offers opportunities to track workers 
over time, thus establishing job entry and exit patterns and therefore job durations at 
particular moments during the introduction and development of LEED. With wage 
data it also offers information on starting wages and wage growth. Proxies for WFF 
eligibility will be crude, but it may be possible to detect changes in labour market 
behaviour that are contemporaneous with WFF changes. For instance, 
Accommodation Supplement (AS) changes may show up in area-specific differences 
in patterns of labour market behaviour. 
 
Another advantage of LEED data is that it offers multiple observations per employer 
and, as such, allows evaluators to establish the extent to which outcomes such as 
wage distributions are accounted for by variance within and across workplaces. 
Comparisons of such outcomes before and after the introduction of WFF may be 
informative with respect to wage-setting behaviour on the part of employers. 
 
5.10.3  Counterfactual scenarios taken from survey respondents 
 
Surveys in the UK, such as PRILIF, have frequently asked respondents directly what 
they might have done in the absence of a policy or if the policy had differed in one or    
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more dimensions. For instance, childcare surveys in the UK
64 have recently asked 
parents about their perceptions of the impact of funded childcare on their childcare 
and employment decisions. These questions complement retrospective data 
collected on childcare use and employment to permit a fuller understanding of how 
parents’ behaviour may have changed in response to a policy that aims to increase 
affordable daycare provision.  
 
Although often distrusted by economists, answers to these questions can be 
revealing in terms of the way in which individuals frame their decision making. Of 
course, when faced with a question such as “Would you work harder if the credit 
were higher?”, it can be difficult to interpret responses, and it is uncertain what 
credence can be given to them in terms of their ability to predict behaviour. There are 
difficulties, too, in comparing responses across individuals at a point in time or for an 
individual over time. Nevertheless, economists and psychologists have developed 
good survey instruments for measuring expectations using subjective probabilities 
(Manski 2004) which could be applied in WFF to help identify how individuals 
respond to financial incentives and in identifying possible counterfactual scenarios. 
Similar approaches could be devised with employers as respondents in relation to 
their hiring behaviour. 
 
5.10.4  Other limitations to survey analysis 
 
As well as difficulties in interpreting survey-based results, surveys are plagued by a 
number of well-known limitations which should nevertheless be remembered when 
considering the value of surveys in the WFF evaluation. 
 
Obtaining reliable sampling frames and distinguishing between eligibles and 
ineligibles have already been mentioned. Measurement errors can also plague 
evaluators, particularly with respect to key variables such as wages (especially 
partner’s wages), capital and assets. It can be difficult to obtain accurate information 
regarding individuals’ receipt of tax credits, and this is going to be particularly 
problematic in the case of WFF given that multiple credits will be paid as a single 
sum. Such errors are not a significant problem, if they are random. However, they 
seldom are. For instance, errors in recalling payment levels tend to be correlated with 
the size and timing of payments. 
 
The value of surveys is frequently undermined by non-response bias, something that 
can arise when response rates are low or when some subsets of the population have 
not been reached. Even if response rates are reasonable in the first wave of a 
survey, differential sample attrition can introduce biases in subsequent waves. There 
are weighting, refreshment sampling and other methodologies to address such 
issues, but none is particularly satisfactory, thus placing the onus on good survey 
design and execution. 
 
There are two particular difficulties with relying on survey data in the case of WFF. 
The first is obtaining baseline (ie pre-reform) survey data. MSD is already well 
advanced in identifying the sorts of surveys it wishes to run and when. Nevertheless, 
there is relatively little time available for WFF evaluators to identify the populations 
they wish to target, the purpose of surveys, their design and content. To illustrate, 
individuals’ motivations are often regarded as a key explanatory variable determining 
                                                  
64 These surveys are still at the design stage, with the report forthcoming. The study is the Evaluation of 
the Neighbourhood Nursery Initiative, commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills and 
carried out by a consortium that includes the National Centre for Social Research, Oxford University and 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies.    
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labour supply behaviour, childbearing and the propensity for programme participation. 
If this variable is not observed, it can confound estimates of WFF effects on making 
work pay, and it means that methods relying on selection on observables are 
problematic. Motivation can be measured in surveys, but the possibility that a 
programme can change motivations means that one needs measures before and 
after the introduction of the programme to make causal inferences. 
 
A second difficulty concerns the policy imperative to understand what WFF is doing to 
sub-groups of the population, some of whom are geographically concentrated or of 
low incidence throughout New Zealand. Of course, one can boost the sample 
numbers of low-incidence groups through stratified random sampling, though this 
does affect effective sample numbers. The bigger point is that one needs large 
samples to make inferences about differences across sub-groups. Large surveys are 
expensive. 
 
5.11  Job entry and job retention: Survival modelling 
 
By affecting the relative returns to being out of work versus being in work, WFF may 
influence the rate at which individuals move into work and, conditional on being in a 
job, the rate at which they leave jobs. If WFF has got it right, then financial incentives 
should have a net impact of increasing the rate at which individuals enter jobs and 
slowing the rate at which they leave. To observe these rates, one requires panel data 
on individuals whose employment status is observed over time. By tracking what 
happens to individuals over time, and estimating their probabilities of entry (exit) 
conditional on the event not having occurred up until that point, one can establish the 
rates of transition into and out of paid employment. To establish whether WFF or its 
sub-programmes have affected transition rates, one can observe what happens to 
individuals before and after policy changes. If shifts in the policy regime influence job 
entry and/or exit rates, this can be observed in the rate at which eligible individuals 
make a transition. If these adjustments are instantaneous, one may observe “spikes” 
in the transition (or “hazard”) rates, which then affect the time individuals spend in 
various states (“survival” rates). It is usual to go beyond simple description of 
transitions and model the process, thus controlling for potentially confounding factors. 
Job search theory suggests that individuals will accept job offers when the wage 
offered exceeds their own “reservation wage”, namely the benchmark notional wage 
that an individual has in mind as a trigger point for labour market entry. In some 
analyses, this reservation wage is explicitly modelled together with the market wage. 
In others, the idea of a comparison between reservation and market wages is simply 
invoked as the model underlying the instantaneous probability of a transition, 
whereupon the model estimating that probability simply includes variables affecting 
the reservation and market wages. 
 
One can also estimate probabilities of exit to more than one state – for example, into 
part-time and full-time jobs – a technique known as competing risks modelling. 
 
Survival modelling has been used to estimate the impact of the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit on the year-to-year transitions of single mothers in the UK (Francesconi and 
van der Klaauw 2004). With administrative data, or detailed work history data 
collected in surveys, it is possible to estimate month-on-month (or even day-by-day) 
probabilities of transition. One difficulty with this approach is how to tackle multiple 
treatments occurring in succession and correspondence between policy change and 
other events. One also needs to deal with the possibility that individuals will anticipate 
policy changes, in which case changes in exit rates may precede the policy event. 
Entry and exit rates may be influenced by a number of factors. It is often difficult to    
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distinguish between duration dependence (the increased probability of non-transition 
by virtue of the lengthening time in a state) and unobservable traits of individuals that 
mean that they differ from one another in systematic ways affecting transition 
probabilities. Note that survival modelling can be used wherever information on the 
spell length is available, and for WFF it might be of interest to examine poverty 
spells.  
 
5.12  Some initial ideas for evaluating WFF sub-programmes 
 
This paper does not set out to give any definitive guidance regarding how to evaluate 
WFF or its sub-programmes. However, it is worthwhile mentioning some initial ideas 
to give a more concrete feel to some of the issues discussed above and in earlier 
sections of the paper. Comments are mainly concentrated on IWP by way of 
illustration. 
 
5.12.1  In-work payment  
 
In evaluating IWP, it is necessary first of all to establish precisely how it differs from 
the previous regime, the Child Tax Credit (CTC). The key features of the new regime 
relative to the old are: 
·  IWP is much more generous than CTC in that its rates are higher, the abatement 
threshold has been increased to $27,500, with the 18% taper between $20,356 
and $27,481 being abolished, thus increasing the income range over which a full 
credit will be paid, but the taper above that threshold remains the same (30%) 
·  a household-level hours threshold for entitlement has been introduced 
·  the payment is at household level rather than per child. 
 
It is also worth noting how IWP differs from tax credits evaluated in the existing 
literature: 
·  the household-level hours threshold is, to our knowledge, unique, since in most 
countries it must be achieved by one or other individual in a couple 
·  unlike Earned Income Tax Credit in the US, there is no “phase-in” period before 
maximum entitlement is achieved 
·  unlike the UK, there is no childcare credit because the subsidy for childcare goes 
directly to the provider 
·  the choice of payment period (weekly, fortnightly or annually) is unusual 
·  the taper is lower than in the UK 
·  unlike the UK or the US, the credit is not paid through the pay packet by default; 
rather, it goes to the main caregiver, and consequently the employer is not 
involved in a direct way, which in turn may mean less wage substitution. 
 
As in the UK, out-of-work payments were raised (through FS), thus affecting the 
replacement ratio. However, this change was not coterminous with the IWP 
introduction. Unlike in the UK, where tax credits count as income in determining 
entitlement for Housing Benefit, IWP does not count as income in the determination 
of AS, thus reducing the impact of IWP on effective marginal tax rates for those 
seeking housing cost assistance. 
 
Increasing the abatement threshold increases the hours’ range over which the 
maximum credit is paid. This hours’ range, in which the EMTR associated with IWP is 
zero because the taper is zero, will be larger for those with low hourly earnings. 
Those with higher earnings potential will hit the threshold at which the taper cuts in 
with fewer working hours.    
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The timing of the IWP change (April 2006) is fortuitous as it appears no other major 
WFF change coincides with it (AS changes occurred in October 2004 and April 2005; 
FS changes occurred in 2005 and there will be more in 2007; Childcare Subsidy 
changes occurred in 2004 and 2005). There is an increase in Family Tax Credit at the 
same time, but this is a credit that goes to relatively few people. Temporary Additional 
Support (TAS) comes in at the same time, but, again, this may not be viewed as a 
major change. This point is important if one wishes to identify the IWP effect and 
isolate it from the effect of other policy changes using a differencing framework. Of 
course, other policies may also change when IWP changes – for example, if there is 
an increase in the national minimum wage. Furthermore, the fact that there are a 
number of key policy changes on either side of the IWP changes – especially in the 
pre-programme period – might make it difficult to identify a settled period before the 
changes, which is required for differencing. 
 
What, then, of the theoretical impact of IWP? This should be carefully established in 
constructing an evaluation strategy and we do not attempt a thorough investigation 
here. In any event, we lack some key information presently, such as the percentage 
of CTC recipients who fall below the IWP hours’ thresholds. However, it seems likely 
that the following outcomes may occur. 
·  Those currently out of work: IWP should increase incentives to work at least 20 
hours (for single parents) or at least 30 hours (for couples), particularly if they are 
liable to lose the payment previously made under CTC. 
·  Sole parents working below the hours’ threshold: They will have an incentive to 
supply at least 20 hours. 
·  Sole parents working more than 20 hours: The effect is indeterminate since there 
will be an income effect away from work but this may be counteracted by 
substitution effects. 
·  Couples doing some work but below the 30 hours’ threshold: If the primary earner 
in a two-earner household can increase his/her hours to the threshold, the 
income effect might mean the household reverts to being a single-earner 
household. But if supply is constrained, the second earner may hike his/her hours 
to the threshold, increasing the incentive for the “primary” earner to quit. 
Alternatively, both may raise supply a little to meet the threshold. 
·  Couples where someone is already working more than 30 hours: The effect is 
indeterminate since there will be an income effect away from work but this may 
be counteracted by substitution effects. 
 
It seems likely that a difference-in-differences methodology could be deployed to 
evaluate IWP using the counterfactual groups discussed in sections 5.7 and 5.10.3. 
This could be undertaken with cross-sectional data, but recent evaluations of tax 
credits have resorted to panel data. A very good example is Leigh (2004), who uses 
the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey pre- and post-reform to evaluate the 
introduction of Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in 1999. The advantage of using 
panel data is that it can take out fixed individual effects, thus controlling for changing 
sample composition over time, which helps isolate changes in behaviour. This is 
useful given the difficulties with DiD arising from changes in the composition of 
eligible and ineligible groups pre- and post-reform. Leigh does not directly observe 
eligibility, but he is careful to check the robustness of his results by checking their 
sensitivity to changes in the definition of the eligible and comparator groups. He 
includes estimates for those predicted to be within scope due to their predicted low 
earnings using predictions made on data for the pre-programme period. The 
drawback to this panel approach is that it is confined to a balanced panel, namely 
those in the workforce both before and after the policy change. This raises the    
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question: “What if compositional change in the eligible and comparator groups is itself 
a function of the policy?” 
 
Another feature of Leigh’s paper is that he estimates a range of impacts to get a fuller 
picture of what the credit is doing. These include: if employed, total weekly hours, 
whether working over the hours’ threshold, and log pre- and post-tax earnings. He 
points out that if one finds positive hours effects for all points in the hours distribution, 
this indicates that the substitution effect (driven by increased marginal returns) 
dominates the income effect on labour supply (arising from an increase in total 
income for a given wage). 
 
Leigh considers confounding factors, the chief one being the statutory national 
minimum wage, which was introduced in Britain at the same time as WFTC and may 
therefore affect the “after-period” co-efficient. However, he argues that it should not 
affect this treatment parameter (“after-period*kids” interaction) because there is no 
reason to suspect that the minimum wage should differentially affect the treatment 
and comparator groups. An alternative might be to check the sensitivity of results to 
the exclusion of those most likely to get the minimum wage, such as the young, 
though this would introduce truncation to the earnings’ distribution.  
 
Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004) also use panel data (from the British 
Household Panel Survey) to estimate WFTC effects using a DiD estimator. A nice 
feature of their paper is that they consider lone mother entry and exit rates to jobs 
pre- and post-reform. 
 
Although the DiD methodology is currently in vogue, section 4 and the comments 
above make it apparent that there are serious limitations to the approach and that, 
despite assertions to the contrary, it is reliant on strong assumptions.
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candidate as an alternative to the DiD methodology is microsimulation using 
structural modelling. Perhaps the most useful paper in this vein is Brewer et al. 
(2005). They argue the need for a structural approach to separate the effects of 
WFTC from the effects of contemporaneous tax/benefit changes, which included 
changes to out-of-work benefits. The approach entails estimating preferences for 
work and income to predict how individuals’ desired labour supply changes in 
response to tax changes. This involves inferring parents’ labour supply preferences 
from observed behaviour on the basis that these are revealed preferences. The 
assumption is that individuals have unconstrained hours’ choice given the wage they 
can command; an assumption that is a particular problem where involuntary 
unemployment is significant or where employers determine hours offered. The 
underpinning assumption is that people maximise their utility subject to their own 
budget constraint. Preferences are written in terms of hours of work, net income, 
observable characteristics and unknown preference parameters to be estimated. The 
technique tries to estimate indifference curves that intersect with the budget 
constraint to give an individual’s choice of hours. This is done for a discrete subset of 
hours choices. The approach relies on one’s ability to depict net income accurately at 
levels of gross income, something that is particularly difficult with the sorts of budget 
constraints described in section 5.4.  
 
Brewer et al. (2005) extend their model to account for additional fixed costs of 
employment, childcare costs/usage and programme non-participation. To account 
adequately for all these factors simultaneously, one needs to estimate the equations 
                                                  
65 Indeed, in one of the most succinct and illuminating critiques of the technique Heckman maintains that 
the popularity of the method is solely based on computational convenience (Heckman 1996, in response 
to Eissa 1996).    
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jointly. This is theoretically and computationally very difficult, so Brewer et al. simplify 
by assuming a fixed, deterministic relationship between hours of childcare and hours 
of work. This is a big assumption since, among other things, it means imputing usage 
and prices for the out-of-work on the basis of usage by those observed in work. 
Brewer et al.’s particular concern is to incorporate the cost of applying for WFTC and 
its impact on take-up and thus labour supply. This requires estimating labour supply 
and programme participation jointly.  
 
Often, analysts assume full take-up, but, as Brewer et al. observe, this can bias 
labour supply estimates:  
 
[a person] observed not working in a model that assumed full programme 
participation would be presumed to have relatively high distastes for work, 
relatively low tastes for income, or relatively high fixed costs of working, when 
the true cause could be that she has relatively high distastes for or relatively low 
knowledge of [the credit]. Assuming full participation in any transfer programme 
that affects the shape of the budget constraint may lead to inconsistent estimates 
of preferences for income and work in a utility-maximising model of labour 
supply. It will also lead to misleading inferences about the extent of high effective 
marginal tax rates. (2005:3) 
 
This raises the following question in the case of WFF: “How realistic is it to expect 
very high take-up?” 
 
Structural modelling of the sort described above relies on identifying factors affecting 
participation that do not independently influence outcomes. It is normal to use 
exogenous variations in budget constraint across individuals that arise from 
variations in wages, the number and age of children, housing costs and so on.  
 
Having estimated preferences for income, distaste for work, fixed costs of work and 
stigma costs, structural modellers draw from the distributions of these preferences to 
estimate individuals’ preferred labour market status under different regimes. 
 
There is a general concern, pertinent to the DiD and structural equation approaches 
to evaluation, raised by Mroz (1987), about the sensitivity of results to the way in 
which self-selection into the labour force is treated when extrapolating from results 
based on employed individuals. There are also difficulties using wages, which may 
be endogenous in the sense that they are the result of labour supply decisions, rather 
than an independent variable capable of predicting supply. It is therefore common to 
use expected wage values instead, driven by prior labour market experience and 
other human capital variables. 
 
Turning to IWP’s impact on wage growth, one must account for the three possible 
sources of wage growth: accumulated labour market experience, job tenure 
(seniority) and job mobility. Predictions as to the likely impact of a wage subsidy on 
these three factors depend, in part, on how one characterises the labour market and 
its jobs. It is instructive to compare and contrast the work of Card et al. (2001) and 
Connolly and Gottschalk (2001) using the same labour programme experiment 
(Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project). Connolly and Gottschalk develop a job search 
model, which includes the effort people make to search while in a job, and allows for 
choice between two types of job – low-starting-wage but high-growth jobs and jobs 
offering a higher starting wage but low growth. Card et al. on the other hand, 
conceive of the treatment effect being driven largely by selection into work of 
individuals with particularly flat earnings profiles. In the case of IWP, predictions 
about the likely impact of the subsidy on wage growth depend on the balance    
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between the costs and benefits of investing in job search and training. These are 
likely to depend upon where in the budget constraint individuals are likely to find 
themselves (ie whether they are within the maximum receipt or taper zone) as well as 
upon the interaction of IWP with other transfers. 
 
The best paper on wage growth is by Lydon and Walker (2004), who use UK 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey panel data comparing 12-month wage growth for 20 
cohorts of workers before and after the introduction of WFTC. They are able to 
measure job tenure, job changes (quits and layoffs) and wage growth, though they 
have problems estimating entitlement accurately due to the absence of data on 
assets. Similar problems may arise with respect to IWP if using the New Zealand 
Labour Force Survey. The authors show the value of descriptive analysis of cohorts 
of workers before and after a policy change. However, although this helps control for 
observable differences between the eligible and comparator groups, Lydon and 
Walker are concerned about unobservable differences between the two groups that 
might independently affect wage growth. They overcome the problem through use of 
the newly entitled individuals who came into scope of the credit because it became 
more generous. Pre-change, those in that part of the wage distribution were entitled 
to nothing and so were not subject to the taper, whereas they were entitled to 
something post-change and were therefore subject to the WFTC taper. This is the 
basis for their natural experiment approach, which permits the computation of DiD 
estimates of effects of the taper on wage growth. They compare this group with 
others based on entitlements (at the maximum or less than the maximum) and take-
up before and after the introduction of WFTC. It would be feasible to adopt a similar 
approach for WFF. In addition, one might wish to investigate those for whom the 
taper was removed because the income range over which people are entitled to the 
maximum was broadened. 
 
The analysis of wage growth remains problematic, particularly if one treats 
experience and tenure as endogenous, as one should if labour supply is responsive 
to wages. The problem can be overcome with panel data if one uses lagged variables 
for experience and tenure. The use of balanced panels means analyses are often 
conducted on persistent workers, who are likely a non-random subset of the 
population. Conditional on being in the sample, it is straightforward to net out worker 
fixed effects, which might drive earnings’ growth and that are correlated with tax 
credit receipt, using first-difference methods.  
 
5.12.2  Accommodation Supplement 
 
The only part of WFF that appears to differ across geographical regions of New 
Zealand is the AS. From April 2005, the maximum available assistance will increase 
in some areas, and the number of rating areas will increase from three to four, 
Auckland being divided into two areas, with new higher maximum rates for central 
and north Auckland.
66 Some other locations will move into an area with higher 
maximum rates. These changes can all be treated as natural experiments, offering 
possibilities for difference-in-differences estimations. These could involve estimating 
the impact of AS entitlement changes on employment in one area relative to what 
happens to a matched comparator group in a “similar” control area where the AS 
entitlement changes are very different. However, if estimated with cross-sectional 
data, this approach may be vulnerable to compositional changes in the treatment and 
comparator groups arising from migration induced by the AS changes. 
  
                                                  
66 There is the possibility of a regression discontinuity study looking at the effects using houses 
immediately on either side of this boundary between the two zones in Auckland.     
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There may also be possibilities for identifying AS effects on making work pay using 
the 15,000 people brought into eligibility for assistance for the first time. 
 
The report to the Minister for Social Development and Employment and the Minister 
for Finance and Revenue entitled Future Directions (MSD 2004b) indicates that 
changes in October 2004 brought in an abatement-free income zone of $80 per 
week, while other documents indicate that the abatement has been removed so that 
people will not have their AS reduced if they have other income. This suggests that 
more people will be entitled to the maximum AS than before. Although this change 
may increase replacement ratios (the amount of income one can receive out of work 
relative to being in work), potentially slowing entry to employment, it may be that if 
the change allows individuals to engage in some paid work without being financially 
penalised, it may improve chances of entering more substantial employment.
67 The 
date of this change does not seem to coincide with other major changes, so it may be 
possible to estimate the impact of this more generous arrangement using differencing 
techniques. However, it does coincide with an uprating in childcare subsidies (see 
section 5.12.3). Its impact on the length of benefit spells can be estimated using the 
survival modelling techniques described in section 5.11. 
 
The structural modelling of discrete choices, described in section 5.12.1 in the 
context of tax credit reforms, can also be applied to housing assistance reforms. This 
approach has been adopted by Bingley and Walker (2001) to investigate the impact 
of housing subsidy changes on work incentives in Great Britain. The technical 
difficulties arise from the fact that hours of work, participation in housing subsidies 
and wages may be jointly determined. One can only obtain an unbiased estimate of 
financial incentives on labour supply if one can net out the unobservable correlations 
between these three outcomes. Bingley and Walker do this by modelling wages, 
labour supply and programme participation jointly. 
 
The AS changes may also affect accommodation prices, thus potentially limiting the 
ability to improve the affordability of housing. It will be important to track the prices 
attached to various types of housing tenure pre- and post-reform. A further difficulty is 
that, to the extent that the differential price and affordability of housing change with 
AS, they may induce changes in migration patterns, affecting the composition and 
size of labour forces, a factor that needs to be investigated to assist in understanding 
any impacts of AS and its interaction with other facets of WFF. 
 
5.12.3  Childcare subsidies 
 
The childcare subsidies (CCS and OSCAR), although payable to providers as hourly 
subsidies, effectively subsidise the cost of care to parents. This increases the 
affordability of childcare for parents, increasing the net returns to employment. The 
improvement in the financial incentives arises from the fact that WFF increased the 
rates of subsidy under two existing schemes in 2004 and 2005 and the thresholds 
over which the subsidy is payable (2004). Parents in work and those in training will 
be eligible for up to 50 hours of childcare assistance each week, while out-of-work 
parents will be eligible for nine hours. The amount of assistance available depends 
on household income and the number of children in the household. It is estimated 
that 28,000 families (33,000 children) may benefit, with an average $23 per week 
gain, at a cost to Government of $120 million over 2004–2008. To increase families’ 
awareness of assistance available and to facilitate take-up, the government instituted 
a nationwide network of Work and Income childcare co-ordinators in October 2004. 
                                                  
67 This depends on the rules for disregarding earnings, and it would be important to take these into 
account.     
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One could treat these changes in childcare subsidies as the basis for a natural 
experiment to establish what happens to patterns of childcare demand and labour 
supply pre- and post-reform. Such a strategy would have particular regard for those 
becoming newly eligible for the subsidy and those who are entitled to substantially 
more hours of care than previously. However, there are two big threats to this 
strategy. The first is ongoing developments in childcare policy – for example, the 
policy introducing additions to the training requirements for childcare staff – that run 
alongside the WFF policies. These make it particularly difficult to establish the 
independent impact of the WFF-related changes. The second difficulty is the potential 
for the changes to feed through into childcare price increases. The likelihood of this 
happening rises where increased demand outstrips supply and because the subsidy 
is particularly apparent to price setters since it goes to them rather than the parents.  
 
The other major difficulties in evaluating the childcare subsidy impact on labour 
supply relate to identifying eligible parents who do not take up care, and establishing 
who has taken up care and whether they are substituting for other unsubsidised 
parents (substitution effects). This might be an issue if childcare subsidies give 
eligible parents greater purchasing power and displace parents who are not entitled 
to the subsidy. This could be the case if the supply of childcare does not increase in 
line with demand and there is a financial advantage for childcare providers to cater 
for parents who are entitled to the subsidies (eg because they can charge them 
higher fees). 
 
Once again, there may be opportunities to evaluate childcare subsidy impacts on 
labour supply by simulating parents’ response to the increased subsidies using 
discrete choice models. 
 
For the reasons outlined above, it will be largely impossible to clearly establish the 
impact of WFF childcare subsidies on patterns of participation in early childhood 
education and childcare. However, information could be collected to gain a better 
understanding of if and how these subsidies affect providers’ and parents’ behaviour. 
This would provide an outcome measure, albeit a rather “soft” one, of the effects of 
these subsidies. As suggested earlier, the WFF evaluation will require regular data 
from all regulated services on the topics listed in section 2.5.3. Additionally, it would 
be useful to supplement this data with information collected from those who are 
responsible for co-ordinating and monitoring childcare provision at the local level. 
Through planned surveys (eg the Childcare Survey and the Longitudinal Study of 
New Zealand Children and Families), it will also be important to gain a good 
understanding of:  
·  the factors that shape parents’ attitudes towards parenting, non-parental care and 
work, with a particular focus on how these might be related to a child’s lifecycle 
stage  
·  the range of influences that might constrain or facilitate parents’ work and 
childcare decisions, with a particular focus on childcare (eg accessibility, cost, 
quality, flexibility) and (perceived) ability to obtain family-friendly working 
arrangements 
·  patterns of participation in early childhood education and out-of-school childcare 
among children in different circumstances (eg sole- and two-parent families, in 
urban and rural areas) and from different communities (eg Māori, Pacific, Asian)  
·  patterns of maternal and paternal employment among families in different 
circumstances, from different communities and socio-economic groups 
·  the impact of early childhood education on a range of child outcomes – this could 
be explored in the longitudinal study and the analysis would be particularly    
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powerful if data on the quality of early childhood education services attended by a 
child could also be included.  
 
5.12.4  Family support (FS) 
 
One should not overlook the potential importance of increases in FS in 2005 and 
2007 for labour supply. As noted in section 5.1, the effects are ambiguous because, 
although they effectively raise out-of-work replacement ratios, they also offer some 
degree of financial security to recipients since payments continue if in paid work. 
Changes to the rates and to the abatement threshold and the fact that increases 
differ with the age of children and between first and subsequent children, may offer 
opportunities for a differencing estimate of the effects of the changes on labour 
supply – for example, between those with a single child versus those with two or 
more children. 
 
5.13  Laboratory experiments 
 
It is only recently that labour economists and psychologists have started to apply 
laboratory techniques to labour supply and programme participation problems. They 
offer evaluators the opportunity to construct a controlled environment in which it is 
possible to observe shifts in the way individuals (beneficiaries, workers, staff, etc) 
respond to different stimuli. These stimuli could include all aspects of WFF, the 
targets staff must meet that are set by management, financial incentive payments 
made to providers, and so on. Laboratory experiments can be devised to test policy 
effects before going into the field, in parallel with field analysis and after programme 
roll-out.  
 
Laboratory experiments are particularly valuable in establishing how and why 
individuals respond to different policy packages in different ways, including the weight 
they attach to different features of an incentive package when making choices 
regarding labour supply, childcare and the like. Camerer et al. (1997), Fehr and Götte 
(2002) and Götte and Huffman (2003) illustrate ways in which laboratory experiments 
can be used to understand labour supply issues. 
 
5.14  General equilibrium estimators 
 
General equilibrium effects come about when programmes affect outcomes and 
behaviour of non-participants as well as of participants, as described in section 4.5.  
 
Comparisons between participants and non-participants cannot recover general 
equilibrium effects because, if one assumes that an entire population is affected in 
different ways by a programme, there is no comparable group from which to draw a 
counterfactual. Another reason is that many of these effects will build up over time, so 
they are unlikely to show up in any data collected over a short time frame. General 
equilibrium effects are usually recovered using structural models that involve making 
explicit assumptions about the mechanisms generating the general equilibrium 
effects. As well as being computationally and conceptually complex, these models 
rely upon strong assumptions about the functional forms of economic relationships 
and the values of economic parameters. Examples include the model of Blundell, 
Costa Dias and Meghir (2003), who have recently estimated the impact of wage 
subsidies under the UK’s New Deal for Young People on labour supply using a 
general equilibrium approach. They find that risk is the main driving force behind 
individual labour market decisions and economic responses to wage subsidies.     
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Another recent example is the model of Lise et al. (2003), who develop a dynamic 
general equilibrium model that seeks to account for the impact of changes in financial 
incentives on job search intensity and the process by which wages are determined in 
the labour market. The authors explain how they first calibrate their equilibrium model 
in the absence of the programme (in their case, the Self-Sufficiency Programme 
(SSP) in Canada) using data on wages, unemployment and the benefit system from 
public-use data. The calibration involves parameters such as discount rates, search 
friction and job separation rates. Using the parameters obtained, the authors simulate 
the SSP regime in partial equilibrium. Finally, they re-calibrate the model in the 
presence of the programme using parameters estimated in the first stage and 
simulate the equilibrium effects (displacement, wage and entry effects) that result 
from introducing the programme. 
 
In trying to gauge the direction and magnitude of general equilibrium effects, some 
past UK evaluations relied on qualitative assessments obtained directly from 
employers. The employers, by recounting how they make hiring and firing decisions, 
can shed some light on the likely impact of WFF sub-programmes. However, the 




5.15  Summary 
 
This section has identified the real prospect of general equilibrium effects associated 
with WFF arising from its potential impact on non-participants and in the childcare 
and housing markets, as well as in wage setting and employment. It has commented 
on the two main partial equilibrium methodologies currently deployed for the analysis 
of employment outcomes associated with tax and benefit changes (conditional 
difference-in-differences estimator and structural modelling). It has also drawn 
attention to the value of panel data in estimating employment outcomes such as job 
entry and exit rates, the length of spells and wage growth. 
 
The methodologies identified are not substitutes for one another, but rather they are 
complementary. If deployed together, they may offer more insights into what WFF is 
doing to labour market outcomes than might be the case if reliance were placed on 
one methodology. The advantage of such an approach is that it permits cross-
checking of results across methodologies and means that, if insuperable problems 
arise in the deployment of one methodology, one can resort to others in the hope of 
answering the same or similar questions. 
                                                  
68 For example, employers may simply respond with answers that they perceive would be well received 
(known as satisficing in survey design). See Hales et al. 2000 for the survey of employers carried out for 
New Deal for Young People.    
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6  Measuring changes in poverty and wellbeing 
 
 
Reductions in poverty, and especially child poverty, are an important aim of the WFF 
package. One of the expected impacts is a 30% reduction in child poverty by 
2007/2008 (using a poverty line based on 60% of median equivalised household 
income).
69 However, if the proportion in poverty comes down after WFF starts, this 
could be because of better economic and labour market conditions rather than WFF 
itself. 
 
A central element of an evaluation of the impact of WFF will be to estimate the effects 
of the programme on poverty incidence and depth. However, as previous sections 
have argued, the ability to evaluate the impact of WFF against an empirical 
counterfactual (the absence of the programme) is limited. This is because the 
package of reforms is being simultaneously implemented across the whole 
population and there are thus no comparison groups.  
 
Methodology for estimating the impact of WFF on poverty is faced with a 
considerable set of complexities and uncertainties, but MSD seems currently well 
placed to capture poverty impacts, for the following reasons. 
 
·  The obvious great strength in current micro-simulation of policy reform within 
MSD given a series of clear forecasts of impact using TAXMOD (Perry 2004). 
One area of methodological consideration is how to use micro simulation to 
assess post-facto rather than pre-facto policy change. There is an opportunity to 
refine some of the limitations of current TAXMOD estimation to capture impacts 
more accurately. 
 
·  The availability of Household Economic Survey (HES) data and the established 
practice of using such data to produce poverty profiles and associated analysis. 
There are questions relating to the need to assess the quality of such data for 
specific elements of WFF reform (housing supplements especially) and to the 
frequency of HES reporting (currently three-yearly).  
 
·  The recent development of complementary and alternative measures of wellbeing 
such as the Economic Living Standard Index (ELSI) and of multi-dimensional 
studies of wellbeing in children. 
 
The main part of this review of methodology addresses the primary task of 
establishing what changes to poverty profiles arise after the introduction of WFF and 
the attribution of such changes to WFF – capturing poverty impacts using a relative 
poverty line. A second, smaller part of the review takes examples of longitudinal and 
other surveys that have captured different aspects of wellbeing as an alternative to or 
alongside poverty. This makes the case for longitudinal surveys to best capture the 
dynamics of poverty. Longitudinal qualitative studies can also give good insight into 
change for particular targeted household types.  
 
6.1  Capturing poverty impacts using a relative poverty line 
 
                                                  
69 This estimate is given in Cabinet Policy Committee (2004:5).    
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The main source of methodological literature that is most relevant to WFF and 
poverty impacts is the UK.
70 The relevance stems from two main similarities: 
·  policy design and implementation (with perhaps greater emphasis in the UK on 
active labour market “pushing” entry into work alongside in-work benefits “pulling” 
people into employment by making work pay)  
·  the adoption of a relative poverty line set as a proportion of median or average 
equivalent household income – as suggested in early assessments of potential 
impact using micro-simulation. 
 
The primary method for evaluating the impact of fiscal reforms on poverty is through 
a combination of:  
·  secondary analysis of data from household survey income data (Household 
Economic Survey in New Zealand; Households Below Average Incomes (HBAI) 
dataset, which is itself based on the UK’s Family Resources Survey)  
·  micro-simulation modelling of policy change – to produce a post-facto model of 
policy before and after reform. 
 
This methodology combines a series of descriptive analytical profiles of changes in 
poverty from HES/HBAI data that describe overall changes in poverty and the income 
distribution. This is used to identify the main drivers of such changes that are not 
policy related but will also affect the incidence of poverty – for instance, changes in 
population structure, and the business cycle. These descriptions and analyses of 
reasons for changes in poverty are then followed by micro-simulation of the policy 
changes to assess their potential impact on poverty. These two sets of analysis – of 
the empirical changes and of modelled change – are then brought together to give a 
range of estimates of the likely impact of policy change on poverty. 
 
6.2  Secondary analysis and poverty profiling 
 
Taking the issue of secondary analysis of HES data and poverty profiling first, there 
are several important considerations. 
 
First, HES or other survey evidence takes a significant period of time to be available, 
and thus some measurements of impact are not available until long after policies 
have taken effect. The HES moved from an annual to a triennial basis in 1997/1998, 
and a more prompt and regular evaluation of WFF would be one reason (among 
many others) for considering moving back to a biennial or annual survey.  
 
Second, both measurement errors and sampling errors will affect poverty estimation 
through secondary analysis of survey data. These are well known to CSRE 
researchers from reading CSRE literature, but it will be important for policymakers to 
realise that estimates of changes in poverty will be accompanied by some uncertainty 
and are best presented in ranges rather than fixed numbers. For example, using 95% 
confidence intervals, UK estimates of changes in child poverty over time show that 
there were between 3.2 and 3.5 million poor children in 1996/1997 and between 2.6 
and 2.9 million in 2000/2001. It is thus certain that poverty has fallen (as there is no 




                                                  
70 It is noticeable from citations in MSD’sCentre for Social Research and Evaluation (CSRE) publications 
that there is already an appreciation and knowledge of current UK measurement of poverty and the 
impact of benefit and tax credit reforms.  
71 See Sutherland et al. (2003, page 23) for instance.    
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The issue of measurement error is of potentially greater concern because it is now 
accepted that incomes at the bottom and top ends of the distribution are subject to 
misreporting and/or under-reporting. There are several complementary ways of 
approaching this problem: a series of weights can be produced, based on national 
accounts, benefit expenditure accounts or other sources that can adjust estimates. 
Alternatively, administrative data can be used to merge with and/or validate survey 
data, subject to survey protocol and data protection issues. Lastly, there is great 
strength in accepting that there is a “mismatch” between low income, poverty and 
living standards using the same data. Those identified as being in poverty may not 
show signs of material disadvantage, and vice versa.
72 This means that it is well 
advised to have alternative measures of living standards, hardship and wellbeing to 
run parallel to the central evaluation of poverty changes measured as a proportion of 
median income. These are discussed further in section 6.4. 
 
There is also the need to ensure that survey instruments are able to record and 
identify the new WFF transfers accurately. This is a problem that additionally cuts 
across many of the evaluation strands of WFF attempting to measure take-up. 
 
Third, interpretation of changes in poverty rates and the impact of policy over time 
need care. Poverty incidence will alter, in part, with the movement of median income 
(if a relative approach is used), and thus periods of economic growth tend to be 
accompanied by a higher propensity for poverty, and recessions by a lower 
propensity for poverty, if the underlying risks of poverty are constant or ignored. This 
means that WFF-type transfers will work, in part, by holding poverty levels constant 
rather than reducing them during periods of economic growth (as envisaged by wider 
New Zealand policy). Additionally, one of the intended effects of WFF is to encourage 
entry into work from social assistance, with resulting higher incomes. Such 
movements will reduce poverty, but such reductions will be offset in part by the 
deterioration of the incomes of those out of work without children compared with 
median income. Similarly, for those receiving WFF payments, these are planned to 
rise with prices in order to maintain their real value, but over time median income is 
likely to rise ahead of prices and thus poverty clearance will erode without growth in 
earnings or other income.  
 
There are a number of reasons why relative poverty measures are less useful. These 
factors suggest that, as in the UK, a secondary approach to measuring changes in 
poverty over time should be considered in addition to using a measure based on the 
contemporary median. The second measure shows changes in real income over time 
compared with the value of the poverty line based on median/average income in the 
first comparison year (prior to policy change), as already done in New Zealand. In 
other words, it captures the absolute income changes of a relative poverty line. Such 
measures would more clearly show the effects of WFF payments up-rated with prices 
and their impact on poverty irrespective of the growth in median income. 
 
Fourth, the previous changes in housing policy on rent levels and the introduction of 
the Accommodation Supplement (AS) mean that the issue of housing allowances and 
rents (and other housing costs) becomes an important ingredient of income change. 
The inclusion of AS in gross income calculations will distort any analysis of recipients’ 
disposable incomes and it would be advisable to consider two measures of poverty, 
one using before-housing-cost incomes and the other using after-housing-cost 
incomes.  
 
                                                  
72 There is an excellent overview of this in Perry (2002).    
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6.3  Micro-simulation 
 
Micro-simulation is used to model post facto the schemes before and after the 
introduction of WFF using the actual rates of payments but holding the population 
constant. This approach is used the analyses in the UK by Brewer, Clark and 
Goodman (2002), HM Treasury (2001) and Sutherland et al. (2003). However, there 
are many considerations to be made and they can be split into two main questions:  
 
·  What is currently required to make TAXMOD (or other micro-simulation models) 
fit post-facto simulation of WFF reforms? 
·  What assumptions can be made about changes in incomes and poverty lines? 
 
From the limited documentation on TAXMOD available, there appears to be great 
potential for it to be used to estimate impact. However, there are several issues that 
should be considered for potential updating of TAXMOD or in the creation of a new 
revised simulation model. 
·  The absence of childcare payments and usage is a serious limitation given the 
target group of WFF policies and the intention to increase parents’ employment 
rates.  
·  The absence of AS is also a problem that springs from measurement error in the 
Household Economic Survey, already discussed. The most obvious solution 
could be to merge administrative data – both on rents and other housing costs 
and on awards – into the HES and use this updated data. 
·  The inability to estimate take-up could also be reviewed. UK-based simulation 
models at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) now use take-up assumptions 
based on eligible recipient characteristics and amount of modelled award.  
 
Making micro-simulation estimates over time requires some careful assumptions 
about income change. First, even for a single-year estimation, the effect of policy on 
median income and the poverty line must be estimated. Second, when comparing 
policy over time, income change can be considered according to either constant or 
changing assumptions. A constant-price approach converts the policies in different 
years to a constant process and applies this to a sample with constant incomes. This 
approach allows the analysis to concentrate solely on policy changes. A changing-
income approach reflects the facts that incomes change over time and that 
entitlement and liabilities to benefits and taxes change alongside median income and 
the resulting poverty line. Aggregate data with adjusted pre-tax and pre-benefit 
incomes is prepared for each year and the appropriately specified simulation 
programme run on each of these datasets (simulating each year the contemporary 
actual tax–benefit system in place). This allows the poverty line to be influenced by 
both income and policy change and allows analysis to take into account both policy 
and income change. Comparison across years can be done by subsequent 
adjustment to constant prices. 
 
This approach of using secondary analysis and micro-simulation gives rise to a 
series of estimates (depending on how many poverty and income definitions are 
chosen) but enables changes in poverty to be analysed carefully and systematically 
and allows empirical evidence to be placed alongside hypothetical counterfactual 
evidence from simulation. This appears to be the major and most relevant measure 
of policy “impact” available in the literature and plays to many existing strengths in 
MSD. However, there are other measures of wellbeing and other ways of evaluating 
the impact of policy on poverty that have been used in the UK and the US. It is to 
these that we now turn. 
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6.4  Evaluating changes to hardship, living standards and wellbeing  
 
Increasingly, governments are recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty 
and the mismatches between family income and expenditure and living standards. 
These added dimensions provide more direct means for observing living standards 
through reports of material possessions, activities and debts rather than relying 
almost solely on income for extrapolating families’ living conditions and quality of life.  
 
Following the lead of the Irish Government, in which a concept of consistent poverty 
is constructed from relative poverty and material deprivation measures, the recently 
revamped Family Resources Survey (FRS) in the UK has introduced family-level and 
child-level material deprivation items into the 2004/2005 observations.
73 This added 
dimension contributes to a three-tiered measure of child poverty consisting of: 
absolute low income – to detect income rises among poor families in real terms 
relative low income – to analyse how poor families’ incomes compare with the growth 
in family incomes on the whole 
material deprivation and low income combined – to include a fuller picture of 
household economies, with outgoing as well as incoming resources. 
 
The FRS family- and child-level material deprivation items are listed in box 6.1. 
Ultimately, the UK Government is succeeding in reducing poverty when all three 
indicators are moving in the right direction.  
 
Section 6.2 has already outlined the need to monitor alternative measures of 
“outcomes” from policy besides changes in relative poverty measured as a proportion 
of median income. This section outlines some of the options for monitoring the impact 
of WFF on family living standards and wellbeing.  
 
                                                  
73 Specific material deprivation items were selected because they best discriminated between poor and 
non-poor families. More details are supplied in Department for Work and Pensions (2003).    
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·  home kept adequately warm 
·  two pairs of all-weather shoes for each adult 
·  home kept in a decent state of repair 
·  a holiday away from home for one week a year, not staying with relatives 
·  any worn-out furniture replaced 
·  a small amount of money to spend each week on yourself, not on your family 
·  regular savings (of £10 a month) for rainy days or retirement 
·  insurance of contents of dwelling 
·  friends or family round for a drink or meal at least once a month 
·  a hobby or leisure activity 





·  a holiday away from home at least one week a year with his or her family 
·  swimming at least once a month  
·  a hobby or leisure activity  
·  friends round for tea or a snack at least once a fortnight  
·  enough bedrooms for every child over 10 of different sex to have his or her own 
bedroom  
·  leisure equipment (eg sports equipment or a bicycle)  
·  celebrations on special occasions such as birthdays, Christmas or other religious 
festivals  
·  playgroup / nursery / toddler group at least once a week for children of pre-school 
age  
·  a school trip at least once a term for school-aged children. 
 
For each item, respondents are asked to indicate one of the following: 
 
“We have this” 
“We would like to have this, but cannot afford it at the moment” 




6.4.1  Wellbeing indicators 
 
Given the magnitude of WFF, one would expect far-reaching impacts on families. In 
time, these would manifest in general demographic trends in work, income, health, 
housing, education, anti-social behaviour and crime. With improved family incomes 
and working-parent role models, it is reasonable to expect improvements to national 
figures monitoring child wellbeing, such as: 
·  infant mortality  
·  children in workless households 
·  smoking and drinking behaviour 
·  truancy and early school leaving 
·  violent assaults    
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·  teenage conceptions 
·  young people’s employment rates 
·  post-secondary school training. 
 
Positive changes in these general population statistics might be detected in time, but 
more direct observations of families who have received the WFF interventions need 
to be taken before any causal connections can be assumed. Longitudinal qualitative 
studies can be very informative in this context. 
 
The profiling and monitoring of family living standards through indicators of material 
wellbeing are a common alternative means for tracking policy initiatives set to 
improve quality of life. The Economic Living Standard Index (ELSI) in New Zealand, 
the Urban Institute’s Survey of American Families in the US and, in addition to the 
Family Resources Survey, the Poverty and Social Exclusion Survey and the Families 
and Children Study (FACS) in the UK are good examples of this. These data sources 
refer to the material aspects of wellbeing, surveying families on a variety of areas of 
social and material expenditure – for example, housing, clothing, food, transportation 
and social entertainment. The focus is on an imposed lack or deprivation of materials, 
usually measured by tallying those items families lack and are not able to afford. 
Over time, living standards are said to improve when more families indicate they 
have the items and there is a drop in the proportion of families who indicate they 
cannot afford the items.  
 
Instating a tool to track changes in living standards is advisable, but is not without 
issue. Recent research on measures applied in the UK questions how consensual 
the “necessary” items really are across population sub-groups (McKay 2004). Family 
profiles on living standards would therefore need to account for variation in the value 
ascribed to items by different sectors of the population (eg split by age or ethnicity). 
In addition, the list of necessary items needs to be empirically updated because 
deprivation rates are expected to decline naturally as certain items, such as 
electronic equipment, become more publicly accessible due to price changes. For 
example, according to FACS data, the rate of personal computer ownership among 
single-parent families increased by 26% between 1999 and 2002.  
 
6.4.2  Summary indices of deprivation 
 
Lists of material deprivation items are unwieldy for analysis purposes, so a summary 
index is suitably derived. Methods for constructing an index vary and may include 
factor analytic techniques and empirical consensus for selection of items to an index. 
Additionally, each item in a scale may be weighted equally, or some may bear more 
importance than others. Whether or not more empirical approaches are used, it is 
vital that the validity of a scale be tested against the expenditure behaviour of the 
contemporary population.  
 
FACS includes the most comprehensive survey of non-monetary deprivation 
indicators in the UK. The derived Hardship Index accounts for over 80 separate 
questions about family housing conditions, financial behaviour (including problem 
debt) and material and social expenditure. For each of nine criteria, families score a 
point on a hardship scale ranging from zero to nine. Scores are then summarised into 
three categories: “not in hardship”, “in moderate hardship” and “in severe hardship”.
74 
The scale is designed as a conservative estimate of poor living standards, so that in 
2002 over 70% of surveyed families with children did not satisfy any of the hardship 
                                                  
74 For details on the construction of the FACS Hardship Index, refer to Vegeris and Perry (2003, 
appendix E).     
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criteria (ie they avoided hardship), one in five families scored 1–2 points on the scale 
(moderate hardship) and only 7% scored 3–9 points (severe hardship).  
 
6.4.3  The case for a longitudinal study 
 
The UK FACS was inaugurated in 1999, before the introduction of a revised in-work 
supplement for working low-income families with children (the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit). With repeated annual sweeps, it was designed to track the impact of national 
family policies in relation to work, benefits, childcare and early years’ education on 
family incomes, living standards, family change, childcare use, education, etc. A 
unique feature of FACS is that past participants are re-interviewed each year while a 
representative sample of new participants is annually introduced. This provides for 
both panel estimates of change and cross-sectional estimates of trends. FACS 
represents families with children from across the income spectrum, thus allowing for 
comparisons across different family circumstances (including contrasts between 
eligible and ineligible benefit recipients). Through the panel element, analyses of 
families in short- or longer-term poverty can be made. Therefore, a single survey tool 
provides longitudinal evidence on changes in living standards and the underlying 
family events and family trajectories that accompany such changes (both policy- and 
non-policy-related).  
 
One of the fundamental aims of WFF policy is dynamic, to assist and support people 
to move into work and improve their quality of life by doing so. Evaluation of WFF 
should thus have a dynamic element, not only to demonstrate such transitions but 
also to understand the likelihood that many such enterers will at some point return to 
payments (so-called cycling).  
 
The study of poverty has increasingly seen the importance of a longitudinal profile to 
distinguish persistent from short-term poverty and to look at the events that trigger 
entry to and exit from poverty. A good reason for this is the apparent “mismatch” 
between low income, deprivation and poverty in cross-sectional studies. Analyses by 
Berthoud et al. (2004) on FACS and the British Household Panel Survey help to 
illustrate this point. By following various cohorts of families in a panel study, it is 
possible to distinguish between, say, new entrants into poverty, who have resources 
similar to the “non-poor”, and recent exiters from poverty, who have little other 
resources and thus resemble the poor. By identifying these anomalies in the income 
distribution and by distinguishing the newly poor from the persistently poor, it 
becomes clearer why a more dynamic approach to monitoring the redistribution of 
income and material/social wellbeing is advisable. Bane and Ellwood (1986) in the 
US especially developed the “triggers” approach; that is, movements into and out of 
poverty often follow immediately after changes such as losing a job, having a child or 
becoming divorced or separated. This kind of analysis shows where (ie around which 
life events) policy can make most difference. Moving into or out of eligibility for 
various elements of WFF could also be considered a “trigger” for moves into and out 
of poverty. See section 3.2 for a discussion of triggers with respect to take-up. 
 
Relationship dynamics as well as income dynamics also come to the fore in 
longitudinal studies of poverty, with partnering, separation, re-partnering and the birth 
and ageing of children all playing important roles in poverty profiles. 
 
MSD wants to assess how far poverty and living standards change as a result of 
changes in social assistance, in-work benefits and housing allowances. A large-scale 
survey such as FACS would be a powerful empirical tool for MSD in evaluating WFF. 
However, on the negative side, such a device would be reasonably costly.  
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Child poverty from the children’s perspective 
 
Usually, all systematic sources of data on child poverty are representative of an adult 
rather than a child perspective. In the UK, Ridge’s (2002) groundbreaking research 
on young people and poverty has emphasised the unique perspective of children in 
non-working households, both distinct from the adult experience and distinct from 
that of children in working households. For the WFF evaluation, such data and 
analysis of child self-reported behaviour and aspirations would improve 
understanding of the dynamics of household deprivation. For policies that seek to 
reduce child poverty, children’s perspective would be invaluable to the findings of the 
WFF evaluation. Longitudinal analysis can track changes in household living 
standards reflected in positive changes from the children’s perspectives. It would be 
useful to complement this analysis with a qualitative investigation into the issue. Also, 
analysis of parent- and child-reported measures would help to substantiate in what 
dimensions of living there are intergenerational similarities and where there are 
differences.  
 
From 2004, FACS includes interviews with children over 10 years of age to glean 
their perspectives on what stability and changes they have experienced. It would be 
revealing to analyse this type of data in association with existing measures of 
deprivation reported by parents, including the FACS-type measures from separate 
components of hardship along with the composite index.  
 
Researching a child’s perspective 
 
Governments are slow to collect the child perspective in policy evaluation, partly 
because research with children poses additional methodological challenges to those 
of research conducted adult to adult. Ethically, children’s participation requires both 
the parent’s and the child’s consent. The experience from PRILIF is that dual consent 
is not difficult to obtain. During the interview, the level of detail reported by children 
might be compromised if the child feels intimidated by the researcher or the research 
process. To avoid this, in a structured survey approach, children could report their 
answers in private either on a self-administered Computer-Assisted Personal 
Interview (CAPI) or with paper and pencil, or an audio tape could be used to ask the 
questions and the children could fill in an answer form.  
 
In a less structured approach that requires interaction with a researcher, care should 
be taken in selecting interviewers with whom the child is more likely to feel 
comfortable, taking into account age, ethnicity, gender, etc. Because of the likelihood 
that parents and children can and do have different understandings of their family 
circumstances, there is the additional challenge of aligning children’s evidence with 
that of their parents.  
 
Data comparability should be borne in mind during the instrument design phase of 
the study, where question wording (and re-wording when adapting existing questions 
to more child-friendly language) should take into account compatibility with other data 
sources. Due to different understandings of the issues, further analysis should be 
undertaken in cases where the child data does not support general adult trends (and 




This paper has identified design aspects that MSD should take into consideration for 
the evaluation of Working for Families (WFF). Throughout, the paper draws on a 
selection of the evaluation literature. The references included are relevant to WFF, 
either because they evaluate a similar programme, or a sub-programme within WFF, 
or because they are informative about evaluation techniques useful for WFF.  
 
A number of features of WFF that affect the evaluation have been detailed. The WFF 
monitoring and evaluation framework should address the following issues: 
·  the scale of WFF may introduce general equilibrium effects  
·  the impact of parts of WFF might not be able to be estimated separately  
·  variation in flexible implementation and delivery may introduce area effects 
·  there will be no “once-and-for-all” impact, and impacts in the short-, medium- and 
long-term should be estimated.  
 
Realistic targets need to be set against which to measure the efficacy of the 
programme, which may vary across the short- to long-term. Non-experimental 
techniques must be relied upon to estimate the impacts of WFF. These evaluation 
methodologies were presented in section 4. They have some particular data 
requirements, which need to be assessed against the data available or collected for 
WFF. Ideally, these specific data needs can be built into the data development 
strategy. The national nature of the programme also imposes some limits on the 
impact estimation methods and on the choice of comparisons. The impact type one 
would like to measure will depend on the foreseen use of the evaluation findings. 
This will need to be carefully considered for any impact evaluation.  
 
The methodological and data requirements that must be addressed in meeting the 
four key evaluation objectives of implementation and delivery, take-up and 
entitlement, making work pay, and poverty and wellbeing were looked at in detail in 
sections 2 to 6. Evaluation for the WFF childcare initiatives has been examined in 
each of these sections. Each topic was introduced and the WFF context outlined. A 
summary of the issues perceived to arise was explored. The solutions or limitations 
imposed were put forward. Examples from the literature demonstrated the capacity to 
resolve the evaluation issues.  
 
An important question is whether WFF can be evaluated at all. This paper may give 
the impression that there are so many difficulties and complications that an 
evaluation is completely impossible. However, it should be emphasised that, in 
practice, some potential problems will not prove to be serious. In addition, good 
choice of designs and methods can deal with other issues to a reasonable degree.  
 
The task for MSD will be to devise a comprehensive evaluation design for WFF that 
includes components capable of capturing the effects of WFF. This might include 
impact studies, process and implementation studies and a more general monitoring 
programme. The precise components remain matters for judgement in the context of 
the WFF. Findings from each of these studies will provide an integrated body of 
evidence on the operation, effectiveness and consequences of WFF. The different 
evaluation parts, when taken together, will offer policymakers and administrators a 
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Figure 1b  Income package available to Rod and Barb in April 2004 
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Figure 1c  Income package available to Rod and Barb in April 2007 
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Figure 2b  Income package available to Rob and Aroha in April 2004 
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Figure 3b  Income package available to Pete and Sue in April 2004 
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Figure 3c  Income package available to Pete and Sue in April 2007 
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Figure 4b  Income package available to Mary in April 2004 
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